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Executive Summary
Climate vulnerable countries face considerable macrofinancial risks that threaten debt 
sustainability, worsen sovereign risk, and harm investment and development prospects. 
This paper reviews the macrofinancial implications and risks of climate change, in 
particular the impacts of climate vulnerability on sovereign risk and the cost of capital, 
with special consideration to challenges facing the V20, a group of 48 climate 
vulnerable countries that are home to 1.2 billion people. It also examines the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s responsiveness to these challenges to date and 
recommends ten initial areas for a joint V20-IMF Action Agenda.
The IMF can play an important role in supporting climate vulnerable countries in 
mitigating and managing macrofinancial risks stemming from the physical and 
transition impacts of climate change, leveraging opportunities from climate policies to 
boost growth, investment and resilience. While the IMF’s attention to climate issues has 
increased markedly, including through research produced by IMF staff, the Fund has 
been rather slow to address climate-related financial risks in its operational work, 
comprised of surveillance, technical assistance and training, and emergency lending 
and crisis support.
A non-representative survey among finance ministries and central banks of V20 
countries indicates the desire for more support from the IMF in addressing climate 
risks and vulnerabilities. The views expressed by V20 members suggest that the IMF 
should integrate climate risk analysis in its surveillance activities, including Article IV 
consultations as well as Financial Sector Assessment Program assessments and Debt 
Sustainability Framework analysis conducted with the World Bank; scale up technical 
support; and explore options for developing its toolkit for climate emergency financing. 
To address the needs of climate vulnerable economies and support them in building 
resilience through improved mitigation and management of climate-related 
macrofinancial risks and enhanced conditions for critical investments in adaptation 
and development, this paper suggests ten potential action areas for a joint V20-IMF 
Action Agenda:
i  Mainstreaming systematic and transparent assessments of climate-related 
financial risks in all IMF operations
In order to better anchor and inform its policy work, the IMF can start integrating 
climate-related financial risks assessments across all of its operations, building on 
the increasing availability and sophistication of science-based climate financial risk 
metrics and methods such as climate stress-testing and climate-financial pricing 
models.
ii    Consistent, systematic, and universal appraisal and treatment of physical climate 
risks and transition risks for all countries in Article IV consultations and Financial 
Sector Assessment Programs
      To facilitate better management and mitigation of macrofinancial risks and enhance 
the recognition of such risks in governments and the financial sector, the IMF can 
include a mandatory section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all 
member countries. The IMF could also introduce a mandatory section on 
climate-related financial risks to the Financial Sector Assessment Programs it 
conducts with the World Bank.
iii   Advancing disclosure of climate-related financial risks and promoting sustainable 
finance and investment practices
To support the development of financial markets that facilitate climate-friendly 
private sector investment, the IMF can use its unique role in international finance to 
promote the disclosure of climate-related financial risks and the development of 
sustainable finance and investment practices.
iv   Exploring synergies between fiscal and monetary policies
To support its membership, and particularly climate vulnerable countries, in building 
resilience while scaling up investments to achieve climate targets, the IMF could 
explore synergies between fiscal and monetary policies as well as macroprudential 
regulations to identify an optimal policy mix that would enhance finance for 
development oriented towards just transition outcomes while improving economic 
competitiveness and ensuring macrofinancial stability.
v  Mainstreaming of climate risk analysis in public financial management and 
supporting the development of a climate disaster risk financing and insurance 
architecture
To support countries in climate-proofing public finances and strengthening their 
public debt management, the IMF can encourage and provide advice to finance 
ministries on how to analyse the potential impacts of climate change on the 
medium- to long-term quality and sustainability of public finances and mainstream 
climate risk analysis in public financial management. The IMF can also support the 
development of an international climate disaster risk financing and insurance 
architecture that addresses different layers of risks. It can also promote a 
discussion around adding natural disaster clauses to sovereign debt contracts and 
the use of instruments such as GDP-linked bonds.
vi   Supporting climate vulnerable countries with debt sustainability problems
To address debt sustainability challenges, the IMF could explore options for the 
treatment of climate debt, i.e. public debt that has been incurred as a direct result of 
climate disasters or necessary adaptation measures. Moreover, the joint World 
Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries could be 
enhanced by a mandatory analysis of the impact of climate-related risks on debt 
sustainability. Such assessments could also be rolled out to climate vulnerable 
middle income countries.
vii  Developing the IMF toolkit for climate emergency financing 
To support vulnerable countries, the IMF could further develop the IMF’s existing 
emergency financing facilities through raising access under the RCF/RFI, or 
converting these facilities into grants, particularly for PRGT-eligible countries. The 
IMF could also consider the establishment of an entirely new climate emergency 
facility.
viii Exploring options to use Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to support climate     
vulnerable countries
To provide vulnerable countries with enhanced liquidity, the IMF could consider the 
possibility of allocating new SDRs or encourage advanced countries, whose historic 
carbon emissions are the main cause of anthropogenic climate change, to make 
their SDRs available to a new multilateral swap facility or donate their SDRs to a trust 
fund at the IMF. A further option would be to develop a mechanism where new SDRs 
are issued exclusively to climate vulnerable countries hit by climate disasters.
ix   Supporting the design and implementation of carbon pricing mechanisms
To support V20 countries in re-directing investment towards climate resilient and 
low-emissions development while stimulating technological innovation and 
generating new revenue streams for governments, the IMF could support V20 
countries in strengthening their fiscal framework and revenue outcomes through 
the design and implementation of appropriate carbon pricing mechanisms.
x    Institutionalising collaboration between the Fund and the V20
To enhance vulnerable developing country voices and representation, and to provide 
a platform to articulate their views and interests, the IMF should recognise the V20 
as an official stakeholder and hold regular consultations with the V20.
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Climate vulnerable countries are not only exposed to the physical effects of 
anthropogenic climate change. They also face transition risks stemming from the move 
away from fossil fuels to low-carbon sources of energy. Both transition and physical 
risks can generate considerable macrofinancial risks that can undermine debt 
sustainability and worsen sovereign risk. This has implications on the cost of capital of 
private and sovereign debt and the fiscal space governments have for crucial 
investments in climate adaptation and resilience and for sustainable development. 
The Vulnerable Twenty (V20) Group of Ministers of Finance, representing 48 developing 
countries, was founded in 2015 by the Climate Vulnerable Forum. Its goal is to translate 
the political agenda for climate into real economy progress while mobilising 
international support for scaling up financial resources for climate action in V20 states. 
In November 2020, the first V20 Ministerial Dialogue with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) will explore the components of a “Joint Action Agenda”. The IMF has 
increasingly recognised the macro-criticality of climate change and started to 
strengthen its analytical capacity in this area. The objective of this paper is to inform the 
formulation of the Joint Action Agenda by identifying actions through which the Fund 
could better address the needs of climate vulnerable economies and support them in 
building resilience through better mitigation and management of climate-related 
macrofinancial risks and improving conditions for critical investments in adaptation 
and development.
Figure 1: World map with V20 countries
This paper suggests ten potential action areas for a joint V20-IMF Action Agenda: (i) 
mainstreaming systematic and transparent assessments of climate-related financial 
risks in all IMF operations; (ii) consistent, systematic, and universal appraisal and 
treatment of physical climate risks and transition risks for all countries in Article IV 
consultations and Financial Sector Assessment Programs; (iii) advancing disclosure of 
climate-related financial risks and promoting sustainable finance and investment 
practices; (iv) exploring synergies between fiscal and monetary policies; (v) 
mainstreaming of climate risk analysis in public financial management and supporting 
the development of a climate disaster risk financing and insurance architecture; (vi) 
supporting climate vulnerable countries with debt sustainability problems; (vii) 
developing the IMF toolkit for climate emergency financing; (viii) exploring options to 
use Special Drawing Rights to support climate vulnerable countries; (ix) supporting the 
design and implementation of carbon pricing mechanisms; and (x) institutionalising 
collaboration between the Fund and the V20.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the macrofinancial implications 
and risks of climate change and highlights the implications of climate change for the 
cost of capital in climate vulnerable countries. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the 
macroeconomic conditions in and debt sustainability of V20 countries. Section 4 
examines the IMF’s current stance and the adequacy of policy frameworks relating to 
climate change. Section 5 presents insights from a survey of V20 finance ministries and 
central banks relating to the role of the IMF in addressing climate risks. Section 6 
discusses options for a V20-IMF Action Agenda. Section 7 concludes.
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1 This section draws on Volz et al. (2020).
2 All economic activity, and hence a country’s economic and fiscal sustainability, is ultimately dependent on natural assets and 
eco-services. Climate change is expected to have dramatic and adverse effects on natural capital, even with the achievement of the 
mitigation goals of the Paris Agreement. Climate change will exacerbate the existing degradation of the natural environment and 
further diminish natural capital. For a detailed discussion, see Volz et al. (2020).
2. The macrofinancial implications and risks of climate change
2.1 Impacts of climate change on sovereign risk1
Climate change can affect an economy and public finances – and thus debt 
sustainability – in multiple ways. Volz et al. (2020) identify seven different transmission 
channels through which climate change can distress public finances and amplify 
sovereign risk (Figure 2). Besides the impacts of climate change on natural capital and 
natural services, which will not be discussed here,2 these transmission channels are: (i) 
fiscal impacts of climate-related disasters; (ii) fiscal effects of adaptation and 
mitigation policies, (iii) macroeconomic impacts of climate change, (iv) climate-related 
risks and financial sector stability, (v) impacts of climate change on international trade 
and capital flows, and (vi) impacts of climate change on political stability.
Figure 2: Transmission channels of risk
Source: Volz et al. (2020).
(i) Fiscal impacts of climate-related disasters
Climate-related disasters such as cyclones, floods, wildfire, storms and drought can 
have significant direct impacts on public finances. Government finances and a 
country’s debt sustainability are exposed to different fiscal risks related to natural 
disasters or climate change-related shocks. The IMF classifies fiscal risk into two 
categories: macroeconomic risks and specific fiscal risks, which may “arise from the 
realization of contingent liabilities or other uncertain events, such as a natural disaster, 
the bailout of a troubled public corporation or subnational government by the central 
government, or the collapse of a bank” (IMF 2018: 95). Explicit contingent liabilities 
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include public guarantees and other legal or contractual liabilities. Implicit contingent 
liabilities are not established by law or contract but may arise because of public 
expectations or a necessity for the government to intervene, for example in the context 
of public bailouts or spending on natural disaster relief, recovery and reconstruction, 
including increased social transfer payments (IMF 2011, 2018, Hochrainer-Stigler et al. 
2018, Schuler et al. 2019). Disaster crisis response measures can have significant 
impact on public spending. Bova et al. (2019)’s analysis of contingent liability 
realisations in a sample of 80 advanced and emerging economies for the period 
1990-2014 shows that natural disasters (including geophysical events) are one of the 
most important sources of contingent liabilities, the realisation of which can be a 
substantial source of fiscal distress. Moreover, a disruption of economic activity by 
climate-related disasters may cause supply or demand shocks and adversely affect tax 
income and other public revenues, or cause changes to commodity prices that could 
affect revenue or increase public spending via fossil fuel or food subsidies. Table 1 
provides an illustration of the disruption caused by a single climate disaster, Typhoon 
Haiyan, which hit the Philippines in 2013.
Table 1: Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) in the Philippines: Losses and government 
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According to DTI, there were about 50,000 MSMEs that were 
affected by the Super Typhoon. Around 90% of the disaster 
impact was borne by the private sector, especially the private 
households and the SMEs.  
The Philippines has various disaster risk financing windows: 
(1) the National DRRM Fund (NDRRMF) or the Calamity Fund 
in the General Appropriations Act (GAA); (2) the Local DRRM 
Fund (LDRRMF); (3) the Government Service Insurance 
System (GSIS); and (4) the People’s Survival Fund (PSF).
The Philippines’ central bank implemented some policy 
decisions to facilitate credit flow in the wake of Typhoon 
Yolanda such as:
Extension of the depreciation period for     writing off bad 
loans to ease banks’ cash position and improved credit 
flow.  
Allowed extension of the existing loans without 
classifying them as restructured loans and extending the 
period over the usual 30 days, both of which have 




(ii) Fiscal effects of adaptation and mitigation policies
Adaptation and mitigation policies are indispensable for responding to the challenges 
posed by climate change. Moreover, economies need to invest in adaptation and 
resilience to address vulnerabilities from extreme weather events and slow onset 
events, which are expected to increase in number and intensity with impacts happening 
sooner than forecasted due to global warming. The Global Commission on the 
Economy and Climate (2016) estimates that globally until 2030 around USD 90 trillion 
will have to be spent on infrastructure, including energy, all of which needs to be 
sustainable and climate resilient. While parts of these investments have to be financed 
by the private sector, governments will have to play an important role in setting the right 
incentives through policies such as carbon prices/taxes, border adjustments and 
prudential frameworks for financial institutions, as well as market structures and 
system design to include variable renewable energy and pricing of grid and non-grid 
Sources: Compiled based on information from Athaves (2018), NDRRMC (2013), PSA (2014), and The 
Manila Times (2014).
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services. Moreover, a considerable share of adaptation and mitigation measures will 
have to be directly financed by the public sector.
Public adaptation to climate change affects public budgets directly on the expenditure 
side (e.g. Bachner et al. 2019). Adaptation costs comprise all expenses associated with 
policies and measures aimed at easing environmental, social, and economic impacts of 
climate change, both preventive and remedial (Forni et al. 2019). The 2016 Adaptation 
Finance Gap Report estimates the costs of adaptation at between USD 140 billion and 
USD 300 billion per year by 2030, and between USD 280 billion and USD 500 billion per 
year by 2050, with potentially higher costs for worse emission pathways (Puig et al 
2016). However, Neufeldt et al. (2018) point to the existence of major information gaps 
and emphasise that particularly the omission of adaptation cost estimates for 
biodiversity and ecosystem services is likely to further increase the overall cost of 
adaptation. Despite the dividends generated by adaptation investment (Hallegatte et al. 
2019, Tanner et al. 2015), including reduced future losses and positive economic 
benefits through reduced risks, adaptation finance in 2016 amounted to only USD 22 
billion (Oliver et al. 2018). 
Mitigation costs comprise all expenses associated with policies and efforts aimed at 
reducing or preventing greenhouse gas emissions to limit global warming (Forni et al. 
2019). Climate change mitigation will require substantial investment in low-carbon 
sources of energy. The IPCC (2018) estimates that USD 1.6-3.8 trillion are annually 
needed for investment in energy systems alone to limit global warming to 1.5°C. While 
recent years have seen a rapid fall in the cost of low-carbon energy generation and 
storage that provide an opportunity to recalibrate towards cost-effective technology,3 
there is a risk that the necessary investments overstretch public finances and that 
opaque and complex financing practices lead to higher debt burdens than expected.
(iii) Macroeconomic impacts of climate change
The physical and transition impacts of climate change can cause aggregate supply and 
demand shocks. Supply shocks affect an economy’s production or productive capacity 
and, accordingly, actual or potential output. Climate change may impact aggregate 
supply in various ways (e.g. Cœure 2018, Batten et al. 2020). Extreme weather events 
can interrupt production and service delivery, damage the capital stock and 
infrastructure, or diminish output in the agriculture, forestry, and fishing industry. They 
can also disrupt transport routes and value chains and cause input shortages. Natural 
disasters may divert resources from innovation to reconstruction and replacement or 
cause shocks to local labour markets.
Supply shocks can also be caused by gradual global warming. Climate change is 
predicted to have significant impact on land use through sea level rise, desertification, 
land degradation, among others (IPCC 2019a), as well as on marine ecosystems (IPCC 
2019b). All these can affect productive assets and capacity in agriculture, forestry, 
fishing and other industries directly relying on ecosystems. Further, the need for 
investment in adaptation may divert resources away from productive investment or 
spending on new technologies, although adaptation investment could also spur 
innovation. Climate change could also have substantial effects on the number of hours 
worked due to extreme heat and on labour productivity (e.g. Burke et al. 2015, Day et al. 
2019).4 For climate vulnerable countries, the economic cost of reduced productivity due 
to heat stress may be more than USD 2 trillion by 2030 (UNDP 2016). Furthermore, 
alterations in the physical environment could make living conditions in some regions 
unbearable and cause large-scale migration, which would affect labour supply. 
Supply-side shocks can also be caused by transition impacts (McKibbin et al. 2017). 
The structural change of an economy away from high-carbon and towards low-carbon 
sectors can cause a stranding of assets and technology and render parts of the 
workforce unemployed if the sectors they were previously employed in cease and skills 
are not transferrable (Bos and Gupta 2019, Semieniuk et al. 2020). Moreover, climate 
policies may constrain the use of land or ecosystem services with impacts on an 
economy’s output potential. Falling costs of renewable energy and storage interacting 
with climate policies could also lead to substantive changes in energy supply.
Climate change impacts can also cause demand-side shocks (Batten et al. 2020). 
Extreme weather events can reduce household income and wealth and therefore 
private consumption or affect international demand for goods and services. 
Furthermore, damages to corporate balance sheets can lead to a reduction of 
investment. However, after the initial stage of loss, natural disasters are typically 
followed by a period of recovery, in which the rebuilding of infrastructure and production 
sites and the replacement of stocks gives a temporary boost in investment and 
consumption (IMF 2016). A negative demand shock is more likely when a large share of 
losses is uninsured (Batten et al. 2016). Furthermore, slow-onset changes to global 
warming can lead to structural economic changes, which may impact on aggregate 
demand through effects on household income (e.g. income from farming or fishery), 
wealth effects (e.g., through changes in property prices), effects on corporate balance 
sheets, or effects on public finances. Global warming may also impact on investment 
through effects on household and corporate balance sheets. 
(iv) Climate-related risks and financial sector stability
Extreme weather events and chronic physical risks such as worsening water stress or 
sea level rise can result in damage or loss of operating assets and reduce production 
output of borrowers. Such impacts can, in turn reduce borrowers’ operating margins 
and cash flows and the value of collateral assets, leading to credit downgrades, a higher 
probability of default and a reduction in the secondary market value of loans held on 
bank balance sheets. In more severe situations, borrowers will not be able to meet their 
debt service obligations, resulting in a higher incidence of non-performing loans (NPLs) 
and a higher loss given default due to the reduced value of collateral assets.
Climate risks related to policy, technology and market changes may also have a 
negative impact on borrowers’ credit profile by stranding production assets and/or 
reducing demand for their products and services (Box 1). These impacts can reduce the 
profitability and cash flows of businesses as well as the value of assets held as 
collateral by banks. These could result in credit downgrades, higher incidence of NPLs 
as well as higher losses given default.
It is now widely recognised that climate change poses a material risk to financial 
stability. Financial instability can worsen sovereign risk. Governments may be forced to 
bail out the financial sector, which could weaken the sovereign balance sheet and 
trigger a negative feedback loop, which further weakens the credit profile of banks due 
to their exposure to sovereign debt (Farhi and Tirole 2018). 
In several large V20 developing countries, public banks play a major role in the financial 
system. For example, in Ethiopia public banks account for about 60% of the country’s 
banking system, while the share of public banks is 45% in Vietnam and 30% on 
Bangladesh (IMF, 2020g). Contingent liabilities from publicly owned banks could 
become a major problem for public finances if these banks suffer losses due to the 
materialisation of climate risks.
Box 1: Stranded Asset Risk
Fossil fuel lock-in has left many developing countries with high subsidies and/or 
prices due to progressive non-performing fossil fuel asset risk. This stranded-asset 
risk can be triggered by a number of causes, including (1) fuel and/or technology 
becoming uneconomical or obsolete due to competition from cheaper alternatives, 
(2) grid design problems that result in dispatch problems for poorly located power 
plants, (3) excess capacity due to inaccurate demand forecasts or a surplus of reserve 
power, (4) higher than anticipated construction costs, (5) operational inefficiency of 
the power plant often due to substandard maintenance, and (6) long-term 
contracted-fuel supply exceeding demand. 
While the energy transition is assumed to trigger higher costs, it is important to realise 
that non-performing fossil fuel stranded assets today are already being paid for by end 
users, taxpayers, investors, creditors, or some combination of all four. The solution to 
this starts with solid policies to encourage energy transition that can change the 
generation mix and permit the deflationary nature of renewable energy and storage 
technologies to insulate the system from future non-performance and stranding. So, 
when badly designed power market policies increase the plant life of underperforming 
fossil fuel assets with guaranteed contracts, it will translate to further costs in the 
form of higher electricity prices paid for by end users, write-offs by investors, 
non-performing loans for creditors, and/or subsidies/bailouts from government, 
which is ultimately paid for by taxpayers. 
Due to the way that the project economics of fossil fuel IPPs deteriorate in the face of 
new cost-competitive technologies, the more that countries delay modernisation of 
their power sector, the greater the cost of displacement. This means an increase in the 
likelihood of fossil fuel asset stranding rises, resulting in higher non-performing loans, 
write-offs, and subsidies/bailouts. While the transition makes economic and financial 
sense, the key is to buy down the cost and the speed of this transition.
Source: Ahmed (2020).
(ii) Fiscal effects of adaptation and mitigation policies
Adaptation and mitigation policies are indispensable for responding to the challenges 
posed by climate change. Moreover, economies need to invest in adaptation and 
resilience to address vulnerabilities from extreme weather events and slow onset 
events, which are expected to increase in number and intensity with impacts happening 
sooner than forecasted due to global warming. The Global Commission on the 
Economy and Climate (2016) estimates that globally until 2030 around USD 90 trillion 
will have to be spent on infrastructure, including energy, all of which needs to be 
sustainable and climate resilient. While parts of these investments have to be financed 
by the private sector, governments will have to play an important role in setting the right 
incentives through policies such as carbon prices/taxes, border adjustments and 
prudential frameworks for financial institutions, as well as market structures and 
system design to include variable renewable energy and pricing of grid and non-grid 
___________________________________________
3  According to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), the price of solar has fallen 82% since 2010 and 13% between 
2018 and 2019, while the price of concentrated solar power has fallen by 47%, onshore wind by 39% and offshore wind by 29%. Both 
onshore and offshore wind prices have fallen by 9% between 2018 and 2019. The deflationary trend in renewable energy means 
that replacing the costliest 500 gigawatts of coal capacity with solar and wind would cut annual system costs by up to USD 23 
billion per year and yield a stimulus worth USD 940 billion, or around 1% of global GDP (IRENA 2020).
services. Moreover, a considerable share of adaptation and mitigation measures will 
have to be directly financed by the public sector.
Public adaptation to climate change affects public budgets directly on the expenditure 
side (e.g. Bachner et al. 2019). Adaptation costs comprise all expenses associated with 
policies and measures aimed at easing environmental, social, and economic impacts of 
climate change, both preventive and remedial (Forni et al. 2019). The 2016 Adaptation 
Finance Gap Report estimates the costs of adaptation at between USD 140 billion and 
USD 300 billion per year by 2030, and between USD 280 billion and USD 500 billion per 
year by 2050, with potentially higher costs for worse emission pathways (Puig et al 
2016). However, Neufeldt et al. (2018) point to the existence of major information gaps 
and emphasise that particularly the omission of adaptation cost estimates for 
biodiversity and ecosystem services is likely to further increase the overall cost of 
adaptation. Despite the dividends generated by adaptation investment (Hallegatte et al. 
2019, Tanner et al. 2015), including reduced future losses and positive economic 
benefits through reduced risks, adaptation finance in 2016 amounted to only USD 22 
billion (Oliver et al. 2018). 
Mitigation costs comprise all expenses associated with policies and efforts aimed at 
reducing or preventing greenhouse gas emissions to limit global warming (Forni et al. 
2019). Climate change mitigation will require substantial investment in low-carbon 
sources of energy. The IPCC (2018) estimates that USD 1.6-3.8 trillion are annually 
needed for investment in energy systems alone to limit global warming to 1.5°C. While 
recent years have seen a rapid fall in the cost of low-carbon energy generation and 
storage that provide an opportunity to recalibrate towards cost-effective technology,3 
there is a risk that the necessary investments overstretch public finances and that 
opaque and complex financing practices lead to higher debt burdens than expected.
(iii) Macroeconomic impacts of climate change
The physical and transition impacts of climate change can cause aggregate supply and 
demand shocks. Supply shocks affect an economy’s production or productive capacity 
and, accordingly, actual or potential output. Climate change may impact aggregate 
supply in various ways (e.g. Cœure 2018, Batten et al. 2020). Extreme weather events 
can interrupt production and service delivery, damage the capital stock and 
infrastructure, or diminish output in the agriculture, forestry, and fishing industry. They 
can also disrupt transport routes and value chains and cause input shortages. Natural 
disasters may divert resources from innovation to reconstruction and replacement or 
cause shocks to local labour markets.
Supply shocks can also be caused by gradual global warming. Climate change is 
predicted to have significant impact on land use through sea level rise, desertification, 
land degradation, among others (IPCC 2019a), as well as on marine ecosystems (IPCC 
2019b). All these can affect productive assets and capacity in agriculture, forestry, 
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fishing and other industries directly relying on ecosystems. Further, the need for 
investment in adaptation may divert resources away from productive investment or 
spending on new technologies, although adaptation investment could also spur 
innovation. Climate change could also have substantial effects on the number of hours 
worked due to extreme heat and on labour productivity (e.g. Burke et al. 2015, Day et al. 
2019).4 For climate vulnerable countries, the economic cost of reduced productivity due 
to heat stress may be more than USD 2 trillion by 2030 (UNDP 2016). Furthermore, 
alterations in the physical environment could make living conditions in some regions 
unbearable and cause large-scale migration, which would affect labour supply. 
Supply-side shocks can also be caused by transition impacts (McKibbin et al. 2017). 
The structural change of an economy away from high-carbon and towards low-carbon 
sectors can cause a stranding of assets and technology and render parts of the 
workforce unemployed if the sectors they were previously employed in cease and skills 
are not transferrable (Bos and Gupta 2019, Semieniuk et al. 2020). Moreover, climate 
policies may constrain the use of land or ecosystem services with impacts on an 
economy’s output potential. Falling costs of renewable energy and storage interacting 
with climate policies could also lead to substantive changes in energy supply.
Climate change impacts can also cause demand-side shocks (Batten et al. 2020). 
Extreme weather events can reduce household income and wealth and therefore 
private consumption or affect international demand for goods and services. 
Furthermore, damages to corporate balance sheets can lead to a reduction of 
investment. However, after the initial stage of loss, natural disasters are typically 
followed by a period of recovery, in which the rebuilding of infrastructure and production 
sites and the replacement of stocks gives a temporary boost in investment and 
consumption (IMF 2016). A negative demand shock is more likely when a large share of 
losses is uninsured (Batten et al. 2016). Furthermore, slow-onset changes to global 
warming can lead to structural economic changes, which may impact on aggregate 
demand through effects on household income (e.g. income from farming or fishery), 
wealth effects (e.g., through changes in property prices), effects on corporate balance 
sheets, or effects on public finances. Global warming may also impact on investment 
through effects on household and corporate balance sheets. 
(iv) Climate-related risks and financial sector stability
Extreme weather events and chronic physical risks such as worsening water stress or 
sea level rise can result in damage or loss of operating assets and reduce production 
output of borrowers. Such impacts can, in turn reduce borrowers’ operating margins 
and cash flows and the value of collateral assets, leading to credit downgrades, a higher 
probability of default and a reduction in the secondary market value of loans held on 
bank balance sheets. In more severe situations, borrowers will not be able to meet their 
debt service obligations, resulting in a higher incidence of non-performing loans (NPLs) 
and a higher loss given default due to the reduced value of collateral assets.
Climate risks related to policy, technology and market changes may also have a 
negative impact on borrowers’ credit profile by stranding production assets and/or 
reducing demand for their products and services (Box 1). These impacts can reduce the 
profitability and cash flows of businesses as well as the value of assets held as 
collateral by banks. These could result in credit downgrades, higher incidence of NPLs 
as well as higher losses given default.
It is now widely recognised that climate change poses a material risk to financial 
stability. Financial instability can worsen sovereign risk. Governments may be forced to 
bail out the financial sector, which could weaken the sovereign balance sheet and 
trigger a negative feedback loop, which further weakens the credit profile of banks due 
to their exposure to sovereign debt (Farhi and Tirole 2018). 
In several large V20 developing countries, public banks play a major role in the financial 
system. For example, in Ethiopia public banks account for about 60% of the country’s 
banking system, while the share of public banks is 45% in Vietnam and 30% on 
Bangladesh (IMF, 2020g). Contingent liabilities from publicly owned banks could 
become a major problem for public finances if these banks suffer losses due to the 
materialisation of climate risks.
Box 1: Stranded Asset Risk
Fossil fuel lock-in has left many developing countries with high subsidies and/or 
prices due to progressive non-performing fossil fuel asset risk. This stranded-asset 
risk can be triggered by a number of causes, including (1) fuel and/or technology 
becoming uneconomical or obsolete due to competition from cheaper alternatives, 
(2) grid design problems that result in dispatch problems for poorly located power 
plants, (3) excess capacity due to inaccurate demand forecasts or a surplus of reserve 
power, (4) higher than anticipated construction costs, (5) operational inefficiency of 
the power plant often due to substandard maintenance, and (6) long-term 
contracted-fuel supply exceeding demand. 
While the energy transition is assumed to trigger higher costs, it is important to realise 
that non-performing fossil fuel stranded assets today are already being paid for by end 
users, taxpayers, investors, creditors, or some combination of all four. The solution to 
this starts with solid policies to encourage energy transition that can change the 
generation mix and permit the deflationary nature of renewable energy and storage 
technologies to insulate the system from future non-performance and stranding. So, 
when badly designed power market policies increase the plant life of underperforming 
fossil fuel assets with guaranteed contracts, it will translate to further costs in the 
form of higher electricity prices paid for by end users, write-offs by investors, 
non-performing loans for creditors, and/or subsidies/bailouts from government, 
which is ultimately paid for by taxpayers. 
Due to the way that the project economics of fossil fuel IPPs deteriorate in the face of 
new cost-competitive technologies, the more that countries delay modernisation of 
their power sector, the greater the cost of displacement. This means an increase in the 
likelihood of fossil fuel asset stranding rises, resulting in higher non-performing loans, 
write-offs, and subsidies/bailouts. While the transition makes economic and financial 
sense, the key is to buy down the cost and the speed of this transition.
Source: Ahmed (2020).
(ii) Fiscal effects of adaptation and mitigation policies
Adaptation and mitigation policies are indispensable for responding to the challenges 
posed by climate change. Moreover, economies need to invest in adaptation and 
resilience to address vulnerabilities from extreme weather events and slow onset 
events, which are expected to increase in number and intensity with impacts happening 
sooner than forecasted due to global warming. The Global Commission on the 
Economy and Climate (2016) estimates that globally until 2030 around USD 90 trillion 
will have to be spent on infrastructure, including energy, all of which needs to be 
sustainable and climate resilient. While parts of these investments have to be financed 
by the private sector, governments will have to play an important role in setting the right 
incentives through policies such as carbon prices/taxes, border adjustments and 
prudential frameworks for financial institutions, as well as market structures and 
system design to include variable renewable energy and pricing of grid and non-grid 
services. Moreover, a considerable share of adaptation and mitigation measures will 
have to be directly financed by the public sector.
Public adaptation to climate change affects public budgets directly on the expenditure 
side (e.g. Bachner et al. 2019). Adaptation costs comprise all expenses associated with 
policies and measures aimed at easing environmental, social, and economic impacts of 
climate change, both preventive and remedial (Forni et al. 2019). The 2016 Adaptation 
Finance Gap Report estimates the costs of adaptation at between USD 140 billion and 
USD 300 billion per year by 2030, and between USD 280 billion and USD 500 billion per 
year by 2050, with potentially higher costs for worse emission pathways (Puig et al 
2016). However, Neufeldt et al. (2018) point to the existence of major information gaps 
and emphasise that particularly the omission of adaptation cost estimates for 
biodiversity and ecosystem services is likely to further increase the overall cost of 
adaptation. Despite the dividends generated by adaptation investment (Hallegatte et al. 
2019, Tanner et al. 2015), including reduced future losses and positive economic 
benefits through reduced risks, adaptation finance in 2016 amounted to only USD 22 
billion (Oliver et al. 2018). 
Mitigation costs comprise all expenses associated with policies and efforts aimed at 
reducing or preventing greenhouse gas emissions to limit global warming (Forni et al. 
2019). Climate change mitigation will require substantial investment in low-carbon 
sources of energy. The IPCC (2018) estimates that USD 1.6-3.8 trillion are annually 
needed for investment in energy systems alone to limit global warming to 1.5°C. While 
recent years have seen a rapid fall in the cost of low-carbon energy generation and 
storage that provide an opportunity to recalibrate towards cost-effective technology,3 
there is a risk that the necessary investments overstretch public finances and that 
opaque and complex financing practices lead to higher debt burdens than expected.
(iii) Macroeconomic impacts of climate change
The physical and transition impacts of climate change can cause aggregate supply and 
demand shocks. Supply shocks affect an economy’s production or productive capacity 
and, accordingly, actual or potential output. Climate change may impact aggregate 
supply in various ways (e.g. Cœure 2018, Batten et al. 2020). Extreme weather events 
can interrupt production and service delivery, damage the capital stock and 
infrastructure, or diminish output in the agriculture, forestry, and fishing industry. They 
can also disrupt transport routes and value chains and cause input shortages. Natural 
disasters may divert resources from innovation to reconstruction and replacement or 
cause shocks to local labour markets.
Supply shocks can also be caused by gradual global warming. Climate change is 
predicted to have significant impact on land use through sea level rise, desertification, 
land degradation, among others (IPCC 2019a), as well as on marine ecosystems (IPCC 
2019b). All these can affect productive assets and capacity in agriculture, forestry, 
fishing and other industries directly relying on ecosystems. Further, the need for 
investment in adaptation may divert resources away from productive investment or 
spending on new technologies, although adaptation investment could also spur 
innovation. Climate change could also have substantial effects on the number of hours 
worked due to extreme heat and on labour productivity (e.g. Burke et al. 2015, Day et al. 
2019).4 For climate vulnerable countries, the economic cost of reduced productivity due 
to heat stress may be more than USD 2 trillion by 2030 (UNDP 2016). Furthermore, 
alterations in the physical environment could make living conditions in some regions 
unbearable and cause large-scale migration, which would affect labour supply. 
Supply-side shocks can also be caused by transition impacts (McKibbin et al. 2017). 
The structural change of an economy away from high-carbon and towards low-carbon 
sectors can cause a stranding of assets and technology and render parts of the 
workforce unemployed if the sectors they were previously employed in cease and skills 
are not transferrable (Bos and Gupta 2019, Semieniuk et al. 2020). Moreover, climate 
policies may constrain the use of land or ecosystem services with impacts on an 
economy’s output potential. Falling costs of renewable energy and storage interacting 
with climate policies could also lead to substantive changes in energy supply.
Climate change impacts can also cause demand-side shocks (Batten et al. 2020). 
Extreme weather events can reduce household income and wealth and therefore 
private consumption or affect international demand for goods and services. 
Furthermore, damages to corporate balance sheets can lead to a reduction of 
investment. However, after the initial stage of loss, natural disasters are typically 
followed by a period of recovery, in which the rebuilding of infrastructure and production 
sites and the replacement of stocks gives a temporary boost in investment and 
consumption (IMF 2016). A negative demand shock is more likely when a large share of 
losses is uninsured (Batten et al. 2016). Furthermore, slow-onset changes to global 
warming can lead to structural economic changes, which may impact on aggregate 
demand through effects on household income (e.g. income from farming or fishery), 
wealth effects (e.g., through changes in property prices), effects on corporate balance 
sheets, or effects on public finances. Global warming may also impact on investment 
through effects on household and corporate balance sheets. 
(iv) Climate-related risks and financial sector stability
Extreme weather events and chronic physical risks such as worsening water stress or 
sea level rise can result in damage or loss of operating assets and reduce production 
output of borrowers. Such impacts can, in turn reduce borrowers’ operating margins 
and cash flows and the value of collateral assets, leading to credit downgrades, a higher 
probability of default and a reduction in the secondary market value of loans held on 
bank balance sheets. In more severe situations, borrowers will not be able to meet their 
debt service obligations, resulting in a higher incidence of non-performing loans (NPLs) 
and a higher loss given default due to the reduced value of collateral assets.
___________________________________________
4  The International Labour Organization estimated that heat stress (i.e. temperatures above 35 degrees Centigrade) may cause 
productivity loss equivalent to 80 million full-time jobs by 2030 (ILO 2019).
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Climate risks related to policy, technology and market changes may also have a 
negative impact on borrowers’ credit profile by stranding production assets and/or 
reducing demand for their products and services (Box 1). These impacts can reduce the 
profitability and cash flows of businesses as well as the value of assets held as 
collateral by banks. These could result in credit downgrades, higher incidence of NPLs 
as well as higher losses given default.
It is now widely recognised that climate change poses a material risk to financial 
stability. Financial instability can worsen sovereign risk. Governments may be forced to 
bail out the financial sector, which could weaken the sovereign balance sheet and 
trigger a negative feedback loop, which further weakens the credit profile of banks due 
to their exposure to sovereign debt (Farhi and Tirole 2018). 
In several large V20 developing countries, public banks play a major role in the financial 
system. For example, in Ethiopia public banks account for about 60% of the country’s 
banking system, while the share of public banks is 45% in Vietnam and 30% on 
Bangladesh (IMF, 2020g). Contingent liabilities from publicly owned banks could 
become a major problem for public finances if these banks suffer losses due to the 
materialisation of climate risks.
Box 1: Stranded Asset Risk
Fossil fuel lock-in has left many developing countries with high subsidies and/or 
prices due to progressive non-performing fossil fuel asset risk. This stranded-asset 
risk can be triggered by a number of causes, including (1) fuel and/or technology 
becoming uneconomical or obsolete due to competition from cheaper alternatives, 
(2) grid design problems that result in dispatch problems for poorly located power 
plants, (3) excess capacity due to inaccurate demand forecasts or a surplus of reserve 
power, (4) higher than anticipated construction costs, (5) operational inefficiency of 
the power plant often due to substandard maintenance, and (6) long-term 
contracted-fuel supply exceeding demand. 
While the energy transition is assumed to trigger higher costs, it is important to realise 
that non-performing fossil fuel stranded assets today are already being paid for by end 
users, taxpayers, investors, creditors, or some combination of all four. The solution to 
this starts with solid policies to encourage energy transition that can change the 
generation mix and permit the deflationary nature of renewable energy and storage 
technologies to insulate the system from future non-performance and stranding. So, 
when badly designed power market policies increase the plant life of underperforming 
fossil fuel assets with guaranteed contracts, it will translate to further costs in the 
form of higher electricity prices paid for by end users, write-offs by investors, 
non-performing loans for creditors, and/or subsidies/bailouts from government, 
which is ultimately paid for by taxpayers. 
Due to the way that the project economics of fossil fuel IPPs deteriorate in the face of 
new cost-competitive technologies, the more that countries delay modernisation of 
their power sector, the greater the cost of displacement. This means an increase in the 
likelihood of fossil fuel asset stranding rises, resulting in higher non-performing loans, 
write-offs, and subsidies/bailouts. While the transition makes economic and financial 
sense, the key is to buy down the cost and the speed of this transition.
Source: Ahmed (2020).
(ii) Fiscal effects of adaptation and mitigation policies
Adaptation and mitigation policies are indispensable for responding to the challenges 
posed by climate change. Moreover, economies need to invest in adaptation and 
resilience to address vulnerabilities from extreme weather events and slow onset 
events, which are expected to increase in number and intensity with impacts happening 
sooner than forecasted due to global warming. The Global Commission on the 
Economy and Climate (2016) estimates that globally until 2030 around USD 90 trillion 
will have to be spent on infrastructure, including energy, all of which needs to be 
sustainable and climate resilient. While parts of these investments have to be financed 
by the private sector, governments will have to play an important role in setting the right 
incentives through policies such as carbon prices/taxes, border adjustments and 
prudential frameworks for financial institutions, as well as market structures and 
system design to include variable renewable energy and pricing of grid and non-grid 
services. Moreover, a considerable share of adaptation and mitigation measures will 
have to be directly financed by the public sector.
Public adaptation to climate change affects public budgets directly on the expenditure 
side (e.g. Bachner et al. 2019). Adaptation costs comprise all expenses associated with 
policies and measures aimed at easing environmental, social, and economic impacts of 
climate change, both preventive and remedial (Forni et al. 2019). The 2016 Adaptation 
Finance Gap Report estimates the costs of adaptation at between USD 140 billion and 
USD 300 billion per year by 2030, and between USD 280 billion and USD 500 billion per 
year by 2050, with potentially higher costs for worse emission pathways (Puig et al 
2016). However, Neufeldt et al. (2018) point to the existence of major information gaps 
and emphasise that particularly the omission of adaptation cost estimates for 
biodiversity and ecosystem services is likely to further increase the overall cost of 
adaptation. Despite the dividends generated by adaptation investment (Hallegatte et al. 
2019, Tanner et al. 2015), including reduced future losses and positive economic 
benefits through reduced risks, adaptation finance in 2016 amounted to only USD 22 
billion (Oliver et al. 2018). 
Mitigation costs comprise all expenses associated with policies and efforts aimed at 
reducing or preventing greenhouse gas emissions to limit global warming (Forni et al. 
2019). Climate change mitigation will require substantial investment in low-carbon 
sources of energy. The IPCC (2018) estimates that USD 1.6-3.8 trillion are annually 
needed for investment in energy systems alone to limit global warming to 1.5°C. While 
recent years have seen a rapid fall in the cost of low-carbon energy generation and 
storage that provide an opportunity to recalibrate towards cost-effective technology,3 
there is a risk that the necessary investments overstretch public finances and that 
opaque and complex financing practices lead to higher debt burdens than expected.
(iii) Macroeconomic impacts of climate change
The physical and transition impacts of climate change can cause aggregate supply and 
demand shocks. Supply shocks affect an economy’s production or productive capacity 
and, accordingly, actual or potential output. Climate change may impact aggregate 
supply in various ways (e.g. Cœure 2018, Batten et al. 2020). Extreme weather events 
can interrupt production and service delivery, damage the capital stock and 
infrastructure, or diminish output in the agriculture, forestry, and fishing industry. They 
can also disrupt transport routes and value chains and cause input shortages. Natural 
disasters may divert resources from innovation to reconstruction and replacement or 
cause shocks to local labour markets.
Supply shocks can also be caused by gradual global warming. Climate change is 
predicted to have significant impact on land use through sea level rise, desertification, 
land degradation, among others (IPCC 2019a), as well as on marine ecosystems (IPCC 
2019b). All these can affect productive assets and capacity in agriculture, forestry, 
fishing and other industries directly relying on ecosystems. Further, the need for 
investment in adaptation may divert resources away from productive investment or 
spending on new technologies, although adaptation investment could also spur 
innovation. Climate change could also have substantial effects on the number of hours 
worked due to extreme heat and on labour productivity (e.g. Burke et al. 2015, Day et al. 
2019).4 For climate vulnerable countries, the economic cost of reduced productivity due 
to heat stress may be more than USD 2 trillion by 2030 (UNDP 2016). Furthermore, 
alterations in the physical environment could make living conditions in some regions 
unbearable and cause large-scale migration, which would affect labour supply. 
Supply-side shocks can also be caused by transition impacts (McKibbin et al. 2017). 
The structural change of an economy away from high-carbon and towards low-carbon 
sectors can cause a stranding of assets and technology and render parts of the 
workforce unemployed if the sectors they were previously employed in cease and skills 
are not transferrable (Bos and Gupta 2019, Semieniuk et al. 2020). Moreover, climate 
policies may constrain the use of land or ecosystem services with impacts on an 
economy’s output potential. Falling costs of renewable energy and storage interacting 
with climate policies could also lead to substantive changes in energy supply.
Climate change impacts can also cause demand-side shocks (Batten et al. 2020). 
Extreme weather events can reduce household income and wealth and therefore 
private consumption or affect international demand for goods and services. 
Furthermore, damages to corporate balance sheets can lead to a reduction of 
investment. However, after the initial stage of loss, natural disasters are typically 
followed by a period of recovery, in which the rebuilding of infrastructure and production 
sites and the replacement of stocks gives a temporary boost in investment and 
consumption (IMF 2016). A negative demand shock is more likely when a large share of 
losses is uninsured (Batten et al. 2016). Furthermore, slow-onset changes to global 
warming can lead to structural economic changes, which may impact on aggregate 
demand through effects on household income (e.g. income from farming or fishery), 
wealth effects (e.g., through changes in property prices), effects on corporate balance 
sheets, or effects on public finances. Global warming may also impact on investment 
through effects on household and corporate balance sheets. 
(iv) Climate-related risks and financial sector stability
Extreme weather events and chronic physical risks such as worsening water stress or 
sea level rise can result in damage or loss of operating assets and reduce production 
output of borrowers. Such impacts can, in turn reduce borrowers’ operating margins 
and cash flows and the value of collateral assets, leading to credit downgrades, a higher 
probability of default and a reduction in the secondary market value of loans held on 
bank balance sheets. In more severe situations, borrowers will not be able to meet their 
debt service obligations, resulting in a higher incidence of non-performing loans (NPLs) 
and a higher loss given default due to the reduced value of collateral assets.
Climate risks related to policy, technology and market changes may also have a 
negative impact on borrowers’ credit profile by stranding production assets and/or 
reducing demand for their products and services (Box 1). These impacts can reduce the 
profitability and cash flows of businesses as well as the value of assets held as 
collateral by banks. These could result in credit downgrades, higher incidence of NPLs 
as well as higher losses given default.
It is now widely recognised that climate change poses a material risk to financial 
stability. Financial instability can worsen sovereign risk. Governments may be forced to 
bail out the financial sector, which could weaken the sovereign balance sheet and 
trigger a negative feedback loop, which further weakens the credit profile of banks due 
to their exposure to sovereign debt (Farhi and Tirole 2018). 
In several large V20 developing countries, public banks play a major role in the financial 
system. For example, in Ethiopia public banks account for about 60% of the country’s 
banking system, while the share of public banks is 45% in Vietnam and 30% on 
Bangladesh (IMF, 2020g). Contingent liabilities from publicly owned banks could 
become a major problem for public finances if these banks suffer losses due to the 
materialisation of climate risks.
Box 1: Stranded Asset Risk
Fossil fuel lock-in has left many developing countries with high subsidies and/or 
prices due to progressive non-performing fossil fuel asset risk. This stranded-asset 
risk can be triggered by a number of causes, including (1) fuel and/or technology 
becoming uneconomical or obsolete due to competition from cheaper alternatives, 
(2) grid design problems that result in dispatch problems for poorly located power 
plants, (3) excess capacity due to inaccurate demand forecasts or a surplus of reserve 
power, (4) higher than anticipated construction costs, (5) operational inefficiency of 
the power plant often due to substandard maintenance, and (6) long-term 
contracted-fuel supply exceeding demand. 
While the energy transition is assumed to trigger higher costs, it is important to realise 
that non-performing fossil fuel stranded assets today are already being paid for by end 
users, taxpayers, investors, creditors, or some combination of all four. The solution to 
this starts with solid policies to encourage energy transition that can change the 
generation mix and permit the deflationary nature of renewable energy and storage 
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technologies to insulate the system from future non-performance and stranding. So, 
when badly designed power market policies increase the plant life of underperforming 
fossil fuel assets with guaranteed contracts, it will translate to further costs in the 
form of higher electricity prices paid for by end users, write-offs by investors, 
non-performing loans for creditors, and/or subsidies/bailouts from government, 
which is ultimately paid for by taxpayers. 
Due to the way that the project economics of fossil fuel IPPs deteriorate in the face of 
new cost-competitive technologies, the more that countries delay modernisation of 
their power sector, the greater the cost of displacement. This means an increase in the 
likelihood of fossil fuel asset stranding rises, resulting in higher non-performing loans, 
write-offs, and subsidies/bailouts. While the transition makes economic and financial 
sense, the key is to buy down the cost and the speed of this transition.
Source: Ahmed (2020).
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(v) Impacts of climate change on international trade and capital flows
Climate change can have substantial impacts on an economy’s trade in goods and 
services and capital flows with the rest of the world, and therefore their balance of 
payment. Historically, balance of payments problems were often at the root of country 
risk and led to external debt crises (Bouchet et al. 2018). 
There are several ways through which climate change could affect the patterns and the 
volume of international trade flows, with potentially significant impacts on countries’ 
balance of payments positions and, ultimately, sovereign risk. Impacts can be grouped 
in three categories: disruptions to trade from climate-related extreme events and 
disasters; long-term effects of global warming on endowments and production; and 
transition impacts on international trade.
First, climate-related extreme weather events could cause physical damages and 
disruptions to production facilities and critical transport infrastructure, and make 
industrial supply, transport and distribution chains more vulnerable. Climate change 
could lead to permanent changes to trade-production networks and transport routes 
and change country’s access to and opportunities in international trade, with 
particularly detrimental effects for developing economies (WTO and UNEP 2009). 
Empirically, evidence suggests that natural disasters diminish exports, while the effects 
on imports are ambiguous (e.g. Gassebner et al. 2010).
Second, the physical effects of gradual global warming could affect domestic 
agricultural and manufacturing output in various ways through changes in 
endowments and production, with potential impacts on an economy’s export capacity 
and import needs. Climate change could also have significant impact on international 
tourism, which often relies on natural assets and pleasant and safe climatic 
environments, and which for many developing countries constitutes an important 
services export in the balance of payments.
Third, climate policies adopted by trading partners, technological change and changes 
to consumption patterns could have significant impact on imports or exports. If major 
economies adopted forceful measures to curb carbon emissions, including a 
decarbonisation of their energy and transport systems, this would have significant 
repercussions on global demand for fossil fuels and their prices (e.g. Huxham et al. 
2019). Countries that are currently dependent on fossil fuel imports may be able to 
substitute these with domestic renewable energy while fossil fuel exporters would 
stand to lose a source of revenue.
Gains and losses from physical and transition impacts of climate change on 
international trade volumes and patterns will be distributed unevenly across countries. 
Economies that are strongly dependent on carbon-intensive exports and little 
diversified export sectors are particularly at risk, as are climate vulnerable economies in 
geographies with relatively high average temperature. Commodity-dependent 
developing countries may be particularly at risk. UNCTAD Secretary-General Mukhisa 
Kituyi describes climate change as an “existential threat to commodity-dependent 
developing countries” (UN News 2019).5
___________________________________________
5 According to UNCTAD (2019), all of the ten most climate vulnerable countries in 2017 were commodity-dependent developing 
countries, while only three of the 40 most climate vulnerable countries were not reliant on commodity exports.
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(vi) Impacts of climate change on political stability
Economic and social effects of climate change may also accentuate social tensions 
within a society and fuel political instability (Islam and Winkel 2017). Moreover, climate 
shocks can trigger migration movements which could also lead to political tensions or 
even inter- or intrastate conflicts (Froese and Schilling 2019). Political instability can 
undermine the ability or willingness of a government to repay its debt. For instance, 
Clark (1997) emphasises the potential impact of political events on the probability of 
sovereign default. Countries that are politically unstable and more polarised often have 
higher default rates and are as a result charged a higher default risk premium in 
international credit markets (Cuadra and Sapriza 2008). 
2.2 Climate change and the cost of capital
The first study to systematically analyse the impact of climate change on the cost of 
sovereign capital is Kling et al. (2018), the results of which feed into Buhr et al. (2018). 
Using annual data for a sample of 46 countries – including 25 V20 countries – over the 
period 1996 to 2016, their results indicate that climate vulnerable countries have to pay 
a risk premium on their sovereign debt because of their climate vulnerability. In 
particular, they estimate that vulnerability to climate change has already raised the cost 
of debt by 117 basis points on average for the sample of 25 V20 countries, translating 
to more than USD 40 billion in interest payments on government debt alone for 40 
member countries of the V20. Incorporating higher sovereign borrowing rates into the 
cost of private external debt, the figure reaches USD 62 billion across both the public 
and private sectors.
In a related study, Kling et al. (2020) use firm-level data of 15,265 firms in 71 countries 
over the period 1999 to 2017 and find that climate vulnerability increases cost of debt 
directly and indirectly through its impact on restricting access to finance. Controlling for 
various firm-specific and macroeconomic factors, their results suggest that the direct 
effect of climate vulnerability on the average increase in cost of debt from 1991 to 2017 
has been 0.63%, while the indirect effect through climate vulnerability’s impact on 
financial leverage has contributed an additional 0.05% increase in the cost of financing.
Cevik and Tovar Jalles (2020) replicate the analysis by Kling et al. (2018), using the 
same measures for climate change vulnerability and resilience for 98 advanced and 
developing countries over the period 1995 to 2017. Like Kling et al., they find that the 
vulnerability and resilience to climate change have a significant impact on the cost 
government borrowing, after controlling for conventional determinants of sovereign 
risk. They also confirm that the magnitude and statistical significance of these effects 
are much greater in developing countries with weaker capacity to adapt to and mitigate 
the consequences of climate change.
Building on Kling et al. (2018), Beirne et al. (2020a) examine the relationship between 
the cost of sovereign borrowing and climate risk with quarterly data for 40 advanced 
and developing economies for the period 2002 to 2018, using more refined measures 
for climate vulnerability and resilience. Their results show that both vulnerability and 
resilience to climate risk are important factors driving the cost of sovereign borrowing 
at the global level, supporting the original findings of Kling et al. (2018). With 275 basis 
points, the premium on sovereign bond yields from rising climate risk vulnerability is 
highest for a sub-sample of the “high risk group”, which comprises 10 countries, 
compared to an increase of 113 basis points for other developing and emerging market 
economies. The effect of vulnerability on bond yields for advanced economies is not 
statistically significant.
Beirne et al. (2020b) empirically tests the link between climate risks and sovereign risk 
in Southeast Asia, one of the world’s most heavily affected regions in terms of climate 
change. They conduct analysis both country-specific and panel estimations with 
monthly data for the period 2002 to 2018 for six Southeast Asian countries. Both the 
country-specific and the panel results show that greater climate vulnerability appears to 
have a sizable positive effect on sovereign bond yields, while greater resilience to 
climate change has an offsetting effect, although on a smaller magnitude. The effects 
tend to be the largest for countries that are more climate vulnerable.
Table 2 shows the comparatively high cost of capital of selected V20 member 
countries. There is a risk that the already high cost of capital currently impeding 
development in the majority of climate vulnerable economies will rise further due to the 
worsening impacts of climate change on their economies over the next decades.
 
Table 2: The V20’s comparatively High Cost of Capital Economic Environment
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and World Bank (GDP deflator)6
The cost of capital has far-reaching implications for the viability of investments and 
development prospects of countries. The financing of adaptation infrastructure 
projects, such as climate-resilient roads or coastal defences, requires a high proportion 
of capital in their first phase. Likewise, renewable energy projects, which have 
comparatively low operating cost since energy fuel is derived from naturally available 
sources, require high upfront investments, which makes financing much more sensitive 
to the cost of capital. In contrast, for fossil fuel energy projects operational costs are 
more significant than the capital investment needed to commence project operations 
(Figure 3). Fossil fuel projects like gas and coal are therefore relatively insensitive to the 
cost of capital compared to renewable energy projects, such as hydro, wind, solar, 
geothermal. For example, the investment cost required upfront is 80% of total cost of 
electricity generation from wind energy while the upfront investment cost for gas is only 
15%.
Box 1: Stranded Asset Risk
Fossil fuel lock-in has left many developing countries with high subsidies and/or 
prices due to progressive non-performing fossil fuel asset risk. This stranded-asset 
risk can be triggered by a number of causes, including (1) fuel and/or technology 
becoming uneconomical or obsolete due to competition from cheaper alternatives, 
(2) grid design problems that result in dispatch problems for poorly located power 
plants, (3) excess capacity due to inaccurate demand forecasts or a surplus of reserve 
power, (4) higher than anticipated construction costs, (5) operational inefficiency of 
the power plant often due to substandard maintenance, and (6) long-term 
contracted-fuel supply exceeding demand. 
While the energy transition is assumed to trigger higher costs, it is important to realise 
that non-performing fossil fuel stranded assets today are already being paid for by end 
users, taxpayers, investors, creditors, or some combination of all four. The solution to 
this starts with solid policies to encourage energy transition that can change the 
generation mix and permit the deflationary nature of renewable energy and storage 
technologies to insulate the system from future non-performance and stranding. So, 
when badly designed power market policies increase the plant life of underperforming 
fossil fuel assets with guaranteed contracts, it will translate to further costs in the 
form of higher electricity prices paid for by end users, write-offs by investors, 
non-performing loans for creditors, and/or subsidies/bailouts from government, 
which is ultimately paid for by taxpayers. 
Due to the way that the project economics of fossil fuel IPPs deteriorate in the face of 
new cost-competitive technologies, the more that countries delay modernisation of 
their power sector, the greater the cost of displacement. This means an increase in the 
likelihood of fossil fuel asset stranding rises, resulting in higher non-performing loans, 
write-offs, and subsidies/bailouts. While the transition makes economic and financial 
sense, the key is to buy down the cost and the speed of this transition.
Source: Ahmed (2020).
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volume of international trade flows, with potentially significant impacts on countries’ 
balance of payments positions and, ultimately, sovereign risk. Impacts can be grouped 
in three categories: disruptions to trade from climate-related extreme events and 
disasters; long-term effects of global warming on endowments and production; and 
transition impacts on international trade.
First, climate-related extreme weather events could cause physical damages and 
disruptions to production facilities and critical transport infrastructure, and make 
industrial supply, transport and distribution chains more vulnerable. Climate change 
could lead to permanent changes to trade-production networks and transport routes 
and change country’s access to and opportunities in international trade, with 
particularly detrimental effects for developing economies (WTO and UNEP 2009). 
Empirically, evidence suggests that natural disasters diminish exports, while the effects 
on imports are ambiguous (e.g. Gassebner et al. 2010).
Second, the physical effects of gradual global warming could affect domestic 
agricultural and manufacturing output in various ways through changes in 
endowments and production, with potential impacts on an economy’s export capacity 
and import needs. Climate change could also have significant impact on international 
tourism, which often relies on natural assets and pleasant and safe climatic 
environments, and which for many developing countries constitutes an important 
services export in the balance of payments.
Third, climate policies adopted by trading partners, technological change and changes 
to consumption patterns could have significant impact on imports or exports. If major 
economies adopted forceful measures to curb carbon emissions, including a 
decarbonisation of their energy and transport systems, this would have significant 
repercussions on global demand for fossil fuels and their prices (e.g. Huxham et al. 
2019). Countries that are currently dependent on fossil fuel imports may be able to 
substitute these with domestic renewable energy while fossil fuel exporters would 
stand to lose a source of revenue.
Gains and losses from physical and transition impacts of climate change on 
international trade volumes and patterns will be distributed unevenly across countries. 
Economies that are strongly dependent on carbon-intensive exports and little 
diversified export sectors are particularly at risk, as are climate vulnerable economies in 
geographies with relatively high average temperature. Commodity-dependent 
developing countries may be particularly at risk. UNCTAD Secretary-General Mukhisa 
Kituyi describes climate change as an “existential threat to commodity-dependent 
developing countries” (UN News 2019).5
(vi) Impacts of climate change on political stability
Economic and social effects of climate change may also accentuate social tensions 
within a society and fuel political instability (Islam and Winkel 2017). Moreover, climate 
shocks can trigger migration movements which could also lead to political tensions or 
even inter- or intrastate conflicts (Froese and Schilling 2019). Political instability can 
undermine the ability or willingness of a government to repay its debt. For instance, 
Clark (1997) emphasises the potential impact of political events on the probability of 
sovereign default. Countries that are politically unstable and more polarised often have 
higher default rates and are as a result charged a higher default risk premium in 
international credit markets (Cuadra and Sapriza 2008). 
2.2 Climate change and the cost of capital
The first study to systematically analyse the impact of climate change on the cost of 
sovereign capital is Kling et al. (2018), the results of which feed into Buhr et al. (2018). 
Using annual data for a sample of 46 countries – including 25 V20 countries – over the 
period 1996 to 2016, their results indicate that climate vulnerable countries have to pay 
a risk premium on their sovereign debt because of their climate vulnerability. In 
particular, they estimate that vulnerability to climate change has already raised the cost 
of debt by 117 basis points on average for the sample of 25 V20 countries, translating 
to more than USD 40 billion in interest payments on government debt alone for 40 
member countries of the V20. Incorporating higher sovereign borrowing rates into the 
cost of private external debt, the figure reaches USD 62 billion across both the public 
and private sectors.
In a related study, Kling et al. (2020) use firm-level data of 15,265 firms in 71 countries 
over the period 1999 to 2017 and find that climate vulnerability increases cost of debt 
directly and indirectly through its impact on restricting access to finance. Controlling for 
various firm-specific and macroeconomic factors, their results suggest that the direct 
effect of climate vulnerability on the average increase in cost of debt from 1991 to 2017 
has been 0.63%, while the indirect effect through climate vulnerability’s impact on 
financial leverage has contributed an additional 0.05% increase in the cost of financing.
Cevik and Tovar Jalles (2020) replicate the analysis by Kling et al. (2018), using the 
same measures for climate change vulnerability and resilience for 98 advanced and 
developing countries over the period 1995 to 2017. Like Kling et al., they find that the 
vulnerability and resilience to climate change have a significant impact on the cost 
government borrowing, after controlling for conventional determinants of sovereign 
risk. They also confirm that the magnitude and statistical significance of these effects 
are much greater in developing countries with weaker capacity to adapt to and mitigate 
the consequences of climate change.
Building on Kling et al. (2018), Beirne et al. (2020a) examine the relationship between 
the cost of sovereign borrowing and climate risk with quarterly data for 40 advanced 
and developing economies for the period 2002 to 2018, using more refined measures 
for climate vulnerability and resilience. Their results show that both vulnerability and 
resilience to climate risk are important factors driving the cost of sovereign borrowing 
at the global level, supporting the original findings of Kling et al. (2018). With 275 basis 
points, the premium on sovereign bond yields from rising climate risk vulnerability is 
highest for a sub-sample of the “high risk group”, which comprises 10 countries, 
compared to an increase of 113 basis points for other developing and emerging market 
economies. The effect of vulnerability on bond yields for advanced economies is not 
statistically significant.
Beirne et al. (2020b) empirically tests the link between climate risks and sovereign risk 
in Southeast Asia, one of the world’s most heavily affected regions in terms of climate 
change. They conduct analysis both country-specific and panel estimations with 
monthly data for the period 2002 to 2018 for six Southeast Asian countries. Both the 
country-specific and the panel results show that greater climate vulnerability appears to 
have a sizable positive effect on sovereign bond yields, while greater resilience to 
climate change has an offsetting effect, although on a smaller magnitude. The effects 
tend to be the largest for countries that are more climate vulnerable.
Table 2 shows the comparatively high cost of capital of selected V20 member 
countries. There is a risk that the already high cost of capital currently impeding 
development in the majority of climate vulnerable economies will rise further due to the 
worsening impacts of climate change on their economies over the next decades.
 
Table 2: The V20’s comparatively High Cost of Capital Economic Environment
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and World Bank (GDP deflator)6
The cost of capital has far-reaching implications for the viability of investments and 
development prospects of countries. The financing of adaptation infrastructure 
projects, such as climate-resilient roads or coastal defences, requires a high proportion 
of capital in their first phase. Likewise, renewable energy projects, which have 
comparatively low operating cost since energy fuel is derived from naturally available 
sources, require high upfront investments, which makes financing much more sensitive 
to the cost of capital. In contrast, for fossil fuel energy projects operational costs are 
more significant than the capital investment needed to commence project operations 
(Figure 3). Fossil fuel projects like gas and coal are therefore relatively insensitive to the 
cost of capital compared to renewable energy projects, such as hydro, wind, solar, 
geothermal. For example, the investment cost required upfront is 80% of total cost of 
electricity generation from wind energy while the upfront investment cost for gas is only 
15%.
Average real interest rates, 2015-17 V20 real interest rate spikes, 2015-17
V20 9.2% Madagascar 48%
G20 5.7% The Gambia 23%
G7 1.83% Malawi 22% 
___________________________________________
6 Average real interest rates represent the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator. Available data 
only used for averages with some country gaps in the data set.
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Figure 3: Climate projects’ relative capital intensity: power generation comparison of 
wind and gas energy projects
Source: Waissbein et al. (2013).
For adaptation infrastructure projects, a relative cost increment applies to already large 
up-front business-as-usual capital investments (such as in buildings, roads, bridges, 
coastal defences) that require an additional outlay to ensure those investments 
withstand current and future climate impacts, such as sea-level rise or changes in 
extreme weather. Amortisation of up-front capital investments is extremely sensitive to 
the cost of capital. According to UNDP, the total of capital expenditure plus cost of 
finance would be reduced by 50% for an effective interest rate of 6% versus 12% 
(Glemarec. 2011, Figure 4). 
This means that when considering the effect of interest rates on the profitability of a 
climate-resilient or renewable energy infrastructure project, the most significant 
determining factor is not the cost of the technology or of achieving resilience, but the 























Paying off principal with monthly
payments over 25 years, nominal dollars
Figure 4: Effect of the Interest Rate on Profitability of the Green Investment
Source: Glemarec (2011).
Figure 5 illustrates how a high cost of capital financing environment can decrease the 
viability of a climate infrastructure project versus a conventional alternative. 
Figure 5: Impact of Financing Costs in Renewable Energy and Fossil Generation
Source: UNDP (2017).
22
























Low Financing Cost Environment
Capital Structure: 30% Equity, 70% Debt
Cost of Equity = 7%
Cost of Debt = 3%
+49%
+5%
High Financing Cost Environment
Capital Structure: 30% Equity, 70% Debt
Cost of Equity = 16%
Cost of Debt = 8%




































Grenada: Public Debt to GDP Ratio
Climate Change Policies (All debt-
financed)
Climate Change Policies (with
concessional financing)
(Percent)
Figure 6 illustrates the case of Grenada, which needs to make large-scale infrastructure 
investments to reduce its vulnerability to climate change. Given the cost of capital and 
the upfront cost, Grenada will require USD 15 million in grants financing annually until 
2030 in order to stay within a debt to GDP ratio of 60%. If Grenada is unable to reduce 
the cost of capital or access grants, public debt is projected to rise to 70% by 2030 (IMF, 
2019e). 
Figure 6: Public Debt to GDP Ratio in Grenada
Source: IMF (2019e).
3. Brief overview of macroeconomic conditions, debt sustainability and 
climate vulnerability of V20 countries
Table 3 provides an overview of selected macroeconomic and climate vulnerability 
indicators for V20 countries. According to the World Bank’s country classification, the 
V20 membership comprises low-income economies, lower- and upper-middle income 
economies, as well as two high-income economies (cf. Column 3). 
More than half of the V20 countries face debt sustainability challenges, as indicated in 
columns 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Currently, 12 V20 countries are considered by the IMF to be at 
high risk of defaulting on their public debt, while three V20 countries are already in debt 
distress. Another 12 V20 countries face moderate risk of debt default. Debt 
sustainability can be expected to worsen as the effects of the COVID-19 crisis affects 
economic output and public finances. Over the last decade, the creditor base of V20 
countries has shifted toward commercial lenders and non-Paris club members. This 
has not only reduced the transparency of public debt; it is also complicating the 
negotiation of debt relief in case countries face solvency problems.
As discussed, debt sustainability is further threatened because of climate vulnerability. 
Table 3 shows indicators for Vulnerability and Readiness from the Notre Dame Global 
Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) (Chen et al. 2015). The NG-GAIN Vulnerability indicator 
measures a country’s exposure, sensitivity and ability to adapt to the negative impact of 
climate change. ND-GAIN measures the overall vulnerability by considering vulnerability 
in six life-supporting sectors – food, water, health, ecosystem service, human habitat 
and infrastructure. The ND-GAIN Readiness indicator measures a country’s overall 
readiness by considering three components – economic readiness, governance 
readiness and social readiness. Both indicators are in the 0-1 range. For Vulnerability, 
lower scores are better, while for Readiness, higher scores are better. There is some 
variation in terms of Vulnerability and Readiness scores among the V20 group, but 
overall, all V20 members are exposed to considerable vulnerability to climate change, 
whereas the capacities to respond are limited. Figures 7 and 8 illustrate that that there 
is a high concentration of public and private debt risk with countries being more 
vulnerable to the effects of climate change.
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Source: Compiled with data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators; Jubilee Debt Campaign (JDC)’s Debt 
Data Portal (https://data.jubileedebt.org.uk); and Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) (Chen et al. 2015).
Note: N/A stands for not available. Palestine is not included in this table because of lack of data. 
*GDP/capita data for Bhutan, Marshall Islands, Palau, and Yemen is for 2018; **GDP/capita data for 
South Sudan is for 2015. The JDC risk classification is based on metrics of public and private debt.
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Figure 7: JDC Risk vs ND-GAIN Vulnerability
Note: N/A stands for not available. Palestine is not included in this table because of lack of data. 
*GDP/capita data for Bhutan, Marshall Islands, Palau, and Yemen is for 2018; **GDP/capita data for 











































Note: JDC risk data, as shown in Table 3, was translated as follows: 0 (no risk identified), 1 (risk of private 
debt crisis or risk of public debt crisis), 2 (risk of public & private debt crisis) and 3 (in debt crisis). Those 
without information are not included.
Figure 7: JDC Risk vs ND-GAIN Vulnerability
Figure 8: IMF Risk vs ND-GAIN Vulnerability
Note: IMF risk data, as shown in Table 3, was translated as follows: 0 (low), 1 (moderate), 2 (high) and 3 



































4. The IMF’s current policy frameworks and analytical tools relating to 
climate change
The IMF recognised climate change as an emerging structural issue in 2015 (Bretton 
Woods Project 2019). In November 2015, Christine Lagarde, the IMF’s Managing 
Director at the time, acknowledged that “[t]he Fund has a role to play in helping its 
members address those challenges of climate change for which fiscal and 
macroeconomic policies are an important component of the appropriate policy 
response” (Lagarde 2015: 1). Lagarde asserted that, while the Fund is “is not an 
environmental organization […] climate change poses significant risks for 
macroeconomic performance and several of the appropriate policy responses lie within 
the Fund’s expertise” (ibid.). Lagarde identified six roles that the Fund should play: (i) 
analytical work; (ii) technical assistance, surveillance and training; (iii) promoting 
dialogue, (iv) integrating natural disaster risks and preparedness strategies in 
macroeconomic forecasts and debt sustainability analyses; (v) helping countries 
incorporate adaptation strategies in medium-term budget frameworks; and (vi) working 
closely with other institutions to encourage consistent climate-related disclosures, 
prudential requirements, and stress testing for the financial sector (Table 4).7
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Note: IMF risk data, as shown in Table 3, was translated as follows: 0 (low), 1 (moderate), 2 (high) and 3 
(in debt crisis). Those without information are not included.
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The IMF recognised climate change as an emerging structural issue in 2015 (Bretton 
Woods Project 2019). In November 2015, Christine Lagarde, the IMF’s Managing 
Director at the time, acknowledged that “[t]he Fund has a role to play in helping its 
members address those challenges of climate change for which fiscal and 
macroeconomic policies are an important component of the appropriate policy 
response” (Lagarde 2015: 1). Lagarde asserted that, while the Fund is “is not an 
environmental organization […] climate change poses significant risks for 
macroeconomic performance and several of the appropriate policy responses lie within 
the Fund’s expertise” (ibid.). Lagarde identified six roles that the Fund should play: (i) 
analytical work; (ii) technical assistance, surveillance and training; (iii) promoting 
dialogue, (iv) integrating natural disaster risks and preparedness strategies in 
macroeconomic forecasts and debt sustainability analyses; (v) helping countries 
incorporate adaptation strategies in medium-term budget frameworks; and (vi) working 
closely with other institutions to encourage consistent climate-related disclosures, 
prudential requirements, and stress testing for the financial sector (Table 4).7
___________________________________________
7 Lagarde’s piece draws from an IMF Staff Discussion Note by Farid et al. (2016).
28





The IMF draws on the specialist analysis of others 
contributing within their mandates (e.g., the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the 
International Energy Agency, the World Bank) and focuses 
on the practical design and administration of fiscal 
instruments for climate policy and broader energy policy. 
For example, Fund staff work has quantified, for over 160 
countries, the environmental, fiscal, and economic benefits 
of energy pricing reform, including the removal of 
subsidies. This information helps policymakers craft the 
specifics of legislation to meet environmental and fiscal 
objectives and enlightens stakeholders on the case for 
reform. An overarching issue, which staff intends to 
analyse, is the growth impact of transitioning to a less 
carbon-intensive economy.
Promoting dialogue The Fund collaborates with other international organizations 
(e.g., World Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, and United Nations Environment Programme) to 
promote policy dialogue among finance ministries, emphasizing 




ce, surveillance and 
training
The Fund is well positioned to provide technical assistance 
and training, given its global membership and expertise in 
fuel tax design, tax administration, and energy price reform. 
Climate and energy policy developments are sometimes 
discussed in Article IV consultations, and this seems likely 
to become increasingly common. Next steps on further 
integration in surveillance will be informed by assessing 
experience with selected pilot countries.
Promoting dialogue The Fund collaborates with other international 
organizations (e.g., World Bank, Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, and United Nations 
Environment Programme) to promote policy dialogue 
among finance ministries, emphasizing the benefits of 
carbon pricing as one component of an effective tax 
structure.
Integrating natural 




forecasts and debt 
sustainability 
analyses
Low-income and small developing states are especially 
vulnerable to increasing risks of extreme weather events. 
Staff, collaborating with other international institutions, will 
work with countries to develop comprehensive risk 
management frameworks to assess risks and determine 
the right mix of building domestic buffers versus risk 
transfer through insurance or financial market instruments, 








More analysis of the macroeconomic implications of 
adaptation policies is needed. Where macro-critical, the 
fiscal costs of adaptation, and the effective use of climate- 
related financial flows, will need to be integrated in 
sustainable medium-term fiscal frameworks.
Source: Volz (2020a).
Note: Included are all the published staff reports of Article IV consultations that took place between 
January 2000 and June 2020 that include the words ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, ‘climate-related’ or 
‘climate risk’. Article IV reports which show at least ten references to ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, 
‘climate risk’ and/or ‘climate-related’ or provide at least one whole paragraph, box or section on the 
topic are categorised as making “substantial reference” to climate change. All others are categorised 
as making “some reference” to climate change. The year refers to the year in which the consultation 
was held, not the year of first publication as a staff report.
At the country level, the IMF conducts two surveillance activities jointly with the World 
Bank: Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and Debt Sustainability Analyses for 
low-income countries. To date, climate change has played no or little role in the 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and where it does, it is covered in the parts 
produced by the World Bank. Likewise, the joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability 
Analyses for low-income countries, which are structured examinations of developing 
country debt based on the Debt Sustainability Framework, do not systematically 
address climate risk analysis for the time being. The latest Debt Sustainability Analysis 
that was carried out for Somalia as part of the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative in 2020, however, did include a simulation of a climate shock 
scenario (IMF 2020c).
At the regional level, the IMF has organised a number or regional dialogues for Pacific 
islands and the Caribbean.9 Among the flagship publications for regional surveillance, 
the Regional Economic Outlooks (REO), to date only the 2020 REO for Sub-Saharan 
Africa had a special chapter dedicated to ‘Adapting to Climate Change in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’ (IMF 2020a).
The IMF’s global surveillance has to date not systematically addressed climate-related 
macrofinancial risks in a major report or integrated this issue in its regular monitoring 
exercises. The IMF published the already-mentioned chapter on the impact of weather 
shocks on economic activity in low-income countries in the 2017 World Economic 
Outlook report (IMF 2017), a chapter on sustainable finance in the 2019 Global 
Financial Stability Report (IMF 2019c) and an analysis of mitigating climate change in 
the 2019 Fiscal Monitor, which focused on carbon pricing. 
With respect to technical assistance, the IMF – together with the World Bank – has thus 
far conducted so-called Climate Change Policy Assessments for six countries: the 
Seychelles (June 2017), St. Lucia (June 2018), Belize (November 2018), Grenada (July 
2019), the Federated States of Micronesia (September 2019), and Tonga (June 2020). 
Climate Change Policy Assessments provide “an overarching assessment of countries’ 
climate strategies—as articulated in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
and other government documents” and “are intended to help countries build coherent 
macro-frameworks for responding to climate change, which could improve prospects 
for attracting external finance and put future revisions to NDCs on a sound footing” (IMF 
2020b).
Regarding the IMF’s third main area of work, supporting member countries facing 
balance of payments difficulties and providing temporary financing, the IMF has a 
Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) and a Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) which can be each 
used in catastrophe situations including climate disasters. The RCF “provides rapid 
concessional financial assistance with limited conditionality to low-income countries 
(LICs) facing an urgent balance of payments need” (IMF 2020d). The RCF’s 
concessional financial support is provided exclusively to LICs through the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT). Member countries that are not PRGT-eligible can 
access the RFI.10 However, while both the RCF and RFI provide quick access to finance, 
they are both quota-based and provide only small emergency support. The IMF has not 
yet had a meaningful discussion about adjusting these facilities or create a new facility 
that would be tailored to support members in responding to shocks related to climate 
change.
The IMF toolkit also comprises the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT), 
which enables the Fund “to provide grants for debt relief for the poorest and most 
vulnerable countries hit by catastrophic natural disasters or public health disasters” 
(IMF 2020e). However, for the time being only 33 countries are eligible for support from 
the CCRT (IMF 2020f).11 For the majority of member countries, including climate 
vulnerable developing countries, the IMF has no specific frameworks or instruments to 
deal with climate-related debt.
Overall, despite growing research evidence and financial supervisors’ awareness of the 
materiality of climate-related financial risks (NGFS 2019), climate risk considerations 
have thus far been largely excluded from the IMF’s policies. The IMF’s own publications 
have established that “climate change is potentially macro-critical” (IMF 2019a), but 
also reveal that staff may still consider climate change to not be macro-critical in some 
countries. The macro-criticality standard as used by the IMF towards questions of 
engagement on macro-structural issues needs to be discussed, especially in the 
context of the IMF’s dealing with climate vulnerable countries.
In the case of climate-related surveillance, the Fund has indicated it will focus on two 
principal types of climate risks: physical risks posed by the increasing severity of 
climate impacts, and transition risks posed by a change in the value of fossil-fuel 
assets. However, the Fund has also indicated that surveillance on climate issues will not 
be mandatory in Article IV consultations, raising the prospect of climate risk being 
evaluated from some countries, but not others. It is understood that a staff guidance 
note on operationalising climate issues at country level, in particular in surveillance, is 
in development.
5. Results from interviews and a survey among the V20
To explore the views and preferences of V20 countries regarding the IMF’s role, a 
written survey was sent to all ministries of finance and central banks of V20 countries 
(as well as a few selected other climate vulnerable countries) in August 2020. The 
complete questionnaire is presented in Annex 1. The surveys were sent to the official 
V20 contact person at the respective institution. As of 23 September 2020, 12 
completed surveys were returned by 6 ministries of finance and 6 central banks from 10 
countries, including 2 non-V20 countries.
To complement the written survey, structured interviews were conducted with senior 
officials from finance ministries and central banks of several V20 countries between 
June and September 2020, including from institutions and countries that did not 
respond to the written survey. The responses in the interviews are in line with the written 
survey responses presented in the following. Given the small sample of respondents 
and potential self-selection bias, the survey responses should not be seen as 
representative of the V20 group as a whole. Still, they provide interesting insights how 
finance ministries and central banks of climate vulnerable countries are coping with 
climate-related risks.
General questions
All institutions have already taken steps to understand potential climate impacts and 
risks over the next 10-20 years, although the majority stated that they have conducted 
only “some analysis”. Only two respondents stated that their institutions had 
undertaken extensive/comprehensive analysis to date. All respondents stated that their 
organisation has been involved in efforts to reduce adverse impacts of climate change, 
e.g. through better planning and investing in a more climate-resilient economy, financial 
sector, and infrastructure. Seven organisations have already taken steps to better 
manage the residual impacts that can’t be reduced, such as through scaled up reserves, 
contingency finance or financial safety nets. 7 institutions (from 6 countries) have thus 
far discussed climate impacts and risks in previous exchanges with the IMF, including 
in technical assistance discussions and Article IV consultations. Of those who did, most 
had the impression that IMF staff are knowledgeable in matters relating to 
macrofinancial risks of climate change, but one was not sure and one negated this.
Surveillance
8 out of 12 respondents expressed the view that the IMF should include a mandatory 
section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all member countries. One 
did not know, while 2 were against making climate risks section in Article IV 
consultations mandatory. One expressed that this should depend on the circumstances 
of each country, with some countries facing important macroeconomic risks that are 
driven by climatic factors while for others those risks are less significant. Using scarce 
Fund resources in the latter cases for this purpose could deviate attention from more 
pressing issues. There was, however, full consensus that the IMF should include a 
mandatory section on climate-related financial risks in the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program assessments it conducts together with the World Bank. 
Moreover, except for one respondent who was not sure, all agreed that the joint World 
Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for low-income economies should be 
enhanced by an analysis of the impact of climate-related financing needs and risks on 
debt sustainability.
Technical assistance and training
To date, only 4 institutions among the respondents had received technical advice on 
mitigating climate risks for public finances and the economy, or on developing disaster 
risk management from the IMF. Regarding technical support on the design of carbon 
taxes, 8 institutions would like to see support from the IMF for their country, 3 were 
unsure, and 2 were against IMF involvement in this. A large majority (10 institutions) 
said they would like to receive support from the IMF in developing a national approach 
for “greening” the financial sector and help them to better address climate-related 
financial risks; one central bank said that this would be an issue for the ministry of 
finance but thought that combined support by the IMF and the World Bank may be 
desirable. One institution was negative regarding a possible role of the IMF in this. The 
picture was almost the same regarding potential support from the IMF in developing an 
energy transition scenario analysis, with 8 institutions indicating interest, while two 
institutions did not see a role for the IMF in this.
10 out of 12 respondents think the IMF should support its member countries’ financial 
and monetary authorities in developing capacities to better assess climate risks, e.g. via 
climate stress-testing, to inform the design of fiscal, monetary or prudential policies, 
while two were against this. 11 out of 12 respondents believe the IMF should support 
member countries in strengthening public debt management to enable them to better 
account for climate risks in public budgets, with one opposing. 9 respondents think the 
IMF should support governments in developing contingency plans and securing 
pre-arranged contingent financing facilities from different sources, as well as 
insurance-based solutions. While one respondent was unsure, one was against IMF 
involvement and highlighted that it was a problem that contingencies are accounted for 
as expenditures, reducing the already limited fiscal space.
Emergency lending and crisis support
When asked about the biggest financing constraints countries face in terms of 
investing in pre-disaster resilience, disaster preparedness, and ex-post disaster 
response, several respondents highlighted a general constrained fiscal space and 
limited access to concessional funds. Among the 10 countries represented in the 
survey, only one country has to date received emergency support from the IMF in the 
context of a natural (geological/hydrological) disaster. On the question whether the IMF 
should adjust its lending facilities or develop new instruments to support climate 
vulnerable countries, 10 respondents answered yes, one no, and one wasn’t sure. One 
respondent highlighted that vulnerable countries may need grants as opposed to 
changing lending conditions, as most of them have high debt already and are 
experiencing growing problems in managing debt payments. 8 respondents think that 
the IMF should raise access under the RCF and the RFI, 2 were unsure and two did not 
answer this question. 9 respondents thought the IMF should explore linking a new 
climate disaster facility to an issuance of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which would 
benefit only countries hit by climate disasters; 2 respondents were unsure about this; 
and 1 respondent did not answer this.
Debt sustainability
Regarding debt sustainability, 9 respondents expressed the view that the IMF should 
explore options for a special treatment of climate debt (i.e. public debt that has been 
incurred as a direct result of climate disasters or necessary adaptation measures), 
while one was unsure and one thought that there should be no special treatment of 
climate-related debt but new metrics for debt in general. 7 respondents think the IMF 
should promote the inclusion of natural disaster clauses in sovereign debt contracts, 
while 3 were unsure, one against, and one did not respond. 8 respondents think the IMF 
should promote the use of instruments such as GDP-linked bonds or catastrophe 
bonds that reduce debt burdens in case of a (climate) disaster, while 2 were unsure, one 
against, and one did not respond. The majority of respondents – 8 – also thought that 
the IMF should work on developing a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, while 2 
were unsure, one against, and one did not respond. Lastly, 9 respondents consider it 
helpful to have an overview of critical metrics on what can be considered 
“unsustainable debt” vs. “sustainable debt”, with 2 respondents unsure on this and one 
did not respond.
Overall, the survey results – as well as the interviews – indicate that most V20 countries 
would like to see more support from the IMF in addressing climate vulnerabilities. Most 
finance ministries and central banks in V20 countries are still in early stages when it 
comes to analysing climate-related macrofinancial risks and would benefit from greater 
support in this area from the IMF. Most thought that the IMF should integrate climate 
risk analysis in its surveillance activities, including Article IV consultations as well as 
Financial Sector Assessment Program assessments and Debt Sustainability 
Framework analysis conducted together with the World Bank. There was also a 
widespread interest in receiving technical support from the IMF for climate-proofing 
public finances and developing disaster risk management. Last but not least, countries 
see a need for better frameworks for dealing with debt in general and climate-related 
debt in particular.
6. Considerations for a V20-IMF Joint Action Agenda
For mainstreaming climate-related financial risks assessment in its operations, the IMF 
needs to recognise that climate risks are different from the traditional type of risk 
addressed in financial risk analyses. Traditional financial risk evaluation and 
benchmarks are backward-looking, i.e. based on historical performances, while climate 
risks are forward-looking and characterised by deep uncertainty, non-linearity and 
endogeneity (Battiston and Monasterolo 2019). Importantly, climate risks can be 
amplified by the complexity of the financial system. 
Ignoring forward-looking climate risks in policy design and implementation could lead 
to unintended effects on financial stability and inequality and broaden countries’ 
distance to their climate and economic targets. This, in turn, may create new sources of 
risk for countries’ macroeconomic and financial stability. Thus, assessing countries’ 
exposures to climate-related macrofinancial risks should be at the core of the IMF’s 
work (Volz 2020a). However, traditional financial risk approaches as currently used by 
the IMF are not designed to consider such characteristics and need to be 
complemented to assess the private and public sectors’ exposure (either via the 
physical or transition risk channel) to forward-looking climate-related risks; to analyse 
the largest sources of macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances induced by countries’ 
exposures to climate-related risks; and to design tailored measures to mitigate such 
risks, while addressing potential trade-offs on sustainable development and inequality.
A V20-IMF collaboration could establish a programme of work involving both the IMF 
and the V20 economies aimed at promoting actions to enhance resilience to climate 
change. A Joint Action Agenda has the potential to drive transformational action to 
minimise climate risks. Some questions to consider in the framing of the Joint Action 
Agenda include: . What further steps could the IMF take to further strengthen the treatment of 
climate     risks in its operations, including in surveillance, policy support and 
financial  assistance? . What policy options are available to V20 members in order to accelerate efforts  
to tac kle climate risks to the economy during the pandemic response and 
recovery, as well as in the longer-term?.   What avenues of international support needs in terms of finance and policy 
assistance could the IMF explore in order to ensure highly vulnerable 
economies are effectively supported to pursue these policy options?
Building on the preceding discussion, the following ten areas could form the basis for a 
Joint Action Agenda by the V20 and IMF.
6.1 Mainstreaming Systematic and Transparent Assessment of Climate-related 
Financial Risks in all IMF Operations
The IMF should mainstream a transparent assessment of climate-related financial 
risks in its operations. As the availability and sophistication of science-based climate 
financial risk metrics and methods such as climate stress-testing and climate-financial 
pricing models increase, the IMF has a solid ground for starting its assessment of 
climate-related financial risks, in order to better anchor and inform its policy work. Given 
the role of the financial sector in the economy and society, the assessment of 
climate-related financial risks and opportunities should be implemented in a 
transparent and independent way.
6.2 Consistent, Systematic, and Universal Appraisal and Treatment of Physical 
Climate Risks and Transition Risks for All Countries in Article IV Consultations and 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs
By including a mandatory section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all 
member countries, the IMF can mainstream the assessment of climate risks in 
countries’ financial stability analyses. A consistent, systematic, and universal treatment 
of climate risks in Article IV consultations will facilitate better management and 
mitigation of macrofinancial risks through governments and enhance the recognition of 
such risks by the financial sector.
The IMF could also introduce a mandatory section on climate-related financial risks to 
the Financial Sector Assessment Programs it conducts jointly with the World Bank. 
Importantly, the IMF should recognise the unique susceptibilities of climate vulnerable 
countries, stemming from both physical and transition risks, and support their financial 
and monetary authorities in developing capacities to better assess and respond to 
climate risks, e.g. via climate stress-testing to inform the design of prudential policies, 
when needed.
A better analysis of climate-related macrofinancial risks will not only enable better 
micro- and macroprudential policies to safeguard macrofinancial stability, it should also 
lead to better pricing of these risks by financial markets, which will contribute to 
overcoming barriers to scaling-up sustainable investment (Monasterolo and Volz 
2020).
6.3 Advancing Disclosure of Climate-related Financial Risks and Promoting 
Sustainable Finance and Investment Practices
Aligning financial markets with sustainable development and the Paris climate goals 
will be crucial for enhancing resilience of climate vulnerable countries. The IMF’s 2020 
Global Financial Stability Report highlights the way investors and equity markets have 
long ignored the growing risk of financial losses associated with climate risk (IMF, 
2020h). The IMF could use its unique role in international finance to promote the 
disclosure of climate-related financial risks and the development of sustainable finance 
and investment practices. Well-developed financial markets that account for 
sustainability risks facilitate climate-friendly private sector investment.
  
Source: Lagarde (2015).
Although the IMF was rather slow to follow up on this agenda set out by Lagarde, there 
has been a steady increase in the number of publications and events with substantial 
reference to climate change since 2016 (Volz 2020a, Figure 9). The most notable 
outputs include a chapter on weather shocks on economic activity in low-income 
countries in the 2017 World Economic Outlook report (IMF 2017), volumes on 
‘Resilience and Growth in the Small States of the Pacific’ (Khor et al. 2016) and 
‘Unleashing Growth and Strengthening Resilience in the Caribbean’ (Alleyne et al. 2017), 
and a policy paper on ‘Small States’ Resilience to Natural Disasters and Climate Change 
– Role for the IMF’ (IMF 2016). Still, only relatively few people at the IMF regarded 
climate change as a “macro-critical” factor, i.e., crucial to the achievement of 
macroeconomic and financial stability, which is at the core of the Fund’s mandate.
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Work closely with 






stress testing for 
the financial sector
Staff work, in close coordination with other institutions, 
such as the World Bank. Financial Stability Board and 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIA) 
will: i) enhance understanding of the transmission 
mechanisms from climate risks to financial stability, ii) 
contribute to the design of appropriate disclosure rules for 
climate risk exposure, iii) provide technical assistance to 
promote safe and sound development of markets and 
instruments to help manage climate-related risks, iv) 
contribute to the development of best practices for 
stress-testing for climate risks, and v) support ongoing 
work on globally consistent prudential requirements for the 
insurance sector, including on a Global Insurance Capital 
Standard being developed by IAIS to allow for catastrophe 
risk in capital requirements.
Figure 9: Number of publications and events with substantial reference to climate 
change
Source: Volz (2020a).
Note: Included are all the published staff reports of Article IV consultations that took place between 
January 2000 and June 2020 that include the words ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, ‘climate-related’ or 
‘climate risk’. Article IV reports which show at least ten references to ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, 
‘climate risk’ and/or ‘climate-related’ or provide at least one whole paragraph, box or section on the 
topic are categorised as making “substantial reference” to climate change. All others are categorised 
as making “some reference” to climate change. The year refers to the year in which the consultation 
was held, not the year of first publication as a staff report.
At the country level, the IMF conducts two surveillance activities jointly with the World 
Bank: Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and Debt Sustainability Analyses for 
low-income countries. To date, climate change has played no or little role in the 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and where it does, it is covered in the parts 
produced by the World Bank. Likewise, the joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability 
Analyses for low-income countries, which are structured examinations of developing 
country debt based on the Debt Sustainability Framework, do not systematically 
address climate risk analysis for the time being. The latest Debt Sustainability Analysis 
that was carried out for Somalia as part of the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative in 2020, however, did include a simulation of a climate shock 
scenario (IMF 2020c).
At the regional level, the IMF has organised a number or regional dialogues for Pacific 
islands and the Caribbean.9 Among the flagship publications for regional surveillance, 
the Regional Economic Outlooks (REO), to date only the 2020 REO for Sub-Saharan 
Africa had a special chapter dedicated to ‘Adapting to Climate Change in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’ (IMF 2020a).
The IMF’s global surveillance has to date not systematically addressed climate-related 
macrofinancial risks in a major report or integrated this issue in its regular monitoring 
exercises. The IMF published the already-mentioned chapter on the impact of weather 
shocks on economic activity in low-income countries in the 2017 World Economic 
Outlook report (IMF 2017), a chapter on sustainable finance in the 2019 Global 
Financial Stability Report (IMF 2019c) and an analysis of mitigating climate change in 
the 2019 Fiscal Monitor, which focused on carbon pricing. 
With respect to technical assistance, the IMF – together with the World Bank – has thus 
far conducted so-called Climate Change Policy Assessments for six countries: the 
Seychelles (June 2017), St. Lucia (June 2018), Belize (November 2018), Grenada (July 
2019), the Federated States of Micronesia (September 2019), and Tonga (June 2020). 
Climate Change Policy Assessments provide “an overarching assessment of countries’ 
climate strategies—as articulated in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
and other government documents” and “are intended to help countries build coherent 
macro-frameworks for responding to climate change, which could improve prospects 
for attracting external finance and put future revisions to NDCs on a sound footing” (IMF 
2020b).
Regarding the IMF’s third main area of work, supporting member countries facing 
balance of payments difficulties and providing temporary financing, the IMF has a 
Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) and a Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) which can be each 
used in catastrophe situations including climate disasters. The RCF “provides rapid 
concessional financial assistance with limited conditionality to low-income countries 
(LICs) facing an urgent balance of payments need” (IMF 2020d). The RCF’s 
concessional financial support is provided exclusively to LICs through the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT). Member countries that are not PRGT-eligible can 
access the RFI.10 However, while both the RCF and RFI provide quick access to finance, 
they are both quota-based and provide only small emergency support. The IMF has not 
yet had a meaningful discussion about adjusting these facilities or create a new facility 
that would be tailored to support members in responding to shocks related to climate 
change.
The IMF toolkit also comprises the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT), 
which enables the Fund “to provide grants for debt relief for the poorest and most 
vulnerable countries hit by catastrophic natural disasters or public health disasters” 
(IMF 2020e). However, for the time being only 33 countries are eligible for support from 
the CCRT (IMF 2020f).11 For the majority of member countries, including climate 
vulnerable developing countries, the IMF has no specific frameworks or instruments to 
deal with climate-related debt.
Overall, despite growing research evidence and financial supervisors’ awareness of the 
materiality of climate-related financial risks (NGFS 2019), climate risk considerations 
have thus far been largely excluded from the IMF’s policies. The IMF’s own publications 
have established that “climate change is potentially macro-critical” (IMF 2019a), but 
also reveal that staff may still consider climate change to not be macro-critical in some 
countries. The macro-criticality standard as used by the IMF towards questions of 
engagement on macro-structural issues needs to be discussed, especially in the 
context of the IMF’s dealing with climate vulnerable countries.
In the case of climate-related surveillance, the Fund has indicated it will focus on two 
principal types of climate risks: physical risks posed by the increasing severity of 
climate impacts, and transition risks posed by a change in the value of fossil-fuel 
assets. However, the Fund has also indicated that surveillance on climate issues will not 
be mandatory in Article IV consultations, raising the prospect of climate risk being 
evaluated from some countries, but not others. It is understood that a staff guidance 
note on operationalising climate issues at country level, in particular in surveillance, is 
in development.
5. Results from interviews and a survey among the V20
To explore the views and preferences of V20 countries regarding the IMF’s role, a 
written survey was sent to all ministries of finance and central banks of V20 countries 
(as well as a few selected other climate vulnerable countries) in August 2020. The 
complete questionnaire is presented in Annex 1. The surveys were sent to the official 
V20 contact person at the respective institution. As of 23 September 2020, 12 
completed surveys were returned by 6 ministries of finance and 6 central banks from 10 
countries, including 2 non-V20 countries.
To complement the written survey, structured interviews were conducted with senior 
officials from finance ministries and central banks of several V20 countries between 
June and September 2020, including from institutions and countries that did not 
respond to the written survey. The responses in the interviews are in line with the written 
survey responses presented in the following. Given the small sample of respondents 
and potential self-selection bias, the survey responses should not be seen as 
representative of the V20 group as a whole. Still, they provide interesting insights how 
finance ministries and central banks of climate vulnerable countries are coping with 
climate-related risks.
General questions
All institutions have already taken steps to understand potential climate impacts and 
risks over the next 10-20 years, although the majority stated that they have conducted 
only “some analysis”. Only two respondents stated that their institutions had 
undertaken extensive/comprehensive analysis to date. All respondents stated that their 
organisation has been involved in efforts to reduce adverse impacts of climate change, 
e.g. through better planning and investing in a more climate-resilient economy, financial 
sector, and infrastructure. Seven organisations have already taken steps to better 
manage the residual impacts that can’t be reduced, such as through scaled up reserves, 
contingency finance or financial safety nets. 7 institutions (from 6 countries) have thus 
far discussed climate impacts and risks in previous exchanges with the IMF, including 
in technical assistance discussions and Article IV consultations. Of those who did, most 
had the impression that IMF staff are knowledgeable in matters relating to 
macrofinancial risks of climate change, but one was not sure and one negated this.
Surveillance
8 out of 12 respondents expressed the view that the IMF should include a mandatory 
section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all member countries. One 
did not know, while 2 were against making climate risks section in Article IV 
consultations mandatory. One expressed that this should depend on the circumstances 
of each country, with some countries facing important macroeconomic risks that are 
driven by climatic factors while for others those risks are less significant. Using scarce 
Fund resources in the latter cases for this purpose could deviate attention from more 
pressing issues. There was, however, full consensus that the IMF should include a 
mandatory section on climate-related financial risks in the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program assessments it conducts together with the World Bank. 
Moreover, except for one respondent who was not sure, all agreed that the joint World 
Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for low-income economies should be 
enhanced by an analysis of the impact of climate-related financing needs and risks on 
debt sustainability.
Technical assistance and training
To date, only 4 institutions among the respondents had received technical advice on 
mitigating climate risks for public finances and the economy, or on developing disaster 
risk management from the IMF. Regarding technical support on the design of carbon 
taxes, 8 institutions would like to see support from the IMF for their country, 3 were 
unsure, and 2 were against IMF involvement in this. A large majority (10 institutions) 
said they would like to receive support from the IMF in developing a national approach 
for “greening” the financial sector and help them to better address climate-related 
financial risks; one central bank said that this would be an issue for the ministry of 
finance but thought that combined support by the IMF and the World Bank may be 
desirable. One institution was negative regarding a possible role of the IMF in this. The 
picture was almost the same regarding potential support from the IMF in developing an 
energy transition scenario analysis, with 8 institutions indicating interest, while two 
institutions did not see a role for the IMF in this.
10 out of 12 respondents think the IMF should support its member countries’ financial 
and monetary authorities in developing capacities to better assess climate risks, e.g. via 
climate stress-testing, to inform the design of fiscal, monetary or prudential policies, 
while two were against this. 11 out of 12 respondents believe the IMF should support 
member countries in strengthening public debt management to enable them to better 
account for climate risks in public budgets, with one opposing. 9 respondents think the 
IMF should support governments in developing contingency plans and securing 
pre-arranged contingent financing facilities from different sources, as well as 
insurance-based solutions. While one respondent was unsure, one was against IMF 
involvement and highlighted that it was a problem that contingencies are accounted for 
as expenditures, reducing the already limited fiscal space.
Emergency lending and crisis support
When asked about the biggest financing constraints countries face in terms of 
investing in pre-disaster resilience, disaster preparedness, and ex-post disaster 
response, several respondents highlighted a general constrained fiscal space and 
limited access to concessional funds. Among the 10 countries represented in the 
survey, only one country has to date received emergency support from the IMF in the 
context of a natural (geological/hydrological) disaster. On the question whether the IMF 
should adjust its lending facilities or develop new instruments to support climate 
vulnerable countries, 10 respondents answered yes, one no, and one wasn’t sure. One 
respondent highlighted that vulnerable countries may need grants as opposed to 
changing lending conditions, as most of them have high debt already and are 
experiencing growing problems in managing debt payments. 8 respondents think that 
the IMF should raise access under the RCF and the RFI, 2 were unsure and two did not 
answer this question. 9 respondents thought the IMF should explore linking a new 
climate disaster facility to an issuance of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which would 
benefit only countries hit by climate disasters; 2 respondents were unsure about this; 
and 1 respondent did not answer this.
Debt sustainability
Regarding debt sustainability, 9 respondents expressed the view that the IMF should 
explore options for a special treatment of climate debt (i.e. public debt that has been 
incurred as a direct result of climate disasters or necessary adaptation measures), 
while one was unsure and one thought that there should be no special treatment of 
climate-related debt but new metrics for debt in general. 7 respondents think the IMF 
should promote the inclusion of natural disaster clauses in sovereign debt contracts, 
while 3 were unsure, one against, and one did not respond. 8 respondents think the IMF 
should promote the use of instruments such as GDP-linked bonds or catastrophe 
bonds that reduce debt burdens in case of a (climate) disaster, while 2 were unsure, one 
against, and one did not respond. The majority of respondents – 8 – also thought that 
the IMF should work on developing a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, while 2 
were unsure, one against, and one did not respond. Lastly, 9 respondents consider it 
helpful to have an overview of critical metrics on what can be considered 
“unsustainable debt” vs. “sustainable debt”, with 2 respondents unsure on this and one 
did not respond.
Overall, the survey results – as well as the interviews – indicate that most V20 countries 
would like to see more support from the IMF in addressing climate vulnerabilities. Most 
finance ministries and central banks in V20 countries are still in early stages when it 
comes to analysing climate-related macrofinancial risks and would benefit from greater 
support in this area from the IMF. Most thought that the IMF should integrate climate 
risk analysis in its surveillance activities, including Article IV consultations as well as 
Financial Sector Assessment Program assessments and Debt Sustainability 
Framework analysis conducted together with the World Bank. There was also a 
widespread interest in receiving technical support from the IMF for climate-proofing 
public finances and developing disaster risk management. Last but not least, countries 
see a need for better frameworks for dealing with debt in general and climate-related 
debt in particular.
6. Considerations for a V20-IMF Joint Action Agenda
For mainstreaming climate-related financial risks assessment in its operations, the IMF 
needs to recognise that climate risks are different from the traditional type of risk 
addressed in financial risk analyses. Traditional financial risk evaluation and 
benchmarks are backward-looking, i.e. based on historical performances, while climate 
risks are forward-looking and characterised by deep uncertainty, non-linearity and 
endogeneity (Battiston and Monasterolo 2019). Importantly, climate risks can be 
amplified by the complexity of the financial system. 
Ignoring forward-looking climate risks in policy design and implementation could lead 
to unintended effects on financial stability and inequality and broaden countries’ 
distance to their climate and economic targets. This, in turn, may create new sources of 
risk for countries’ macroeconomic and financial stability. Thus, assessing countries’ 
exposures to climate-related macrofinancial risks should be at the core of the IMF’s 
work (Volz 2020a). However, traditional financial risk approaches as currently used by 
the IMF are not designed to consider such characteristics and need to be 
complemented to assess the private and public sectors’ exposure (either via the 
physical or transition risk channel) to forward-looking climate-related risks; to analyse 
the largest sources of macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances induced by countries’ 
exposures to climate-related risks; and to design tailored measures to mitigate such 
risks, while addressing potential trade-offs on sustainable development and inequality.
A V20-IMF collaboration could establish a programme of work involving both the IMF 
and the V20 economies aimed at promoting actions to enhance resilience to climate 
change. A Joint Action Agenda has the potential to drive transformational action to 
minimise climate risks. Some questions to consider in the framing of the Joint Action 
Agenda include: . What further steps could the IMF take to further strengthen the treatment of 
climate     risks in its operations, including in surveillance, policy support and 
financial  assistance? . What policy options are available to V20 members in order to accelerate efforts  
to tac kle climate risks to the economy during the pandemic response and 
recovery, as well as in the longer-term?.   What avenues of international support needs in terms of finance and policy 
assistance could the IMF explore in order to ensure highly vulnerable 
economies are effectively supported to pursue these policy options?
Building on the preceding discussion, the following ten areas could form the basis for a 
Joint Action Agenda by the V20 and IMF.
6.1 Mainstreaming Systematic and Transparent Assessment of Climate-related 
Financial Risks in all IMF Operations
The IMF should mainstream a transparent assessment of climate-related financial 
risks in its operations. As the availability and sophistication of science-based climate 
financial risk metrics and methods such as climate stress-testing and climate-financial 
pricing models increase, the IMF has a solid ground for starting its assessment of 
climate-related financial risks, in order to better anchor and inform its policy work. Given 
the role of the financial sector in the economy and society, the assessment of 
climate-related financial risks and opportunities should be implemented in a 
transparent and independent way.
6.2 Consistent, Systematic, and Universal Appraisal and Treatment of Physical 
Climate Risks and Transition Risks for All Countries in Article IV Consultations and 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs
By including a mandatory section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all 
member countries, the IMF can mainstream the assessment of climate risks in 
countries’ financial stability analyses. A consistent, systematic, and universal treatment 
of climate risks in Article IV consultations will facilitate better management and 
mitigation of macrofinancial risks through governments and enhance the recognition of 
such risks by the financial sector.
The IMF could also introduce a mandatory section on climate-related financial risks to 
the Financial Sector Assessment Programs it conducts jointly with the World Bank. 
Importantly, the IMF should recognise the unique susceptibilities of climate vulnerable 
countries, stemming from both physical and transition risks, and support their financial 
and monetary authorities in developing capacities to better assess and respond to 
climate risks, e.g. via climate stress-testing to inform the design of prudential policies, 
when needed.
A better analysis of climate-related macrofinancial risks will not only enable better 
micro- and macroprudential policies to safeguard macrofinancial stability, it should also 
lead to better pricing of these risks by financial markets, which will contribute to 
overcoming barriers to scaling-up sustainable investment (Monasterolo and Volz 
2020).
6.3 Advancing Disclosure of Climate-related Financial Risks and Promoting 
Sustainable Finance and Investment Practices
Aligning financial markets with sustainable development and the Paris climate goals 
will be crucial for enhancing resilience of climate vulnerable countries. The IMF’s 2020 
Global Financial Stability Report highlights the way investors and equity markets have 
long ignored the growing risk of financial losses associated with climate risk (IMF, 
2020h). The IMF could use its unique role in international finance to promote the 
disclosure of climate-related financial risks and the development of sustainable finance 
and investment practices. Well-developed financial markets that account for 
sustainability risks facilitate climate-friendly private sector investment.
  
Source: Lagarde (2015).
Although the IMF was rather slow to follow up on this agenda set out by Lagarde, there 
has been a steady increase in the number of publications and events with substantial 
reference to climate change since 2016 (Volz 2020a, Figure 9). The most notable 
outputs include a chapter on weather shocks on economic activity in low-income 
countries in the 2017 World Economic Outlook report (IMF 2017), volumes on 
‘Resilience and Growth in the Small States of the Pacific’ (Khor et al. 2016) and 
‘Unleashing Growth and Strengthening Resilience in the Caribbean’ (Alleyne et al. 2017), 
and a policy paper on ‘Small States’ Resilience to Natural Disasters and Climate Change 
– Role for the IMF’ (IMF 2016). Still, only relatively few people at the IMF regarded 
climate change as a “macro-critical” factor, i.e., crucial to the achievement of 
macroeconomic and financial stability, which is at the core of the Fund’s mandate.
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emergency lending and crisis support – the IMF has been rather slow to address 
climate-related financial risks (Volz 2020a). In its surveillance and monitoring 
operations, which are carried out at the global, regional and country levels, the IMF 
seeks to identify potential risks to macroeconomic and financial stability and puts 
forward policy adjustments that should support economic growth, promote financial 
and economic stability, and prevent the build-up of financial risks. At the country level, 
surveillance centres around the annual Article IV consultations. As can be seen in 
Figure 10 the IMF has only recently started to address climate change in some of its 
Article IV consultations with its member countries. Since the early 2010s, when climate 
change was still virtually absent from Article IV consultations, a small number of Article 
IV reports per year included substantial references to climate change. A large increase 
was recorded in 2019. However, in the vast majority of Article IV consultations, climate 
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Note: Publications which show at least ten references to ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, ‘climate risk’ 
and/or ‘climate-related’ or provide at least one whole paragraph, box or section on the topic are 
categorised as having “substantial reference” to climate change.
The IMF’s attention to climate change increased markedly in 2019. That year, IMF staff 
produced a growing number of working papers and reports addressing important 
dimensions of climate change, including the fiscal challenges of and responses to 
climate change (IMF 2019a, 2019b) and sustainable finance and environmental, social 
and governance reporting (IMF 2019c). The IMF also published a review of 
macroeconomic and financial policies for mitigating climate change (Krogstrup and 
Oman 2019). On top of this, the IMF became an observer of the Central Banks and 
Financial Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), a group of 72 
(as of 18 September 2020) central banks and supervisory authorities (and 13 
observers) committed to better understand and manage the financial risks and 
opportunities stemming from climate change.8
Upon taking up her role in October 2019, the new Managing Director Kristalina 
Georgieva made clear that she considers climate change a key responsibility for the 
IMF. At the 2019 Annual Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank Group in October, 
Georgieva acknowledged the centrality of climate risks for the Fund’s work: “The 
criticality of addressing climate change for financial stability, for making sure that we 
can have sustainable growth, is so very clear and proven today, that no institution, no 
individual can step from the responsibility to act. For the IMF, we always look at risks. 
And this is now a category of risk that absolutely has to be front and centre in our work” 
(IMF 2019d).
In its operational work – comprising surveillance, technical assistance and training, and 
______________________________
 8 Numbers as of 18 September 2020.
Figure 9: Number of publications and events with substantial reference to climate 
change
Source: Volz (2020a).
Note: Included are all the published staff reports of Article IV consultations that took place between 
January 2000 and June 2020 that include the words ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, ‘climate-related’ or 
‘climate risk’. Article IV reports which show at least ten references to ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, 
‘climate risk’ and/or ‘climate-related’ or provide at least one whole paragraph, box or section on the 
topic are categorised as making “substantial reference” to climate change. All others are categorised 
as making “some reference” to climate change. The year refers to the year in which the consultation 
was held, not the year of first publication as a staff report.
At the country level, the IMF conducts two surveillance activities jointly with the World 
Bank: Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and Debt Sustainability Analyses for 
low-income countries. To date, climate change has played no or little role in the 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and where it does, it is covered in the parts 
produced by the World Bank. Likewise, the joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability 
Analyses for low-income countries, which are structured examinations of developing 
country debt based on the Debt Sustainability Framework, do not systematically 
address climate risk analysis for the time being. The latest Debt Sustainability Analysis 
that was carried out for Somalia as part of the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative in 2020, however, did include a simulation of a climate shock 
scenario (IMF 2020c).
At the regional level, the IMF has organised a number or regional dialogues for Pacific 
islands and the Caribbean.9 Among the flagship publications for regional surveillance, 
the Regional Economic Outlooks (REO), to date only the 2020 REO for Sub-Saharan 
Africa had a special chapter dedicated to ‘Adapting to Climate Change in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’ (IMF 2020a).
The IMF’s global surveillance has to date not systematically addressed climate-related 
macrofinancial risks in a major report or integrated this issue in its regular monitoring 
exercises. The IMF published the already-mentioned chapter on the impact of weather 
shocks on economic activity in low-income countries in the 2017 World Economic 
Outlook report (IMF 2017), a chapter on sustainable finance in the 2019 Global 
Financial Stability Report (IMF 2019c) and an analysis of mitigating climate change in 
the 2019 Fiscal Monitor, which focused on carbon pricing. 
With respect to technical assistance, the IMF – together with the World Bank – has thus 
far conducted so-called Climate Change Policy Assessments for six countries: the 
Seychelles (June 2017), St. Lucia (June 2018), Belize (November 2018), Grenada (July 
2019), the Federated States of Micronesia (September 2019), and Tonga (June 2020). 
Climate Change Policy Assessments provide “an overarching assessment of countries’ 
climate strategies—as articulated in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
and other government documents” and “are intended to help countries build coherent 
macro-frameworks for responding to climate change, which could improve prospects 
for attracting external finance and put future revisions to NDCs on a sound footing” (IMF 
2020b).
Regarding the IMF’s third main area of work, supporting member countries facing 
balance of payments difficulties and providing temporary financing, the IMF has a 
Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) and a Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) which can be each 
used in catastrophe situations including climate disasters. The RCF “provides rapid 
concessional financial assistance with limited conditionality to low-income countries 
(LICs) facing an urgent balance of payments need” (IMF 2020d). The RCF’s 
concessional financial support is provided exclusively to LICs through the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT). Member countries that are not PRGT-eligible can 
access the RFI.10 However, while both the RCF and RFI provide quick access to finance, 
they are both quota-based and provide only small emergency support. The IMF has not 
yet had a meaningful discussion about adjusting these facilities or create a new facility 
that would be tailored to support members in responding to shocks related to climate 
change.
The IMF toolkit also comprises the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT), 
which enables the Fund “to provide grants for debt relief for the poorest and most 
vulnerable countries hit by catastrophic natural disasters or public health disasters” 
(IMF 2020e). However, for the time being only 33 countries are eligible for support from 
the CCRT (IMF 2020f).11 For the majority of member countries, including climate 
vulnerable developing countries, the IMF has no specific frameworks or instruments to 
deal with climate-related debt.
Overall, despite growing research evidence and financial supervisors’ awareness of the 
materiality of climate-related financial risks (NGFS 2019), climate risk considerations 
have thus far been largely excluded from the IMF’s policies. The IMF’s own publications 
have established that “climate change is potentially macro-critical” (IMF 2019a), but 
also reveal that staff may still consider climate change to not be macro-critical in some 
countries. The macro-criticality standard as used by the IMF towards questions of 
engagement on macro-structural issues needs to be discussed, especially in the 
context of the IMF’s dealing with climate vulnerable countries.
In the case of climate-related surveillance, the Fund has indicated it will focus on two 
principal types of climate risks: physical risks posed by the increasing severity of 
climate impacts, and transition risks posed by a change in the value of fossil-fuel 
assets. However, the Fund has also indicated that surveillance on climate issues will not 
be mandatory in Article IV consultations, raising the prospect of climate risk being 
evaluated from some countries, but not others. It is understood that a staff guidance 
note on operationalising climate issues at country level, in particular in surveillance, is 
in development.
5. Results from interviews and a survey among the V20
To explore the views and preferences of V20 countries regarding the IMF’s role, a 
written survey was sent to all ministries of finance and central banks of V20 countries 
(as well as a few selected other climate vulnerable countries) in August 2020. The 
complete questionnaire is presented in Annex 1. The surveys were sent to the official 
V20 contact person at the respective institution. As of 23 September 2020, 12 
completed surveys were returned by 6 ministries of finance and 6 central banks from 10 
countries, including 2 non-V20 countries.
To complement the written survey, structured interviews were conducted with senior 
officials from finance ministries and central banks of several V20 countries between 
June and September 2020, including from institutions and countries that did not 
respond to the written survey. The responses in the interviews are in line with the written 
survey responses presented in the following. Given the small sample of respondents 
and potential self-selection bias, the survey responses should not be seen as 
representative of the V20 group as a whole. Still, they provide interesting insights how 
finance ministries and central banks of climate vulnerable countries are coping with 
climate-related risks.
General questions
All institutions have already taken steps to understand potential climate impacts and 
risks over the next 10-20 years, although the majority stated that they have conducted 
only “some analysis”. Only two respondents stated that their institutions had 
undertaken extensive/comprehensive analysis to date. All respondents stated that their 
organisation has been involved in efforts to reduce adverse impacts of climate change, 
e.g. through better planning and investing in a more climate-resilient economy, financial 
sector, and infrastructure. Seven organisations have already taken steps to better 
manage the residual impacts that can’t be reduced, such as through scaled up reserves, 
contingency finance or financial safety nets. 7 institutions (from 6 countries) have thus 
far discussed climate impacts and risks in previous exchanges with the IMF, including 
in technical assistance discussions and Article IV consultations. Of those who did, most 
had the impression that IMF staff are knowledgeable in matters relating to 
macrofinancial risks of climate change, but one was not sure and one negated this.
Surveillance
8 out of 12 respondents expressed the view that the IMF should include a mandatory 
section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all member countries. One 
did not know, while 2 were against making climate risks section in Article IV 
consultations mandatory. One expressed that this should depend on the circumstances 
of each country, with some countries facing important macroeconomic risks that are 
driven by climatic factors while for others those risks are less significant. Using scarce 
Fund resources in the latter cases for this purpose could deviate attention from more 
pressing issues. There was, however, full consensus that the IMF should include a 
mandatory section on climate-related financial risks in the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program assessments it conducts together with the World Bank. 
Moreover, except for one respondent who was not sure, all agreed that the joint World 
Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for low-income economies should be 
enhanced by an analysis of the impact of climate-related financing needs and risks on 
debt sustainability.
Technical assistance and training
To date, only 4 institutions among the respondents had received technical advice on 
mitigating climate risks for public finances and the economy, or on developing disaster 
risk management from the IMF. Regarding technical support on the design of carbon 
taxes, 8 institutions would like to see support from the IMF for their country, 3 were 
unsure, and 2 were against IMF involvement in this. A large majority (10 institutions) 
said they would like to receive support from the IMF in developing a national approach 
for “greening” the financial sector and help them to better address climate-related 
financial risks; one central bank said that this would be an issue for the ministry of 
finance but thought that combined support by the IMF and the World Bank may be 
desirable. One institution was negative regarding a possible role of the IMF in this. The 
picture was almost the same regarding potential support from the IMF in developing an 
energy transition scenario analysis, with 8 institutions indicating interest, while two 
institutions did not see a role for the IMF in this.
10 out of 12 respondents think the IMF should support its member countries’ financial 
and monetary authorities in developing capacities to better assess climate risks, e.g. via 
climate stress-testing, to inform the design of fiscal, monetary or prudential policies, 
while two were against this. 11 out of 12 respondents believe the IMF should support 
member countries in strengthening public debt management to enable them to better 
account for climate risks in public budgets, with one opposing. 9 respondents think the 
IMF should support governments in developing contingency plans and securing 
pre-arranged contingent financing facilities from different sources, as well as 
insurance-based solutions. While one respondent was unsure, one was against IMF 
involvement and highlighted that it was a problem that contingencies are accounted for 
as expenditures, reducing the already limited fiscal space.
Emergency lending and crisis support
When asked about the biggest financing constraints countries face in terms of 
investing in pre-disaster resilience, disaster preparedness, and ex-post disaster 
response, several respondents highlighted a general constrained fiscal space and 
limited access to concessional funds. Among the 10 countries represented in the 
survey, only one country has to date received emergency support from the IMF in the 
context of a natural (geological/hydrological) disaster. On the question whether the IMF 
should adjust its lending facilities or develop new instruments to support climate 
vulnerable countries, 10 respondents answered yes, one no, and one wasn’t sure. One 
respondent highlighted that vulnerable countries may need grants as opposed to 
changing lending conditions, as most of them have high debt already and are 
experiencing growing problems in managing debt payments. 8 respondents think that 
the IMF should raise access under the RCF and the RFI, 2 were unsure and two did not 
answer this question. 9 respondents thought the IMF should explore linking a new 
climate disaster facility to an issuance of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which would 
benefit only countries hit by climate disasters; 2 respondents were unsure about this; 
and 1 respondent did not answer this.
Debt sustainability
Regarding debt sustainability, 9 respondents expressed the view that the IMF should 
explore options for a special treatment of climate debt (i.e. public debt that has been 
incurred as a direct result of climate disasters or necessary adaptation measures), 
while one was unsure and one thought that there should be no special treatment of 
climate-related debt but new metrics for debt in general. 7 respondents think the IMF 
should promote the inclusion of natural disaster clauses in sovereign debt contracts, 
while 3 were unsure, one against, and one did not respond. 8 respondents think the IMF 
should promote the use of instruments such as GDP-linked bonds or catastrophe 
bonds that reduce debt burdens in case of a (climate) disaster, while 2 were unsure, one 
against, and one did not respond. The majority of respondents – 8 – also thought that 
the IMF should work on developing a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, while 2 
were unsure, one against, and one did not respond. Lastly, 9 respondents consider it 
helpful to have an overview of critical metrics on what can be considered 
“unsustainable debt” vs. “sustainable debt”, with 2 respondents unsure on this and one 
did not respond.
Overall, the survey results – as well as the interviews – indicate that most V20 countries 
would like to see more support from the IMF in addressing climate vulnerabilities. Most 
finance ministries and central banks in V20 countries are still in early stages when it 
comes to analysing climate-related macrofinancial risks and would benefit from greater 
support in this area from the IMF. Most thought that the IMF should integrate climate 
risk analysis in its surveillance activities, including Article IV consultations as well as 
Financial Sector Assessment Program assessments and Debt Sustainability 
Framework analysis conducted together with the World Bank. There was also a 
widespread interest in receiving technical support from the IMF for climate-proofing 
public finances and developing disaster risk management. Last but not least, countries 
see a need for better frameworks for dealing with debt in general and climate-related 
debt in particular.
6. Considerations for a V20-IMF Joint Action Agenda
For mainstreaming climate-related financial risks assessment in its operations, the IMF 
needs to recognise that climate risks are different from the traditional type of risk 
addressed in financial risk analyses. Traditional financial risk evaluation and 
benchmarks are backward-looking, i.e. based on historical performances, while climate 
risks are forward-looking and characterised by deep uncertainty, non-linearity and 
endogeneity (Battiston and Monasterolo 2019). Importantly, climate risks can be 
amplified by the complexity of the financial system. 
Ignoring forward-looking climate risks in policy design and implementation could lead 
to unintended effects on financial stability and inequality and broaden countries’ 
distance to their climate and economic targets. This, in turn, may create new sources of 
risk for countries’ macroeconomic and financial stability. Thus, assessing countries’ 
exposures to climate-related macrofinancial risks should be at the core of the IMF’s 
work (Volz 2020a). However, traditional financial risk approaches as currently used by 
the IMF are not designed to consider such characteristics and need to be 
complemented to assess the private and public sectors’ exposure (either via the 
physical or transition risk channel) to forward-looking climate-related risks; to analyse 
the largest sources of macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances induced by countries’ 
exposures to climate-related risks; and to design tailored measures to mitigate such 
risks, while addressing potential trade-offs on sustainable development and inequality.
A V20-IMF collaboration could establish a programme of work involving both the IMF 
and the V20 economies aimed at promoting actions to enhance resilience to climate 
change. A Joint Action Agenda has the potential to drive transformational action to 
minimise climate risks. Some questions to consider in the framing of the Joint Action 
Agenda include: . What further steps could the IMF take to further strengthen the treatment of 
climate     risks in its operations, including in surveillance, policy support and 
financial  assistance? . What policy options are available to V20 members in order to accelerate efforts  
to tac kle climate risks to the economy during the pandemic response and 
recovery, as well as in the longer-term?.   What avenues of international support needs in terms of finance and policy 
assistance could the IMF explore in order to ensure highly vulnerable 
economies are effectively supported to pursue these policy options?
Building on the preceding discussion, the following ten areas could form the basis for a 
Joint Action Agenda by the V20 and IMF.
6.1 Mainstreaming Systematic and Transparent Assessment of Climate-related 
Financial Risks in all IMF Operations
The IMF should mainstream a transparent assessment of climate-related financial 
risks in its operations. As the availability and sophistication of science-based climate 
financial risk metrics and methods such as climate stress-testing and climate-financial 
pricing models increase, the IMF has a solid ground for starting its assessment of 
climate-related financial risks, in order to better anchor and inform its policy work. Given 
the role of the financial sector in the economy and society, the assessment of 
climate-related financial risks and opportunities should be implemented in a 
transparent and independent way.
6.2 Consistent, Systematic, and Universal Appraisal and Treatment of Physical 
Climate Risks and Transition Risks for All Countries in Article IV Consultations and 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs
By including a mandatory section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all 
member countries, the IMF can mainstream the assessment of climate risks in 
countries’ financial stability analyses. A consistent, systematic, and universal treatment 
of climate risks in Article IV consultations will facilitate better management and 
mitigation of macrofinancial risks through governments and enhance the recognition of 
such risks by the financial sector.
The IMF could also introduce a mandatory section on climate-related financial risks to 
the Financial Sector Assessment Programs it conducts jointly with the World Bank. 
Importantly, the IMF should recognise the unique susceptibilities of climate vulnerable 
countries, stemming from both physical and transition risks, and support their financial 
and monetary authorities in developing capacities to better assess and respond to 
climate risks, e.g. via climate stress-testing to inform the design of prudential policies, 
when needed.
A better analysis of climate-related macrofinancial risks will not only enable better 
micro- and macroprudential policies to safeguard macrofinancial stability, it should also 
lead to better pricing of these risks by financial markets, which will contribute to 
overcoming barriers to scaling-up sustainable investment (Monasterolo and Volz 
2020).
6.3 Advancing Disclosure of Climate-related Financial Risks and Promoting 
Sustainable Finance and Investment Practices
Aligning financial markets with sustainable development and the Paris climate goals 
will be crucial for enhancing resilience of climate vulnerable countries. The IMF’s 2020 
Global Financial Stability Report highlights the way investors and equity markets have 
long ignored the growing risk of financial losses associated with climate risk (IMF, 
2020h). The IMF could use its unique role in international finance to promote the 
disclosure of climate-related financial risks and the development of sustainable finance 
and investment practices. Well-developed financial markets that account for 
sustainability risks facilitate climate-friendly private sector investment.
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emergency lending and crisis support – the IMF has been rather slow to address 
climate-related financial risks (Volz 2020a). In its surveillance and monitoring 
operations, which are carried out at the global, regional and country levels, the IMF 
seeks to identify potential risks to macroeconomic and financial stability and puts 
forward policy adjustments that should support economic growth, promote financial 
and economic stability, and prevent the build-up of financial risks. At the country level, 
surveillance centres around the annual Article IV consultations. As can be seen in 
Figure 10 the IMF has only recently started to address climate change in some of its 
Article IV consultations with its member countries. Since the early 2010s, when climate 
change was still virtually absent from Article IV consultations, a small number of Article 
IV reports per year included substantial references to climate change. A large increase 
was recorded in 2019. However, in the vast majority of Article IV consultations, climate 
change and climate-related macroeconomic and fiscal risks still play no role.
Note: Publications which show at least ten references to ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, ‘climate risk’ 
and/or ‘climate-related’ or provide at least one whole paragraph, box or section on the topic are 
categorised as having “substantial reference” to climate change.
The IMF’s attention to climate change increased markedly in 2019. That year, IMF staff 
produced a growing number of working papers and reports addressing important 
dimensions of climate change, including the fiscal challenges of and responses to 
climate change (IMF 2019a, 2019b) and sustainable finance and environmental, social 
and governance reporting (IMF 2019c). The IMF also published a review of 
macroeconomic and financial policies for mitigating climate change (Krogstrup and 
Oman 2019). On top of this, the IMF became an observer of the Central Banks and 
Financial Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), a group of 72 
(as of 18 September 2020) central banks and supervisory authorities (and 13 
observers) committed to better understand and manage the financial risks and 
opportunities stemming from climate change.8
Upon taking up her role in October 2019, the new Managing Director Kristalina 
Georgieva made clear that she considers climate change a key responsibility for the 
IMF. At the 2019 Annual Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank Group in October, 
Georgieva acknowledged the centrality of climate risks for the Fund’s work: “The 
criticality of addressing climate change for financial stability, for making sure that we 
can have sustainable growth, is so very clear and proven today, that no institution, no 
individual can step from the responsibility to act. For the IMF, we always look at risks. 
And this is now a category of risk that absolutely has to be front and centre in our work” 
(IMF 2019d).
In its operational work – comprising surveillance, technical assistance and training, and 
Figure 10: Number of Article IV reports with reference to climate change, January 
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Source: Volz (2020a).
Note: Included are all the published staff reports of Article IV consultations that took place between 
January 2000 and June 2020 that include the words ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, ‘climate-related’ or 
‘climate risk’. Article IV reports which show at least ten references to ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, 
‘climate risk’ and/or ‘climate-related’ or provide at least one whole paragraph, box or section on the 
topic are categorised as making “substantial reference” to climate change. All others are categorised 
as making “some reference” to climate change. The year refers to the year in which the consultation 
was held, not the year of first publication as a staff report.
At the country level, the IMF conducts two surveillance activities jointly with the World 
Bank: Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and Debt Sustainability Analyses for 
low-income countries. To date, climate change has played no or little role in the 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and where it does, it is covered in the parts 
produced by the World Bank. Likewise, the joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability 
Analyses for low-income countries, which are structured examinations of developing 
country debt based on the Debt Sustainability Framework, do not systematically 
address climate risk analysis for the time being. The latest Debt Sustainability Analysis 
that was carried out for Somalia as part of the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative in 2020, however, did include a simulation of a climate shock 
scenario (IMF 2020c).
At the regional level, the IMF has organised a number or regional dialogues for Pacific 
islands and the Caribbean.9 Among the flagship publications for regional surveillance, 
the Regional Economic Outlooks (REO), to date only the 2020 REO for Sub-Saharan 
Africa had a special chapter dedicated to ‘Adapting to Climate Change in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’ (IMF 2020a).
The IMF’s global surveillance has to date not systematically addressed climate-related 
macrofinancial risks in a major report or integrated this issue in its regular monitoring 
exercises. The IMF published the already-mentioned chapter on the impact of weather 
shocks on economic activity in low-income countries in the 2017 World Economic 
Outlook report (IMF 2017), a chapter on sustainable finance in the 2019 Global 
Financial Stability Report (IMF 2019c) and an analysis of mitigating climate change in 
the 2019 Fiscal Monitor, which focused on carbon pricing. 
With respect to technical assistance, the IMF – together with the World Bank – has thus 
far conducted so-called Climate Change Policy Assessments for six countries: the 
Seychelles (June 2017), St. Lucia (June 2018), Belize (November 2018), Grenada (July 
2019), the Federated States of Micronesia (September 2019), and Tonga (June 2020). 
Climate Change Policy Assessments provide “an overarching assessment of countries’ 
climate strategies—as articulated in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
and other government documents” and “are intended to help countries build coherent 
macro-frameworks for responding to climate change, which could improve prospects 
for attracting external finance and put future revisions to NDCs on a sound footing” (IMF 
2020b).
Regarding the IMF’s third main area of work, supporting member countries facing 
balance of payments difficulties and providing temporary financing, the IMF has a 
Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) and a Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) which can be each 
used in catastrophe situations including climate disasters. The RCF “provides rapid 
concessional financial assistance with limited conditionality to low-income countries 
(LICs) facing an urgent balance of payments need” (IMF 2020d). The RCF’s 
concessional financial support is provided exclusively to LICs through the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT). Member countries that are not PRGT-eligible can 
access the RFI.10 However, while both the RCF and RFI provide quick access to finance, 
they are both quota-based and provide only small emergency support. The IMF has not 
yet had a meaningful discussion about adjusting these facilities or create a new facility 
that would be tailored to support members in responding to shocks related to climate 
change.
The IMF toolkit also comprises the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT), 
which enables the Fund “to provide grants for debt relief for the poorest and most 
vulnerable countries hit by catastrophic natural disasters or public health disasters” 
(IMF 2020e). However, for the time being only 33 countries are eligible for support from 
the CCRT (IMF 2020f).11 For the majority of member countries, including climate 
vulnerable developing countries, the IMF has no specific frameworks or instruments to 
deal with climate-related debt.
Overall, despite growing research evidence and financial supervisors’ awareness of the 
materiality of climate-related financial risks (NGFS 2019), climate risk considerations 
have thus far been largely excluded from the IMF’s policies. The IMF’s own publications 
have established that “climate change is potentially macro-critical” (IMF 2019a), but 
also reveal that staff may still consider climate change to not be macro-critical in some 
countries. The macro-criticality standard as used by the IMF towards questions of 
engagement on macro-structural issues needs to be discussed, especially in the 
context of the IMF’s dealing with climate vulnerable countries.
In the case of climate-related surveillance, the Fund has indicated it will focus on two 
principal types of climate risks: physical risks posed by the increasing severity of 
climate impacts, and transition risks posed by a change in the value of fossil-fuel 
assets. However, the Fund has also indicated that surveillance on climate issues will not 
be mandatory in Article IV consultations, raising the prospect of climate risk being 
evaluated from some countries, but not others. It is understood that a staff guidance 
note on operationalising climate issues at country level, in particular in surveillance, is 
in development.
5. Results from interviews and a survey among the V20
To explore the views and preferences of V20 countries regarding the IMF’s role, a 
written survey was sent to all ministries of finance and central banks of V20 countries 
(as well as a few selected other climate vulnerable countries) in August 2020. The 
complete questionnaire is presented in Annex 1. The surveys were sent to the official 
V20 contact person at the respective institution. As of 23 September 2020, 12 
completed surveys were returned by 6 ministries of finance and 6 central banks from 10 
countries, including 2 non-V20 countries.
To complement the written survey, structured interviews were conducted with senior 
officials from finance ministries and central banks of several V20 countries between 
June and September 2020, including from institutions and countries that did not 
respond to the written survey. The responses in the interviews are in line with the written 
survey responses presented in the following. Given the small sample of respondents 
and potential self-selection bias, the survey responses should not be seen as 
representative of the V20 group as a whole. Still, they provide interesting insights how 
finance ministries and central banks of climate vulnerable countries are coping with 
climate-related risks.
General questions
All institutions have already taken steps to understand potential climate impacts and 
risks over the next 10-20 years, although the majority stated that they have conducted 
only “some analysis”. Only two respondents stated that their institutions had 
undertaken extensive/comprehensive analysis to date. All respondents stated that their 
organisation has been involved in efforts to reduce adverse impacts of climate change, 
e.g. through better planning and investing in a more climate-resilient economy, financial 
sector, and infrastructure. Seven organisations have already taken steps to better 
manage the residual impacts that can’t be reduced, such as through scaled up reserves, 
contingency finance or financial safety nets. 7 institutions (from 6 countries) have thus 
far discussed climate impacts and risks in previous exchanges with the IMF, including 
in technical assistance discussions and Article IV consultations. Of those who did, most 
had the impression that IMF staff are knowledgeable in matters relating to 
macrofinancial risks of climate change, but one was not sure and one negated this.
Surveillance
8 out of 12 respondents expressed the view that the IMF should include a mandatory 
section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all member countries. One 
did not know, while 2 were against making climate risks section in Article IV 
consultations mandatory. One expressed that this should depend on the circumstances 
of each country, with some countries facing important macroeconomic risks that are 
driven by climatic factors while for others those risks are less significant. Using scarce 
Fund resources in the latter cases for this purpose could deviate attention from more 
pressing issues. There was, however, full consensus that the IMF should include a 
mandatory section on climate-related financial risks in the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program assessments it conducts together with the World Bank. 
Moreover, except for one respondent who was not sure, all agreed that the joint World 
Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for low-income economies should be 
enhanced by an analysis of the impact of climate-related financing needs and risks on 
debt sustainability.
Technical assistance and training
To date, only 4 institutions among the respondents had received technical advice on 
mitigating climate risks for public finances and the economy, or on developing disaster 
risk management from the IMF. Regarding technical support on the design of carbon 
taxes, 8 institutions would like to see support from the IMF for their country, 3 were 
unsure, and 2 were against IMF involvement in this. A large majority (10 institutions) 
said they would like to receive support from the IMF in developing a national approach 
for “greening” the financial sector and help them to better address climate-related 
financial risks; one central bank said that this would be an issue for the ministry of 
finance but thought that combined support by the IMF and the World Bank may be 
desirable. One institution was negative regarding a possible role of the IMF in this. The 
picture was almost the same regarding potential support from the IMF in developing an 
energy transition scenario analysis, with 8 institutions indicating interest, while two 
institutions did not see a role for the IMF in this.
10 out of 12 respondents think the IMF should support its member countries’ financial 
and monetary authorities in developing capacities to better assess climate risks, e.g. via 
climate stress-testing, to inform the design of fiscal, monetary or prudential policies, 
while two were against this. 11 out of 12 respondents believe the IMF should support 
member countries in strengthening public debt management to enable them to better 
account for climate risks in public budgets, with one opposing. 9 respondents think the 
IMF should support governments in developing contingency plans and securing 
pre-arranged contingent financing facilities from different sources, as well as 
insurance-based solutions. While one respondent was unsure, one was against IMF 
involvement and highlighted that it was a problem that contingencies are accounted for 
as expenditures, reducing the already limited fiscal space.
Emergency lending and crisis support
When asked about the biggest financing constraints countries face in terms of 
investing in pre-disaster resilience, disaster preparedness, and ex-post disaster 
response, several respondents highlighted a general constrained fiscal space and 
limited access to concessional funds. Among the 10 countries represented in the 
survey, only one country has to date received emergency support from the IMF in the 
context of a natural (geological/hydrological) disaster. On the question whether the IMF 
should adjust its lending facilities or develop new instruments to support climate 
vulnerable countries, 10 respondents answered yes, one no, and one wasn’t sure. One 
respondent highlighted that vulnerable countries may need grants as opposed to 
changing lending conditions, as most of them have high debt already and are 
experiencing growing problems in managing debt payments. 8 respondents think that 
the IMF should raise access under the RCF and the RFI, 2 were unsure and two did not 
answer this question. 9 respondents thought the IMF should explore linking a new 
climate disaster facility to an issuance of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which would 
benefit only countries hit by climate disasters; 2 respondents were unsure about this; 
and 1 respondent did not answer this.
Debt sustainability
Regarding debt sustainability, 9 respondents expressed the view that the IMF should 
explore options for a special treatment of climate debt (i.e. public debt that has been 
incurred as a direct result of climate disasters or necessary adaptation measures), 
while one was unsure and one thought that there should be no special treatment of 
climate-related debt but new metrics for debt in general. 7 respondents think the IMF 
should promote the inclusion of natural disaster clauses in sovereign debt contracts, 
while 3 were unsure, one against, and one did not respond. 8 respondents think the IMF 
should promote the use of instruments such as GDP-linked bonds or catastrophe 
bonds that reduce debt burdens in case of a (climate) disaster, while 2 were unsure, one 
against, and one did not respond. The majority of respondents – 8 – also thought that 
the IMF should work on developing a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, while 2 
were unsure, one against, and one did not respond. Lastly, 9 respondents consider it 
helpful to have an overview of critical metrics on what can be considered 
“unsustainable debt” vs. “sustainable debt”, with 2 respondents unsure on this and one 
did not respond.
Overall, the survey results – as well as the interviews – indicate that most V20 countries 
would like to see more support from the IMF in addressing climate vulnerabilities. Most 
finance ministries and central banks in V20 countries are still in early stages when it 
comes to analysing climate-related macrofinancial risks and would benefit from greater 
support in this area from the IMF. Most thought that the IMF should integrate climate 
risk analysis in its surveillance activities, including Article IV consultations as well as 
Financial Sector Assessment Program assessments and Debt Sustainability 
Framework analysis conducted together with the World Bank. There was also a 
widespread interest in receiving technical support from the IMF for climate-proofing 
public finances and developing disaster risk management. Last but not least, countries 
see a need for better frameworks for dealing with debt in general and climate-related 
debt in particular.
6. Considerations for a V20-IMF Joint Action Agenda
For mainstreaming climate-related financial risks assessment in its operations, the IMF 
needs to recognise that climate risks are different from the traditional type of risk 
addressed in financial risk analyses. Traditional financial risk evaluation and 
benchmarks are backward-looking, i.e. based on historical performances, while climate 
risks are forward-looking and characterised by deep uncertainty, non-linearity and 
endogeneity (Battiston and Monasterolo 2019). Importantly, climate risks can be 
amplified by the complexity of the financial system. 
Ignoring forward-looking climate risks in policy design and implementation could lead 
to unintended effects on financial stability and inequality and broaden countries’ 
distance to their climate and economic targets. This, in turn, may create new sources of 
risk for countries’ macroeconomic and financial stability. Thus, assessing countries’ 
exposures to climate-related macrofinancial risks should be at the core of the IMF’s 
work (Volz 2020a). However, traditional financial risk approaches as currently used by 
the IMF are not designed to consider such characteristics and need to be 
complemented to assess the private and public sectors’ exposure (either via the 
physical or transition risk channel) to forward-looking climate-related risks; to analyse 
the largest sources of macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances induced by countries’ 
exposures to climate-related risks; and to design tailored measures to mitigate such 
risks, while addressing potential trade-offs on sustainable development and inequality.
A V20-IMF collaboration could establish a programme of work involving both the IMF 
and the V20 economies aimed at promoting actions to enhance resilience to climate 
change. A Joint Action Agenda has the potential to drive transformational action to 
minimise climate risks. Some questions to consider in the framing of the Joint Action 
Agenda include: . What further steps could the IMF take to further strengthen the treatment of 
climate     risks in its operations, including in surveillance, policy support and 
financial  assistance? . What policy options are available to V20 members in order to accelerate efforts  
to tac kle climate risks to the economy during the pandemic response and 
recovery, as well as in the longer-term?.   What avenues of international support needs in terms of finance and policy 
assistance could the IMF explore in order to ensure highly vulnerable 
economies are effectively supported to pursue these policy options?
Building on the preceding discussion, the following ten areas could form the basis for a 
Joint Action Agenda by the V20 and IMF.
6.1 Mainstreaming Systematic and Transparent Assessment of Climate-related 
Financial Risks in all IMF Operations
The IMF should mainstream a transparent assessment of climate-related financial 
risks in its operations. As the availability and sophistication of science-based climate 
financial risk metrics and methods such as climate stress-testing and climate-financial 
pricing models increase, the IMF has a solid ground for starting its assessment of 
climate-related financial risks, in order to better anchor and inform its policy work. Given 
the role of the financial sector in the economy and society, the assessment of 
climate-related financial risks and opportunities should be implemented in a 
transparent and independent way.
6.2 Consistent, Systematic, and Universal Appraisal and Treatment of Physical 
Climate Risks and Transition Risks for All Countries in Article IV Consultations and 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs
By including a mandatory section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all 
member countries, the IMF can mainstream the assessment of climate risks in 
countries’ financial stability analyses. A consistent, systematic, and universal treatment 
of climate risks in Article IV consultations will facilitate better management and 
mitigation of macrofinancial risks through governments and enhance the recognition of 
such risks by the financial sector.
The IMF could also introduce a mandatory section on climate-related financial risks to 
the Financial Sector Assessment Programs it conducts jointly with the World Bank. 
Importantly, the IMF should recognise the unique susceptibilities of climate vulnerable 
countries, stemming from both physical and transition risks, and support their financial 
and monetary authorities in developing capacities to better assess and respond to 
climate risks, e.g. via climate stress-testing to inform the design of prudential policies, 
when needed.
A better analysis of climate-related macrofinancial risks will not only enable better 
micro- and macroprudential policies to safeguard macrofinancial stability, it should also 
lead to better pricing of these risks by financial markets, which will contribute to 
overcoming barriers to scaling-up sustainable investment (Monasterolo and Volz 
2020).
6.3 Advancing Disclosure of Climate-related Financial Risks and Promoting 
Sustainable Finance and Investment Practices
Aligning financial markets with sustainable development and the Paris climate goals 
will be crucial for enhancing resilience of climate vulnerable countries. The IMF’s 2020 
Global Financial Stability Report highlights the way investors and equity markets have 
long ignored the growing risk of financial losses associated with climate risk (IMF, 
2020h). The IMF could use its unique role in international finance to promote the 
disclosure of climate-related financial risks and the development of sustainable finance 
and investment practices. Well-developed financial markets that account for 




9 These included a High-Level Dialogue on ‘Enhancing Macroeconomic Resilience to Natural Disasters in the Pacific Islands’ in 
2015, a workshop and High-Level Pacific Islands Dialogue on ‘Building Resilience to Natural Disasters and Climate Change’ in 2017, 
and a High-Level Conference on ‘Building Resilience to Disasters and Climate Change in the Caribbean’ in 2018.
10 The RFI replaced the Emergency Natural Disaster Assistance and Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance facilities.
Source: Volz (2020a).
Note: Included are all the published staff reports of Article IV consultations that took place between 
January 2000 and June 2020 that include the words ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, ‘climate-related’ or 
‘climate risk’. Article IV reports which show at least ten references to ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, 
‘climate risk’ and/or ‘climate-related’ or provide at least one whole paragraph, box or section on the 
topic are categorised as making “substantial reference” to climate change. All others are categorised 
as making “some reference” to climate change. The year refers to the year in which the consultation 
was held, not the year of first publication as a staff report.
At the country level, the IMF conducts two surveillance activities jointly with the World 
Bank: Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and Debt Sustainability Analyses for 
low-income countries. To date, climate change has played no or little role in the 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and where it does, it is covered in the parts 
produced by the World Bank. Likewise, the joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability 
Analyses for low-income countries, which are structured examinations of developing 
country debt based on the Debt Sustainability Framework, do not systematically 
address climate risk analysis for the time being. The latest Debt Sustainability Analysis 
that was carried out for Somalia as part of the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative in 2020, however, did include a simulation of a climate shock 
scenario (IMF 2020c).
At the regional level, the IMF has organised a number or regional dialogues for Pacific 
islands and the Caribbean.9 Among the flagship publications for regional surveillance, 
the Regional Economic Outlooks (REO), to date only the 2020 REO for Sub-Saharan 
Africa had a special chapter dedicated to ‘Adapting to Climate Change in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’ (IMF 2020a).
The IMF’s global surveillance has to date not systematically addressed climate-related 
macrofinancial risks in a major report or integrated this issue in its regular monitoring 
exercises. The IMF published the already-mentioned chapter on the impact of weather 
shocks on economic activity in low-income countries in the 2017 World Economic 
Outlook report (IMF 2017), a chapter on sustainable finance in the 2019 Global 
Financial Stability Report (IMF 2019c) and an analysis of mitigating climate change in 
the 2019 Fiscal Monitor, which focused on carbon pricing. 
With respect to technical assistance, the IMF – together with the World Bank – has thus 
far conducted so-called Climate Change Policy Assessments for six countries: the 
Seychelles (June 2017), St. Lucia (June 2018), Belize (November 2018), Grenada (July 
2019), the Federated States of Micronesia (September 2019), and Tonga (June 2020). 
Climate Change Policy Assessments provide “an overarching assessment of countries’ 
climate strategies—as articulated in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
and other government documents” and “are intended to help countries build coherent 
macro-frameworks for responding to climate change, which could improve prospects 
for attracting external finance and put future revisions to NDCs on a sound footing” (IMF 
2020b).
Regarding the IMF’s third main area of work, supporting member countries facing 
balance of payments difficulties and providing temporary financing, the IMF has a 
Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) and a Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) which can be each 
used in catastrophe situations including climate disasters. The RCF “provides rapid 
concessional financial assistance with limited conditionality to low-income countries 
(LICs) facing an urgent balance of payments need” (IMF 2020d). The RCF’s 
concessional financial support is provided exclusively to LICs through the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT). Member countries that are not PRGT-eligible can 
access the RFI.10 However, while both the RCF and RFI provide quick access to finance, 
they are both quota-based and provide only small emergency support. The IMF has not 
yet had a meaningful discussion about adjusting these facilities or create a new facility 
that would be tailored to support members in responding to shocks related to climate 
change.
The IMF toolkit also comprises the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT), 
which enables the Fund “to provide grants for debt relief for the poorest and most 
vulnerable countries hit by catastrophic natural disasters or public health disasters” 
(IMF 2020e). However, for the time being only 33 countries are eligible for support from 
the CCRT (IMF 2020f).11 For the majority of member countries, including climate 
vulnerable developing countries, the IMF has no specific frameworks or instruments to 
deal with climate-related debt.
Overall, despite growing research evidence and financial supervisors’ awareness of the 
materiality of climate-related financial risks (NGFS 2019), climate risk considerations 
have thus far been largely excluded from the IMF’s policies. The IMF’s own publications 
have established that “climate change is potentially macro-critical” (IMF 2019a), but 
also reveal that staff may still consider climate change to not be macro-critical in some 
countries. The macro-criticality standard as used by the IMF towards questions of 
engagement on macro-structural issues needs to be discussed, especially in the 
context of the IMF’s dealing with climate vulnerable countries.
In the case of climate-related surveillance, the Fund has indicated it will focus on two 
principal types of climate risks: physical risks posed by the increasing severity of 
climate impacts, and transition risks posed by a change in the value of fossil-fuel 
assets. However, the Fund has also indicated that surveillance on climate issues will not 
be mandatory in Article IV consultations, raising the prospect of climate risk being 
evaluated from some countries, but not others. It is understood that a staff guidance 
note on operationalising climate issues at country level, in particular in surveillance, is 
in development.
5. Results from interviews and a survey among the V20
To explore the views and preferences of V20 countries regarding the IMF’s role, a 
written survey was sent to all ministries of finance and central banks of V20 countries 
(as well as a few selected other climate vulnerable countries) in August 2020. The 
complete questionnaire is presented in Annex 1. The surveys were sent to the official 
V20 contact person at the respective institution. As of 23 September 2020, 12 
completed surveys were returned by 6 ministries of finance and 6 central banks from 10 
countries, including 2 non-V20 countries.
To complement the written survey, structured interviews were conducted with senior 
officials from finance ministries and central banks of several V20 countries between 
June and September 2020, including from institutions and countries that did not 
respond to the written survey. The responses in the interviews are in line with the written 
survey responses presented in the following. Given the small sample of respondents 
and potential self-selection bias, the survey responses should not be seen as 
representative of the V20 group as a whole. Still, they provide interesting insights how 
finance ministries and central banks of climate vulnerable countries are coping with 
climate-related risks.
General questions
All institutions have already taken steps to understand potential climate impacts and 
risks over the next 10-20 years, although the majority stated that they have conducted 
only “some analysis”. Only two respondents stated that their institutions had 
undertaken extensive/comprehensive analysis to date. All respondents stated that their 
organisation has been involved in efforts to reduce adverse impacts of climate change, 
e.g. through better planning and investing in a more climate-resilient economy, financial 
sector, and infrastructure. Seven organisations have already taken steps to better 
manage the residual impacts that can’t be reduced, such as through scaled up reserves, 
contingency finance or financial safety nets. 7 institutions (from 6 countries) have thus 
far discussed climate impacts and risks in previous exchanges with the IMF, including 
in technical assistance discussions and Article IV consultations. Of those who did, most 
had the impression that IMF staff are knowledgeable in matters relating to 
macrofinancial risks of climate change, but one was not sure and one negated this.
Surveillance
8 out of 12 respondents expressed the view that the IMF should include a mandatory 
section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all member countries. One 
did not know, while 2 were against making climate risks section in Article IV 
consultations mandatory. One expressed that this should depend on the circumstances 
of each country, with some countries facing important macroeconomic risks that are 
driven by climatic factors while for others those risks are less significant. Using scarce 
Fund resources in the latter cases for this purpose could deviate attention from more 
pressing issues. There was, however, full consensus that the IMF should include a 
mandatory section on climate-related financial risks in the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program assessments it conducts together with the World Bank. 
Moreover, except for one respondent who was not sure, all agreed that the joint World 
Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for low-income economies should be 
enhanced by an analysis of the impact of climate-related financing needs and risks on 
debt sustainability.
Technical assistance and training
To date, only 4 institutions among the respondents had received technical advice on 
mitigating climate risks for public finances and the economy, or on developing disaster 
risk management from the IMF. Regarding technical support on the design of carbon 
taxes, 8 institutions would like to see support from the IMF for their country, 3 were 
unsure, and 2 were against IMF involvement in this. A large majority (10 institutions) 
said they would like to receive support from the IMF in developing a national approach 
for “greening” the financial sector and help them to better address climate-related 
financial risks; one central bank said that this would be an issue for the ministry of 
finance but thought that combined support by the IMF and the World Bank may be 
desirable. One institution was negative regarding a possible role of the IMF in this. The 
picture was almost the same regarding potential support from the IMF in developing an 
energy transition scenario analysis, with 8 institutions indicating interest, while two 
institutions did not see a role for the IMF in this.
10 out of 12 respondents think the IMF should support its member countries’ financial 
and monetary authorities in developing capacities to better assess climate risks, e.g. via 
climate stress-testing, to inform the design of fiscal, monetary or prudential policies, 
while two were against this. 11 out of 12 respondents believe the IMF should support 
member countries in strengthening public debt management to enable them to better 
account for climate risks in public budgets, with one opposing. 9 respondents think the 
IMF should support governments in developing contingency plans and securing 
pre-arranged contingent financing facilities from different sources, as well as 
insurance-based solutions. While one respondent was unsure, one was against IMF 
involvement and highlighted that it was a problem that contingencies are accounted for 
as expenditures, reducing the already limited fiscal space.
Emergency lending and crisis support
When asked about the biggest financing constraints countries face in terms of 
investing in pre-disaster resilience, disaster preparedness, and ex-post disaster 
response, several respondents highlighted a general constrained fiscal space and 
limited access to concessional funds. Among the 10 countries represented in the 
survey, only one country has to date received emergency support from the IMF in the 
context of a natural (geological/hydrological) disaster. On the question whether the IMF 
should adjust its lending facilities or develop new instruments to support climate 
vulnerable countries, 10 respondents answered yes, one no, and one wasn’t sure. One 
respondent highlighted that vulnerable countries may need grants as opposed to 
changing lending conditions, as most of them have high debt already and are 
experiencing growing problems in managing debt payments. 8 respondents think that 
the IMF should raise access under the RCF and the RFI, 2 were unsure and two did not 
answer this question. 9 respondents thought the IMF should explore linking a new 
climate disaster facility to an issuance of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which would 
benefit only countries hit by climate disasters; 2 respondents were unsure about this; 
and 1 respondent did not answer this.
Debt sustainability
Regarding debt sustainability, 9 respondents expressed the view that the IMF should 
explore options for a special treatment of climate debt (i.e. public debt that has been 
incurred as a direct result of climate disasters or necessary adaptation measures), 
while one was unsure and one thought that there should be no special treatment of 
climate-related debt but new metrics for debt in general. 7 respondents think the IMF 
should promote the inclusion of natural disaster clauses in sovereign debt contracts, 
while 3 were unsure, one against, and one did not respond. 8 respondents think the IMF 
should promote the use of instruments such as GDP-linked bonds or catastrophe 
bonds that reduce debt burdens in case of a (climate) disaster, while 2 were unsure, one 
against, and one did not respond. The majority of respondents – 8 – also thought that 
the IMF should work on developing a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, while 2 
were unsure, one against, and one did not respond. Lastly, 9 respondents consider it 
helpful to have an overview of critical metrics on what can be considered 
“unsustainable debt” vs. “sustainable debt”, with 2 respondents unsure on this and one 
did not respond.
Overall, the survey results – as well as the interviews – indicate that most V20 countries 
would like to see more support from the IMF in addressing climate vulnerabilities. Most 
finance ministries and central banks in V20 countries are still in early stages when it 
comes to analysing climate-related macrofinancial risks and would benefit from greater 
support in this area from the IMF. Most thought that the IMF should integrate climate 
risk analysis in its surveillance activities, including Article IV consultations as well as 
Financial Sector Assessment Program assessments and Debt Sustainability 
Framework analysis conducted together with the World Bank. There was also a 
widespread interest in receiving technical support from the IMF for climate-proofing 
public finances and developing disaster risk management. Last but not least, countries 
see a need for better frameworks for dealing with debt in general and climate-related 
debt in particular.
6. Considerations for a V20-IMF Joint Action Agenda
For mainstreaming climate-related financial risks assessment in its operations, the IMF 
needs to recognise that climate risks are different from the traditional type of risk 
addressed in financial risk analyses. Traditional financial risk evaluation and 
benchmarks are backward-looking, i.e. based on historical performances, while climate 
risks are forward-looking and characterised by deep uncertainty, non-linearity and 
endogeneity (Battiston and Monasterolo 2019). Importantly, climate risks can be 
amplified by the complexity of the financial system. 
Ignoring forward-looking climate risks in policy design and implementation could lead 
to unintended effects on financial stability and inequality and broaden countries’ 
distance to their climate and economic targets. This, in turn, may create new sources of 
risk for countries’ macroeconomic and financial stability. Thus, assessing countries’ 
exposures to climate-related macrofinancial risks should be at the core of the IMF’s 
work (Volz 2020a). However, traditional financial risk approaches as currently used by 
the IMF are not designed to consider such characteristics and need to be 
complemented to assess the private and public sectors’ exposure (either via the 
physical or transition risk channel) to forward-looking climate-related risks; to analyse 
the largest sources of macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances induced by countries’ 
exposures to climate-related risks; and to design tailored measures to mitigate such 
risks, while addressing potential trade-offs on sustainable development and inequality.
A V20-IMF collaboration could establish a programme of work involving both the IMF 
and the V20 economies aimed at promoting actions to enhance resilience to climate 
change. A Joint Action Agenda has the potential to drive transformational action to 
minimise climate risks. Some questions to consider in the framing of the Joint Action 
Agenda include: . What further steps could the IMF take to further strengthen the treatment of 
climate     risks in its operations, including in surveillance, policy support and 
financial  assistance? . What policy options are available to V20 members in order to accelerate efforts  
to tac kle climate risks to the economy during the pandemic response and 
recovery, as well as in the longer-term?.   What avenues of international support needs in terms of finance and policy 
assistance could the IMF explore in order to ensure highly vulnerable 
economies are effectively supported to pursue these policy options?
Building on the preceding discussion, the following ten areas could form the basis for a 
Joint Action Agenda by the V20 and IMF.
6.1 Mainstreaming Systematic and Transparent Assessment of Climate-related 
Financial Risks in all IMF Operations
The IMF should mainstream a transparent assessment of climate-related financial 
risks in its operations. As the availability and sophistication of science-based climate 
financial risk metrics and methods such as climate stress-testing and climate-financial 
pricing models increase, the IMF has a solid ground for starting its assessment of 
climate-related financial risks, in order to better anchor and inform its policy work. Given 
the role of the financial sector in the economy and society, the assessment of 
climate-related financial risks and opportunities should be implemented in a 
transparent and independent way.
6.2 Consistent, Systematic, and Universal Appraisal and Treatment of Physical 
Climate Risks and Transition Risks for All Countries in Article IV Consultations and 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs
By including a mandatory section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all 
member countries, the IMF can mainstream the assessment of climate risks in 
countries’ financial stability analyses. A consistent, systematic, and universal treatment 
of climate risks in Article IV consultations will facilitate better management and 
mitigation of macrofinancial risks through governments and enhance the recognition of 
such risks by the financial sector.
The IMF could also introduce a mandatory section on climate-related financial risks to 
the Financial Sector Assessment Programs it conducts jointly with the World Bank. 
Importantly, the IMF should recognise the unique susceptibilities of climate vulnerable 
countries, stemming from both physical and transition risks, and support their financial 
and monetary authorities in developing capacities to better assess and respond to 
climate risks, e.g. via climate stress-testing to inform the design of prudential policies, 
when needed.
A better analysis of climate-related macrofinancial risks will not only enable better 
micro- and macroprudential policies to safeguard macrofinancial stability, it should also 
lead to better pricing of these risks by financial markets, which will contribute to 
overcoming barriers to scaling-up sustainable investment (Monasterolo and Volz 
2020).
6.3 Advancing Disclosure of Climate-related Financial Risks and Promoting 
Sustainable Finance and Investment Practices
Aligning financial markets with sustainable development and the Paris climate goals 
will be crucial for enhancing resilience of climate vulnerable countries. The IMF’s 2020 
Global Financial Stability Report highlights the way investors and equity markets have 
long ignored the growing risk of financial losses associated with climate risk (IMF, 
2020h). The IMF could use its unique role in international finance to promote the 
disclosure of climate-related financial risks and the development of sustainable finance 
and investment practices. Well-developed financial markets that account for 




11 The following 16 V20 countries are eligible for support from the CCRT: Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Comoros, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Haiti, Madagascar, Malawi, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Republic of Tanzania, Republic of 
Yemen, South Sudan, and Timor- Leste.
Source: Volz (2020a).
Note: Included are all the published staff reports of Article IV consultations that took place between 
January 2000 and June 2020 that include the words ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, ‘climate-related’ or 
‘climate risk’. Article IV reports which show at least ten references to ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, 
‘climate risk’ and/or ‘climate-related’ or provide at least one whole paragraph, box or section on the 
topic are categorised as making “substantial reference” to climate change. All others are categorised 
as making “some reference” to climate change. The year refers to the year in which the consultation 
was held, not the year of first publication as a staff report.
At the country level, the IMF conducts two surveillance activities jointly with the World 
Bank: Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and Debt Sustainability Analyses for 
low-income countries. To date, climate change has played no or little role in the 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and where it does, it is covered in the parts 
produced by the World Bank. Likewise, the joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability 
Analyses for low-income countries, which are structured examinations of developing 
country debt based on the Debt Sustainability Framework, do not systematically 
address climate risk analysis for the time being. The latest Debt Sustainability Analysis 
that was carried out for Somalia as part of the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative in 2020, however, did include a simulation of a climate shock 
scenario (IMF 2020c).
At the regional level, the IMF has organised a number or regional dialogues for Pacific 
islands and the Caribbean.9 Among the flagship publications for regional surveillance, 
the Regional Economic Outlooks (REO), to date only the 2020 REO for Sub-Saharan 
Africa had a special chapter dedicated to ‘Adapting to Climate Change in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’ (IMF 2020a).
The IMF’s global surveillance has to date not systematically addressed climate-related 
macrofinancial risks in a major report or integrated this issue in its regular monitoring 
exercises. The IMF published the already-mentioned chapter on the impact of weather 
shocks on economic activity in low-income countries in the 2017 World Economic 
Outlook report (IMF 2017), a chapter on sustainable finance in the 2019 Global 
Financial Stability Report (IMF 2019c) and an analysis of mitigating climate change in 
the 2019 Fiscal Monitor, which focused on carbon pricing. 
With respect to technical assistance, the IMF – together with the World Bank – has thus 
far conducted so-called Climate Change Policy Assessments for six countries: the 
Seychelles (June 2017), St. Lucia (June 2018), Belize (November 2018), Grenada (July 
2019), the Federated States of Micronesia (September 2019), and Tonga (June 2020). 
Climate Change Policy Assessments provide “an overarching assessment of countries’ 
climate strategies—as articulated in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
and other government documents” and “are intended to help countries build coherent 
macro-frameworks for responding to climate change, which could improve prospects 
for attracting external finance and put future revisions to NDCs on a sound footing” (IMF 
2020b).
Regarding the IMF’s third main area of work, supporting member countries facing 
balance of payments difficulties and providing temporary financing, the IMF has a 
Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) and a Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) which can be each 
used in catastrophe situations including climate disasters. The RCF “provides rapid 
concessional financial assistance with limited conditionality to low-income countries 
(LICs) facing an urgent balance of payments need” (IMF 2020d). The RCF’s 
concessional financial support is provided exclusively to LICs through the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT). Member countries that are not PRGT-eligible can 
access the RFI.10 However, while both the RCF and RFI provide quick access to finance, 
they are both quota-based and provide only small emergency support. The IMF has not 
yet had a meaningful discussion about adjusting these facilities or create a new facility 
that would be tailored to support members in responding to shocks related to climate 
change.
The IMF toolkit also comprises the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT), 
which enables the Fund “to provide grants for debt relief for the poorest and most 
vulnerable countries hit by catastrophic natural disasters or public health disasters” 
(IMF 2020e). However, for the time being only 33 countries are eligible for support from 
the CCRT (IMF 2020f).11 For the majority of member countries, including climate 
vulnerable developing countries, the IMF has no specific frameworks or instruments to 
deal with climate-related debt.
Overall, despite growing research evidence and financial supervisors’ awareness of the 
materiality of climate-related financial risks (NGFS 2019), climate risk considerations 
have thus far been largely excluded from the IMF’s policies. The IMF’s own publications 
have established that “climate change is potentially macro-critical” (IMF 2019a), but 
also reveal that staff may still consider climate change to not be macro-critical in some 
countries. The macro-criticality standard as used by the IMF towards questions of 
engagement on macro-structural issues needs to be discussed, especially in the 
context of the IMF’s dealing with climate vulnerable countries.
In the case of climate-related surveillance, the Fund has indicated it will focus on two 
principal types of climate risks: physical risks posed by the increasing severity of 
climate impacts, and transition risks posed by a change in the value of fossil-fuel 
assets. However, the Fund has also indicated that surveillance on climate issues will not 
be mandatory in Article IV consultations, raising the prospect of climate risk being 
evaluated from some countries, but not others. It is understood that a staff guidance 
note on operationalising climate issues at country level, in particular in surveillance, is 
in development.
5. Results from interviews and a survey among the V20
To explore the views and preferences of V20 countries regarding the IMF’s role, a 
written survey was sent to all ministries of finance and central banks of V20 countries 
(as well as a few selected other climate vulnerable countries) in August 2020. The 
complete questionnaire is presented in Annex 1. The surveys were sent to the official 
V20 contact person at the respective institution. As of 23 September 2020, 12 
completed surveys were returned by 6 ministries of finance and 6 central banks from 10 
countries, including 2 non-V20 countries.
To complement the written survey, structured interviews were conducted with senior 
officials from finance ministries and central banks of several V20 countries between 
June and September 2020, including from institutions and countries that did not 
respond to the written survey. The responses in the interviews are in line with the written 
survey responses presented in the following. Given the small sample of respondents 
and potential self-selection bias, the survey responses should not be seen as 
representative of the V20 group as a whole. Still, they provide interesting insights how 
finance ministries and central banks of climate vulnerable countries are coping with 
climate-related risks.
General questions
All institutions have already taken steps to understand potential climate impacts and 
risks over the next 10-20 years, although the majority stated that they have conducted 
only “some analysis”. Only two respondents stated that their institutions had 
undertaken extensive/comprehensive analysis to date. All respondents stated that their 
organisation has been involved in efforts to reduce adverse impacts of climate change, 
e.g. through better planning and investing in a more climate-resilient economy, financial 
sector, and infrastructure. Seven organisations have already taken steps to better 
manage the residual impacts that can’t be reduced, such as through scaled up reserves, 
contingency finance or financial safety nets. 7 institutions (from 6 countries) have thus 
far discussed climate impacts and risks in previous exchanges with the IMF, including 
in technical assistance discussions and Article IV consultations. Of those who did, most 
had the impression that IMF staff are knowledgeable in matters relating to 
macrofinancial risks of climate change, but one was not sure and one negated this.
Surveillance
8 out of 12 respondents expressed the view that the IMF should include a mandatory 
section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all member countries. One 
did not know, while 2 were against making climate risks section in Article IV 
consultations mandatory. One expressed that this should depend on the circumstances 
of each country, with some countries facing important macroeconomic risks that are 
driven by climatic factors while for others those risks are less significant. Using scarce 
Fund resources in the latter cases for this purpose could deviate attention from more 
pressing issues. There was, however, full consensus that the IMF should include a 
mandatory section on climate-related financial risks in the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program assessments it conducts together with the World Bank. 
Moreover, except for one respondent who was not sure, all agreed that the joint World 
Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for low-income economies should be 
enhanced by an analysis of the impact of climate-related financing needs and risks on 
debt sustainability.
Technical assistance and training
To date, only 4 institutions among the respondents had received technical advice on 
mitigating climate risks for public finances and the economy, or on developing disaster 
risk management from the IMF. Regarding technical support on the design of carbon 
taxes, 8 institutions would like to see support from the IMF for their country, 3 were 
unsure, and 2 were against IMF involvement in this. A large majority (10 institutions) 
said they would like to receive support from the IMF in developing a national approach 
for “greening” the financial sector and help them to better address climate-related 
financial risks; one central bank said that this would be an issue for the ministry of 
finance but thought that combined support by the IMF and the World Bank may be 
desirable. One institution was negative regarding a possible role of the IMF in this. The 
picture was almost the same regarding potential support from the IMF in developing an 
energy transition scenario analysis, with 8 institutions indicating interest, while two 
institutions did not see a role for the IMF in this.
10 out of 12 respondents think the IMF should support its member countries’ financial 
and monetary authorities in developing capacities to better assess climate risks, e.g. via 
climate stress-testing, to inform the design of fiscal, monetary or prudential policies, 
while two were against this. 11 out of 12 respondents believe the IMF should support 
member countries in strengthening public debt management to enable them to better 
account for climate risks in public budgets, with one opposing. 9 respondents think the 
IMF should support governments in developing contingency plans and securing 
pre-arranged contingent financing facilities from different sources, as well as 
insurance-based solutions. While one respondent was unsure, one was against IMF 
involvement and highlighted that it was a problem that contingencies are accounted for 
as expenditures, reducing the already limited fiscal space.
Emergency lending and crisis support
When asked about the biggest financing constraints countries face in terms of 
investing in pre-disaster resilience, disaster preparedness, and ex-post disaster 
response, several respondents highlighted a general constrained fiscal space and 
limited access to concessional funds. Among the 10 countries represented in the 
survey, only one country has to date received emergency support from the IMF in the 
context of a natural (geological/hydrological) disaster. On the question whether the IMF 
should adjust its lending facilities or develop new instruments to support climate 
vulnerable countries, 10 respondents answered yes, one no, and one wasn’t sure. One 
respondent highlighted that vulnerable countries may need grants as opposed to 
changing lending conditions, as most of them have high debt already and are 
experiencing growing problems in managing debt payments. 8 respondents think that 
the IMF should raise access under the RCF and the RFI, 2 were unsure and two did not 
answer this question. 9 respondents thought the IMF should explore linking a new 
climate disaster facility to an issuance of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which would 
benefit only countries hit by climate disasters; 2 respondents were unsure about this; 
and 1 respondent did not answer this.
Debt sustainability
Regarding debt sustainability, 9 respondents expressed the view that the IMF should 
explore options for a special treatment of climate debt (i.e. public debt that has been 
incurred as a direct result of climate disasters or necessary adaptation measures), 
while one was unsure and one thought that there should be no special treatment of 
climate-related debt but new metrics for debt in general. 7 respondents think the IMF 
should promote the inclusion of natural disaster clauses in sovereign debt contracts, 
while 3 were unsure, one against, and one did not respond. 8 respondents think the IMF 
should promote the use of instruments such as GDP-linked bonds or catastrophe 
bonds that reduce debt burdens in case of a (climate) disaster, while 2 were unsure, one 
against, and one did not respond. The majority of respondents – 8 – also thought that 
the IMF should work on developing a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, while 2 
were unsure, one against, and one did not respond. Lastly, 9 respondents consider it 
helpful to have an overview of critical metrics on what can be considered 
“unsustainable debt” vs. “sustainable debt”, with 2 respondents unsure on this and one 
did not respond.
Overall, the survey results – as well as the interviews – indicate that most V20 countries 
would like to see more support from the IMF in addressing climate vulnerabilities. Most 
finance ministries and central banks in V20 countries are still in early stages when it 
comes to analysing climate-related macrofinancial risks and would benefit from greater 
support in this area from the IMF. Most thought that the IMF should integrate climate 
risk analysis in its surveillance activities, including Article IV consultations as well as 
Financial Sector Assessment Program assessments and Debt Sustainability 
Framework analysis conducted together with the World Bank. There was also a 
widespread interest in receiving technical support from the IMF for climate-proofing 
public finances and developing disaster risk management. Last but not least, countries 
see a need for better frameworks for dealing with debt in general and climate-related 
debt in particular.
6. Considerations for a V20-IMF Joint Action Agenda
For mainstreaming climate-related financial risks assessment in its operations, the IMF 
needs to recognise that climate risks are different from the traditional type of risk 
addressed in financial risk analyses. Traditional financial risk evaluation and 
benchmarks are backward-looking, i.e. based on historical performances, while climate 
risks are forward-looking and characterised by deep uncertainty, non-linearity and 
endogeneity (Battiston and Monasterolo 2019). Importantly, climate risks can be 
amplified by the complexity of the financial system. 
Ignoring forward-looking climate risks in policy design and implementation could lead 
to unintended effects on financial stability and inequality and broaden countries’ 
distance to their climate and economic targets. This, in turn, may create new sources of 
risk for countries’ macroeconomic and financial stability. Thus, assessing countries’ 
exposures to climate-related macrofinancial risks should be at the core of the IMF’s 
work (Volz 2020a). However, traditional financial risk approaches as currently used by 
the IMF are not designed to consider such characteristics and need to be 
complemented to assess the private and public sectors’ exposure (either via the 
physical or transition risk channel) to forward-looking climate-related risks; to analyse 
the largest sources of macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances induced by countries’ 
exposures to climate-related risks; and to design tailored measures to mitigate such 
risks, while addressing potential trade-offs on sustainable development and inequality.
A V20-IMF collaboration could establish a programme of work involving both the IMF 
and the V20 economies aimed at promoting actions to enhance resilience to climate 
change. A Joint Action Agenda has the potential to drive transformational action to 
minimise climate risks. Some questions to consider in the framing of the Joint Action 
Agenda include: . What further steps could the IMF take to further strengthen the treatment of 
climate     risks in its operations, including in surveillance, policy support and 
financial  assistance? . What policy options are available to V20 members in order to accelerate efforts  
to tac kle climate risks to the economy during the pandemic response and 
recovery, as well as in the longer-term?.   What avenues of international support needs in terms of finance and policy 
assistance could the IMF explore in order to ensure highly vulnerable 
economies are effectively supported to pursue these policy options?
Building on the preceding discussion, the following ten areas could form the basis for a 
Joint Action Agenda by the V20 and IMF.
6.1 Mainstreaming Systematic and Transparent Assessment of Climate-related 
Financial Risks in all IMF Operations
The IMF should mainstream a transparent assessment of climate-related financial 
risks in its operations. As the availability and sophistication of science-based climate 
financial risk metrics and methods such as climate stress-testing and climate-financial 
pricing models increase, the IMF has a solid ground for starting its assessment of 
climate-related financial risks, in order to better anchor and inform its policy work. Given 
the role of the financial sector in the economy and society, the assessment of 
climate-related financial risks and opportunities should be implemented in a 
transparent and independent way.
6.2 Consistent, Systematic, and Universal Appraisal and Treatment of Physical 
Climate Risks and Transition Risks for All Countries in Article IV Consultations and 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs
By including a mandatory section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all 
member countries, the IMF can mainstream the assessment of climate risks in 
countries’ financial stability analyses. A consistent, systematic, and universal treatment 
of climate risks in Article IV consultations will facilitate better management and 
mitigation of macrofinancial risks through governments and enhance the recognition of 
such risks by the financial sector.
The IMF could also introduce a mandatory section on climate-related financial risks to 
the Financial Sector Assessment Programs it conducts jointly with the World Bank. 
Importantly, the IMF should recognise the unique susceptibilities of climate vulnerable 
countries, stemming from both physical and transition risks, and support their financial 
and monetary authorities in developing capacities to better assess and respond to 
climate risks, e.g. via climate stress-testing to inform the design of prudential policies, 
when needed.
A better analysis of climate-related macrofinancial risks will not only enable better 
micro- and macroprudential policies to safeguard macrofinancial stability, it should also 
lead to better pricing of these risks by financial markets, which will contribute to 
overcoming barriers to scaling-up sustainable investment (Monasterolo and Volz 
2020).
6.3 Advancing Disclosure of Climate-related Financial Risks and Promoting 
Sustainable Finance and Investment Practices
Aligning financial markets with sustainable development and the Paris climate goals 
will be crucial for enhancing resilience of climate vulnerable countries. The IMF’s 2020 
Global Financial Stability Report highlights the way investors and equity markets have 
long ignored the growing risk of financial losses associated with climate risk (IMF, 
2020h). The IMF could use its unique role in international finance to promote the 
disclosure of climate-related financial risks and the development of sustainable finance 
and investment practices. Well-developed financial markets that account for 




Note: Included are all the published staff reports of Article IV consultations that took place between 
January 2000 and June 2020 that include the words ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, ‘climate-related’ or 
‘climate risk’. Article IV reports which show at least ten references to ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, 
‘climate risk’ and/or ‘climate-related’ or provide at least one whole paragraph, box or section on the 
topic are categorised as making “substantial reference” to climate change. All others are categorised 
as making “some reference” to climate change. The year refers to the year in which the consultation 
was held, not the year of first publication as a staff report.
At the country level, the IMF conducts two surveillance activities jointly with the World 
Bank: Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and Debt Sustainability Analyses for 
low-income countries. To date, climate change has played no or little role in the 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and where it does, it is covered in the parts 
produced by the World Bank. Likewise, the joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability 
Analyses for low-income countries, which are structured examinations of developing 
country debt based on the Debt Sustainability Framework, do not systematically 
address climate risk analysis for the time being. The latest Debt Sustainability Analysis 
that was carried out for Somalia as part of the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative in 2020, however, did include a simulation of a climate shock 
scenario (IMF 2020c).
At the regional level, the IMF has organised a number or regional dialogues for Pacific 
islands and the Caribbean.9 Among the flagship publications for regional surveillance, 
the Regional Economic Outlooks (REO), to date only the 2020 REO for Sub-Saharan 
Africa had a special chapter dedicated to ‘Adapting to Climate Change in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’ (IMF 2020a).
The IMF’s global surveillance has to date not systematically addressed climate-related 
macrofinancial risks in a major report or integrated this issue in its regular monitoring 
exercises. The IMF published the already-mentioned chapter on the impact of weather 
shocks on economic activity in low-income countries in the 2017 World Economic 
Outlook report (IMF 2017), a chapter on sustainable finance in the 2019 Global 
Financial Stability Report (IMF 2019c) and an analysis of mitigating climate change in 
the 2019 Fiscal Monitor, which focused on carbon pricing. 
With respect to technical assistance, the IMF – together with the World Bank – has thus 
far conducted so-called Climate Change Policy Assessments for six countries: the 
Seychelles (June 2017), St. Lucia (June 2018), Belize (November 2018), Grenada (July 
2019), the Federated States of Micronesia (September 2019), and Tonga (June 2020). 
Climate Change Policy Assessments provide “an overarching assessment of countries’ 
climate strategies—as articulated in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
and other government documents” and “are intended to help countries build coherent 
macro-frameworks for responding to climate change, which could improve prospects 
for attracting external finance and put future revisions to NDCs on a sound footing” (IMF 
2020b).
Regarding the IMF’s third main area of work, supporting member countries facing 
balance of payments difficulties and providing temporary financing, the IMF has a 
Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) and a Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) which can be each 
used in catastrophe situations including climate disasters. The RCF “provides rapid 
concessional financial assistance with limited conditionality to low-income countries 
(LICs) facing an urgent balance of payments need” (IMF 2020d). The RCF’s 
concessional financial support is provided exclusively to LICs through the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT). Member countries that are not PRGT-eligible can 
access the RFI.10 However, while both the RCF and RFI provide quick access to finance, 
they are both quota-based and provide only small emergency support. The IMF has not 
yet had a meaningful discussion about adjusting these facilities or create a new facility 
that would be tailored to support members in responding to shocks related to climate 
change.
The IMF toolkit also comprises the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT), 
which enables the Fund “to provide grants for debt relief for the poorest and most 
vulnerable countries hit by catastrophic natural disasters or public health disasters” 
(IMF 2020e). However, for the time being only 33 countries are eligible for support from 
the CCRT (IMF 2020f).11 For the majority of member countries, including climate 
vulnerable developing countries, the IMF has no specific frameworks or instruments to 
deal with climate-related debt.
Overall, despite growing research evidence and financial supervisors’ awareness of the 
materiality of climate-related financial risks (NGFS 2019), climate risk considerations 
have thus far been largely excluded from the IMF’s policies. The IMF’s own publications 
have established that “climate change is potentially macro-critical” (IMF 2019a), but 
also reveal that staff may still consider climate change to not be macro-critical in some 
countries. The macro-criticality standard as used by the IMF towards questions of 
engagement on macro-structural issues needs to be discussed, especially in the 
context of the IMF’s dealing with climate vulnerable countries.
In the case of climate-related surveillance, the Fund has indicated it will focus on two 
principal types of climate risks: physical risks posed by the increasing severity of 
climate impacts, and transition risks posed by a change in the value of fossil-fuel 
assets. However, the Fund has also indicated that surveillance on climate issues will not 
be mandatory in Article IV consultations, raising the prospect of climate risk being 
evaluated from some countries, but not others. It is understood that a staff guidance 
note on operationalising climate issues at country level, in particular in surveillance, is 
in development.
5. Results from interviews and a survey among the V20
To explore the views and preferences of V20 countries regarding the IMF’s role, a 
written survey was sent to all ministries of finance and central banks of V20 countries 
(as well as a few selected other climate vulnerable countries) in August 2020. The 
complete questionnaire is presented in Annex 1. The surveys were sent to the official 
V20 contact person at the respective institution. As of 23 September 2020, 12 
completed surveys were returned by 6 ministries of finance and 6 central banks from 10 
countries, including 2 non-V20 countries.
To complement the written survey, structured interviews were conducted with senior 
officials from finance ministries and central banks of several V20 countries between 
June and September 2020, including from institutions and countries that did not 
respond to the written survey. The responses in the interviews are in line with the written 
survey responses presented in the following. Given the small sample of respondents 
and potential self-selection bias, the survey responses should not be seen as 
representative of the V20 group as a whole. Still, they provide interesting insights how 
finance ministries and central banks of climate vulnerable countries are coping with 
climate-related risks.
General questions
All institutions have already taken steps to understand potential climate impacts and 
risks over the next 10-20 years, although the majority stated that they have conducted 
only “some analysis”. Only two respondents stated that their institutions had 
undertaken extensive/comprehensive analysis to date. All respondents stated that their 
organisation has been involved in efforts to reduce adverse impacts of climate change, 
e.g. through better planning and investing in a more climate-resilient economy, financial 
sector, and infrastructure. Seven organisations have already taken steps to better 
manage the residual impacts that can’t be reduced, such as through scaled up reserves, 
contingency finance or financial safety nets. 7 institutions (from 6 countries) have thus 
far discussed climate impacts and risks in previous exchanges with the IMF, including 
in technical assistance discussions and Article IV consultations. Of those who did, most 
had the impression that IMF staff are knowledgeable in matters relating to 
macrofinancial risks of climate change, but one was not sure and one negated this.
Surveillance
8 out of 12 respondents expressed the view that the IMF should include a mandatory 
section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all member countries. One 
did not know, while 2 were against making climate risks section in Article IV 
consultations mandatory. One expressed that this should depend on the circumstances 
of each country, with some countries facing important macroeconomic risks that are 
driven by climatic factors while for others those risks are less significant. Using scarce 
Fund resources in the latter cases for this purpose could deviate attention from more 
pressing issues. There was, however, full consensus that the IMF should include a 
mandatory section on climate-related financial risks in the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program assessments it conducts together with the World Bank. 
Moreover, except for one respondent who was not sure, all agreed that the joint World 
Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for low-income economies should be 
enhanced by an analysis of the impact of climate-related financing needs and risks on 
debt sustainability.
Technical assistance and training
To date, only 4 institutions among the respondents had received technical advice on 
mitigating climate risks for public finances and the economy, or on developing disaster 
risk management from the IMF. Regarding technical support on the design of carbon 
taxes, 8 institutions would like to see support from the IMF for their country, 3 were 
unsure, and 2 were against IMF involvement in this. A large majority (10 institutions) 
said they would like to receive support from the IMF in developing a national approach 
for “greening” the financial sector and help them to better address climate-related 
financial risks; one central bank said that this would be an issue for the ministry of 
finance but thought that combined support by the IMF and the World Bank may be 
desirable. One institution was negative regarding a possible role of the IMF in this. The 
picture was almost the same regarding potential support from the IMF in developing an 
energy transition scenario analysis, with 8 institutions indicating interest, while two 
institutions did not see a role for the IMF in this.
10 out of 12 respondents think the IMF should support its member countries’ financial 
and monetary authorities in developing capacities to better assess climate risks, e.g. via 
climate stress-testing, to inform the design of fiscal, monetary or prudential policies, 
while two were against this. 11 out of 12 respondents believe the IMF should support 
member countries in strengthening public debt management to enable them to better 
account for climate risks in public budgets, with one opposing. 9 respondents think the 
IMF should support governments in developing contingency plans and securing 
pre-arranged contingent financing facilities from different sources, as well as 
insurance-based solutions. While one respondent was unsure, one was against IMF 
involvement and highlighted that it was a problem that contingencies are accounted for 
as expenditures, reducing the already limited fiscal space.
Emergency lending and crisis support
When asked about the biggest financing constraints countries face in terms of 
investing in pre-disaster resilience, disaster preparedness, and ex-post disaster 
response, several respondents highlighted a general constrained fiscal space and 
limited access to concessional funds. Among the 10 countries represented in the 
survey, only one country has to date received emergency support from the IMF in the 
context of a natural (geological/hydrological) disaster. On the question whether the IMF 
should adjust its lending facilities or develop new instruments to support climate 
vulnerable countries, 10 respondents answered yes, one no, and one wasn’t sure. One 
respondent highlighted that vulnerable countries may need grants as opposed to 
changing lending conditions, as most of them have high debt already and are 
experiencing growing problems in managing debt payments. 8 respondents think that 
the IMF should raise access under the RCF and the RFI, 2 were unsure and two did not 
answer this question. 9 respondents thought the IMF should explore linking a new 
climate disaster facility to an issuance of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which would 
benefit only countries hit by climate disasters; 2 respondents were unsure about this; 
and 1 respondent did not answer this.
Debt sustainability
Regarding debt sustainability, 9 respondents expressed the view that the IMF should 
explore options for a special treatment of climate debt (i.e. public debt that has been 
incurred as a direct result of climate disasters or necessary adaptation measures), 
while one was unsure and one thought that there should be no special treatment of 
climate-related debt but new metrics for debt in general. 7 respondents think the IMF 
should promote the inclusion of natural disaster clauses in sovereign debt contracts, 
while 3 were unsure, one against, and one did not respond. 8 respondents think the IMF 
should promote the use of instruments such as GDP-linked bonds or catastrophe 
bonds that reduce debt burdens in case of a (climate) disaster, while 2 were unsure, one 
against, and one did not respond. The majority of respondents – 8 – also thought that 
the IMF should work on developing a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, while 2 
were unsure, one against, and one did not respond. Lastly, 9 respondents consider it 
helpful to have an overview of critical metrics on what can be considered 
“unsustainable debt” vs. “sustainable debt”, with 2 respondents unsure on this and one 
did not respond.
Overall, the survey results – as well as the interviews – indicate that most V20 countries 
would like to see more support from the IMF in addressing climate vulnerabilities. Most 
finance ministries and central banks in V20 countries are still in early stages when it 
comes to analysing climate-related macrofinancial risks and would benefit from greater 
support in this area from the IMF. Most thought that the IMF should integrate climate 
risk analysis in its surveillance activities, including Article IV consultations as well as 
Financial Sector Assessment Program assessments and Debt Sustainability 
Framework analysis conducted together with the World Bank. There was also a 
widespread interest in receiving technical support from the IMF for climate-proofing 
public finances and developing disaster risk management. Last but not least, countries 
see a need for better frameworks for dealing with debt in general and climate-related 
debt in particular.
6. Considerations for a V20-IMF Joint Action Agenda
For mainstreaming climate-related financial risks assessment in its operations, the IMF 
needs to recognise that climate risks are different from the traditional type of risk 
addressed in financial risk analyses. Traditional financial risk evaluation and 
benchmarks are backward-looking, i.e. based on historical performances, while climate 
risks are forward-looking and characterised by deep uncertainty, non-linearity and 
endogeneity (Battiston and Monasterolo 2019). Importantly, climate risks can be 
amplified by the complexity of the financial system. 
Ignoring forward-looking climate risks in policy design and implementation could lead 
to unintended effects on financial stability and inequality and broaden countries’ 
distance to their climate and economic targets. This, in turn, may create new sources of 
risk for countries’ macroeconomic and financial stability. Thus, assessing countries’ 
exposures to climate-related macrofinancial risks should be at the core of the IMF’s 
work (Volz 2020a). However, traditional financial risk approaches as currently used by 
the IMF are not designed to consider such characteristics and need to be 
complemented to assess the private and public sectors’ exposure (either via the 
physical or transition risk channel) to forward-looking climate-related risks; to analyse 
the largest sources of macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances induced by countries’ 
exposures to climate-related risks; and to design tailored measures to mitigate such 
risks, while addressing potential trade-offs on sustainable development and inequality.
A V20-IMF collaboration could establish a programme of work involving both the IMF 
and the V20 economies aimed at promoting actions to enhance resilience to climate 
change. A Joint Action Agenda has the potential to drive transformational action to 
minimise climate risks. Some questions to consider in the framing of the Joint Action 
Agenda include: . What further steps could the IMF take to further strengthen the treatment of 
climate     risks in its operations, including in surveillance, policy support and 
financial  assistance? . What policy options are available to V20 members in order to accelerate efforts  
to tac kle climate risks to the economy during the pandemic response and 
recovery, as well as in the longer-term?.   What avenues of international support needs in terms of finance and policy 
assistance could the IMF explore in order to ensure highly vulnerable 
economies are effectively supported to pursue these policy options?
Building on the preceding discussion, the following ten areas could form the basis for a 
Joint Action Agenda by the V20 and IMF.
6.1 Mainstreaming Systematic and Transparent Assessment of Climate-related 
Financial Risks in all IMF Operations
The IMF should mainstream a transparent assessment of climate-related financial 
risks in its operations. As the availability and sophistication of science-based climate 
financial risk metrics and methods such as climate stress-testing and climate-financial 
pricing models increase, the IMF has a solid ground for starting its assessment of 
climate-related financial risks, in order to better anchor and inform its policy work. Given 
the role of the financial sector in the economy and society, the assessment of 
climate-related financial risks and opportunities should be implemented in a 
transparent and independent way.
6.2 Consistent, Systematic, and Universal Appraisal and Treatment of Physical 
Climate Risks and Transition Risks for All Countries in Article IV Consultations and 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs
By including a mandatory section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all 
member countries, the IMF can mainstream the assessment of climate risks in 
countries’ financial stability analyses. A consistent, systematic, and universal treatment 
of climate risks in Article IV consultations will facilitate better management and 
mitigation of macrofinancial risks through governments and enhance the recognition of 
such risks by the financial sector.
The IMF could also introduce a mandatory section on climate-related financial risks to 
the Financial Sector Assessment Programs it conducts jointly with the World Bank. 
Importantly, the IMF should recognise the unique susceptibilities of climate vulnerable 
countries, stemming from both physical and transition risks, and support their financial 
and monetary authorities in developing capacities to better assess and respond to 
climate risks, e.g. via climate stress-testing to inform the design of prudential policies, 
when needed.
A better analysis of climate-related macrofinancial risks will not only enable better 
micro- and macroprudential policies to safeguard macrofinancial stability, it should also 
lead to better pricing of these risks by financial markets, which will contribute to 
overcoming barriers to scaling-up sustainable investment (Monasterolo and Volz 
2020).
6.3 Advancing Disclosure of Climate-related Financial Risks and Promoting 
Sustainable Finance and Investment Practices
Aligning financial markets with sustainable development and the Paris climate goals 
will be crucial for enhancing resilience of climate vulnerable countries. The IMF’s 2020 
Global Financial Stability Report highlights the way investors and equity markets have 
long ignored the growing risk of financial losses associated with climate risk (IMF, 
2020h). The IMF could use its unique role in international finance to promote the 
disclosure of climate-related financial risks and the development of sustainable finance 
and investment practices. Well-developed financial markets that account for 




Note: Included are all the published staff reports of Article IV consultations that took place between 
January 2000 and June 2020 that include the words ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, ‘climate-related’ or 
‘climate risk’. Article IV reports which show at least ten references to ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, 
‘climate risk’ and/or ‘climate-related’ or provide at least one whole paragraph, box or section on the 
topic are categorised as making “substantial reference” to climate change. All others are categorised 
as making “some reference” to climate change. The year refers to the year in which the consultation 
was held, not the year of first publication as a staff report.
At the country level, the IMF conducts two surveillance activities jointly with the World 
Bank: Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and Debt Sustainability Analyses for 
low-income countries. To date, climate change has played no or little role in the 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and where it does, it is covered in the parts 
produced by the World Bank. Likewise, the joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability 
Analyses for low-income countries, which are structured examinations of developing 
country debt based on the Debt Sustainability Framework, do not systematically 
address climate risk analysis for the time being. The latest Debt Sustainability Analysis 
that was carried out for Somalia as part of the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative in 2020, however, did include a simulation of a climate shock 
scenario (IMF 2020c).
At the regional level, the IMF has organised a number or regional dialogues for Pacific 
islands and the Caribbean.9 Among the flagship publications for regional surveillance, 
the Regional Economic Outlooks (REO), to date only the 2020 REO for Sub-Saharan 
Africa had a special chapter dedicated to ‘Adapting to Climate Change in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’ (IMF 2020a).
The IMF’s global surveillance has to date not systematically addressed climate-related 
macrofinancial risks in a major report or integrated this issue in its regular monitoring 
exercises. The IMF published the already-mentioned chapter on the impact of weather 
shocks on economic activity in low-income countries in the 2017 World Economic 
Outlook report (IMF 2017), a chapter on sustainable finance in the 2019 Global 
Financial Stability Report (IMF 2019c) and an analysis of mitigating climate change in 
the 2019 Fiscal Monitor, which focused on carbon pricing. 
With respect to technical assistance, the IMF – together with the World Bank – has thus 
far conducted so-called Climate Change Policy Assessments for six countries: the 
Seychelles (June 2017), St. Lucia (June 2018), Belize (November 2018), Grenada (July 
2019), the Federated States of Micronesia (September 2019), and Tonga (June 2020). 
Climate Change Policy Assessments provide “an overarching assessment of countries’ 
climate strategies—as articulated in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
and other government documents” and “are intended to help countries build coherent 
macro-frameworks for responding to climate change, which could improve prospects 
for attracting external finance and put future revisions to NDCs on a sound footing” (IMF 
2020b).
Regarding the IMF’s third main area of work, supporting member countries facing 
balance of payments difficulties and providing temporary financing, the IMF has a 
Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) and a Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) which can be each 
used in catastrophe situations including climate disasters. The RCF “provides rapid 
concessional financial assistance with limited conditionality to low-income countries 
(LICs) facing an urgent balance of payments need” (IMF 2020d). The RCF’s 
concessional financial support is provided exclusively to LICs through the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT). Member countries that are not PRGT-eligible can 
access the RFI.10 However, while both the RCF and RFI provide quick access to finance, 
they are both quota-based and provide only small emergency support. The IMF has not 
yet had a meaningful discussion about adjusting these facilities or create a new facility 
that would be tailored to support members in responding to shocks related to climate 
change.
The IMF toolkit also comprises the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT), 
which enables the Fund “to provide grants for debt relief for the poorest and most 
vulnerable countries hit by catastrophic natural disasters or public health disasters” 
(IMF 2020e). However, for the time being only 33 countries are eligible for support from 
the CCRT (IMF 2020f).11 For the majority of member countries, including climate 
vulnerable developing countries, the IMF has no specific frameworks or instruments to 
deal with climate-related debt.
Overall, despite growing research evidence and financial supervisors’ awareness of the 
materiality of climate-related financial risks (NGFS 2019), climate risk considerations 
have thus far been largely excluded from the IMF’s policies. The IMF’s own publications 
have established that “climate change is potentially macro-critical” (IMF 2019a), but 
also reveal that staff may still consider climate change to not be macro-critical in some 
countries. The macro-criticality standard as used by the IMF towards questions of 
engagement on macro-structural issues needs to be discussed, especially in the 
context of the IMF’s dealing with climate vulnerable countries.
In the case of climate-related surveillance, the Fund has indicated it will focus on two 
principal types of climate risks: physical risks posed by the increasing severity of 
climate impacts, and transition risks posed by a change in the value of fossil-fuel 
assets. However, the Fund has also indicated that surveillance on climate issues will not 
be mandatory in Article IV consultations, raising the prospect of climate risk being 
evaluated from some countries, but not others. It is understood that a staff guidance 
note on operationalising climate issues at country level, in particular in surveillance, is 
in development.
5. Results from interviews and a survey among the V20
To explore the views and preferences of V20 countries regarding the IMF’s role, a 
written survey was sent to all ministries of finance and central banks of V20 countries 
(as well as a few selected other climate vulnerable countries) in August 2020. The 
complete questionnaire is presented in Annex 1. The surveys were sent to the official 
V20 contact person at the respective institution. As of 23 September 2020, 12 
completed surveys were returned by 6 ministries of finance and 6 central banks from 10 
countries, including 2 non-V20 countries.
To complement the written survey, structured interviews were conducted with senior 
officials from finance ministries and central banks of several V20 countries between 
June and September 2020, including from institutions and countries that did not 
respond to the written survey. The responses in the interviews are in line with the written 
survey responses presented in the following. Given the small sample of respondents 
and potential self-selection bias, the survey responses should not be seen as 
representative of the V20 group as a whole. Still, they provide interesting insights how 
finance ministries and central banks of climate vulnerable countries are coping with 
climate-related risks.
General questions
All institutions have already taken steps to understand potential climate impacts and 
risks over the next 10-20 years, although the majority stated that they have conducted 
only “some analysis”. Only two respondents stated that their institutions had 
undertaken extensive/comprehensive analysis to date. All respondents stated that their 
organisation has been involved in efforts to reduce adverse impacts of climate change, 
e.g. through better planning and investing in a more climate-resilient economy, financial 
sector, and infrastructure. Seven organisations have already taken steps to better 
manage the residual impacts that can’t be reduced, such as through scaled up reserves, 
contingency finance or financial safety nets. 7 institutions (from 6 countries) have thus 
far discussed climate impacts and risks in previous exchanges with the IMF, including 
in technical assistance discussions and Article IV consultations. Of those who did, most 
had the impression that IMF staff are knowledgeable in matters relating to 
macrofinancial risks of climate change, but one was not sure and one negated this.
Surveillance
8 out of 12 respondents expressed the view that the IMF should include a mandatory 
section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all member countries. One 
did not know, while 2 were against making climate risks section in Article IV 
consultations mandatory. One expressed that this should depend on the circumstances 
of each country, with some countries facing important macroeconomic risks that are 
driven by climatic factors while for others those risks are less significant. Using scarce 
Fund resources in the latter cases for this purpose could deviate attention from more 
pressing issues. There was, however, full consensus that the IMF should include a 
mandatory section on climate-related financial risks in the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program assessments it conducts together with the World Bank. 
Moreover, except for one respondent who was not sure, all agreed that the joint World 
Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for low-income economies should be 
enhanced by an analysis of the impact of climate-related financing needs and risks on 
debt sustainability.
Technical assistance and training
To date, only 4 institutions among the respondents had received technical advice on 
mitigating climate risks for public finances and the economy, or on developing disaster 
risk management from the IMF. Regarding technical support on the design of carbon 
taxes, 8 institutions would like to see support from the IMF for their country, 3 were 
unsure, and 2 were against IMF involvement in this. A large majority (10 institutions) 
said they would like to receive support from the IMF in developing a national approach 
for “greening” the financial sector and help them to better address climate-related 
financial risks; one central bank said that this would be an issue for the ministry of 
finance but thought that combined support by the IMF and the World Bank may be 
desirable. One institution was negative regarding a possible role of the IMF in this. The 
picture was almost the same regarding potential support from the IMF in developing an 
energy transition scenario analysis, with 8 institutions indicating interest, while two 
institutions did not see a role for the IMF in this.
10 out of 12 respondents think the IMF should support its member countries’ financial 
and monetary authorities in developing capacities to better assess climate risks, e.g. via 
climate stress-testing, to inform the design of fiscal, monetary or prudential policies, 
while two were against this. 11 out of 12 respondents believe the IMF should support 
member countries in strengthening public debt management to enable them to better 
account for climate risks in public budgets, with one opposing. 9 respondents think the 
IMF should support governments in developing contingency plans and securing 
pre-arranged contingent financing facilities from different sources, as well as 
insurance-based solutions. While one respondent was unsure, one was against IMF 
involvement and highlighted that it was a problem that contingencies are accounted for 
as expenditures, reducing the already limited fiscal space.
Emergency lending and crisis support
When asked about the biggest financing constraints countries face in terms of 
investing in pre-disaster resilience, disaster preparedness, and ex-post disaster 
response, several respondents highlighted a general constrained fiscal space and 
limited access to concessional funds. Among the 10 countries represented in the 
survey, only one country has to date received emergency support from the IMF in the 
context of a natural (geological/hydrological) disaster. On the question whether the IMF 
should adjust its lending facilities or develop new instruments to support climate 
vulnerable countries, 10 respondents answered yes, one no, and one wasn’t sure. One 
respondent highlighted that vulnerable countries may need grants as opposed to 
changing lending conditions, as most of them have high debt already and are 
experiencing growing problems in managing debt payments. 8 respondents think that 
the IMF should raise access under the RCF and the RFI, 2 were unsure and two did not 
answer this question. 9 respondents thought the IMF should explore linking a new 
climate disaster facility to an issuance of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which would 
benefit only countries hit by climate disasters; 2 respondents were unsure about this; 
and 1 respondent did not answer this.
Debt sustainability
Regarding debt sustainability, 9 respondents expressed the view that the IMF should 
explore options for a special treatment of climate debt (i.e. public debt that has been 
incurred as a direct result of climate disasters or necessary adaptation measures), 
while one was unsure and one thought that there should be no special treatment of 
climate-related debt but new metrics for debt in general. 7 respondents think the IMF 
should promote the inclusion of natural disaster clauses in sovereign debt contracts, 
while 3 were unsure, one against, and one did not respond. 8 respondents think the IMF 
should promote the use of instruments such as GDP-linked bonds or catastrophe 
bonds that reduce debt burdens in case of a (climate) disaster, while 2 were unsure, one 
against, and one did not respond. The majority of respondents – 8 – also thought that 
the IMF should work on developing a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, while 2 
were unsure, one against, and one did not respond. Lastly, 9 respondents consider it 
helpful to have an overview of critical metrics on what can be considered 
“unsustainable debt” vs. “sustainable debt”, with 2 respondents unsure on this and one 
did not respond.
Overall, the survey results – as well as the interviews – indicate that most V20 countries 
would like to see more support from the IMF in addressing climate vulnerabilities. Most 
finance ministries and central banks in V20 countries are still in early stages when it 
comes to analysing climate-related macrofinancial risks and would benefit from greater 
support in this area from the IMF. Most thought that the IMF should integrate climate 
risk analysis in its surveillance activities, including Article IV consultations as well as 
Financial Sector Assessment Program assessments and Debt Sustainability 
Framework analysis conducted together with the World Bank. There was also a 
widespread interest in receiving technical support from the IMF for climate-proofing 
public finances and developing disaster risk management. Last but not least, countries 
see a need for better frameworks for dealing with debt in general and climate-related 
debt in particular.
6. Considerations for a V20-IMF Joint Action Agenda
For mainstreaming climate-related financial risks assessment in its operations, the IMF 
needs to recognise that climate risks are different from the traditional type of risk 
addressed in financial risk analyses. Traditional financial risk evaluation and 
benchmarks are backward-looking, i.e. based on historical performances, while climate 
risks are forward-looking and characterised by deep uncertainty, non-linearity and 
endogeneity (Battiston and Monasterolo 2019). Importantly, climate risks can be 
amplified by the complexity of the financial system. 
Ignoring forward-looking climate risks in policy design and implementation could lead 
to unintended effects on financial stability and inequality and broaden countries’ 
distance to their climate and economic targets. This, in turn, may create new sources of 
risk for countries’ macroeconomic and financial stability. Thus, assessing countries’ 
exposures to climate-related macrofinancial risks should be at the core of the IMF’s 
work (Volz 2020a). However, traditional financial risk approaches as currently used by 
the IMF are not designed to consider such characteristics and need to be 
complemented to assess the private and public sectors’ exposure (either via the 
physical or transition risk channel) to forward-looking climate-related risks; to analyse 
the largest sources of macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances induced by countries’ 
exposures to climate-related risks; and to design tailored measures to mitigate such 
risks, while addressing potential trade-offs on sustainable development and inequality.
A V20-IMF collaboration could establish a programme of work involving both the IMF 
and the V20 economies aimed at promoting actions to enhance resilience to climate 
change. A Joint Action Agenda has the potential to drive transformational action to 
minimise climate risks. Some questions to consider in the framing of the Joint Action 
Agenda include: . What further steps could the IMF take to further strengthen the treatment of 
climate     risks in its operations, including in surveillance, policy support and 
financial  assistance? . What policy options are available to V20 members in order to accelerate efforts  
to tac kle climate risks to the economy during the pandemic response and 
recovery, as well as in the longer-term?.   What avenues of international support needs in terms of finance and policy 
assistance could the IMF explore in order to ensure highly vulnerable 
economies are effectively supported to pursue these policy options?
Building on the preceding discussion, the following ten areas could form the basis for a 
Joint Action Agenda by the V20 and IMF.
6.1 Mainstreaming Systematic and Transparent Assessment of Climate-related 
Financial Risks in all IMF Operations
The IMF should mainstream a transparent assessment of climate-related financial 
risks in its operations. As the availability and sophistication of science-based climate 
financial risk metrics and methods such as climate stress-testing and climate-financial 
pricing models increase, the IMF has a solid ground for starting its assessment of 
climate-related financial risks, in order to better anchor and inform its policy work. Given 
the role of the financial sector in the economy and society, the assessment of 
climate-related financial risks and opportunities should be implemented in a 
transparent and independent way.
6.2 Consistent, Systematic, and Universal Appraisal and Treatment of Physical 
Climate Risks and Transition Risks for All Countries in Article IV Consultations and 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs
By including a mandatory section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all 
member countries, the IMF can mainstream the assessment of climate risks in 
countries’ financial stability analyses. A consistent, systematic, and universal treatment 
of climate risks in Article IV consultations will facilitate better management and 
mitigation of macrofinancial risks through governments and enhance the recognition of 
such risks by the financial sector.
The IMF could also introduce a mandatory section on climate-related financial risks to 
the Financial Sector Assessment Programs it conducts jointly with the World Bank. 
Importantly, the IMF should recognise the unique susceptibilities of climate vulnerable 
countries, stemming from both physical and transition risks, and support their financial 
and monetary authorities in developing capacities to better assess and respond to 
climate risks, e.g. via climate stress-testing to inform the design of prudential policies, 
when needed.
A better analysis of climate-related macrofinancial risks will not only enable better 
micro- and macroprudential policies to safeguard macrofinancial stability, it should also 
lead to better pricing of these risks by financial markets, which will contribute to 
overcoming barriers to scaling-up sustainable investment (Monasterolo and Volz 
2020).
6.3 Advancing Disclosure of Climate-related Financial Risks and Promoting 
Sustainable Finance and Investment Practices
Aligning financial markets with sustainable development and the Paris climate goals 
will be crucial for enhancing resilience of climate vulnerable countries. The IMF’s 2020 
Global Financial Stability Report highlights the way investors and equity markets have 
long ignored the growing risk of financial losses associated with climate risk (IMF, 
2020h). The IMF could use its unique role in international finance to promote the 
disclosure of climate-related financial risks and the development of sustainable finance 
and investment practices. Well-developed financial markets that account for 
sustainability risks facilitate climate-friendly private sector investment.
  
6.4 Exploring synergies between Fiscal and Monetary Policies 
The IMF could explore synergies between fiscal and monetary policies as well as 
macroprudential regulations to identify an optimal policy mix that would enhance 
finance for development oriented towards just transition outcomes while improving 
economic competitiveness and ensuring macrofinancial stability. In this regard, closer 
collaboration between financial institutions acting on climate finance, including 
development finance institutions, central banks and financial regulators, would be 
crucial. By considering the materiality of forward-looking climate risks in the design of 
fiscal and financial policies, the IMF could support its membership in general, and 
climate vulnerable countries in particular, in building resilience to such risks while 
scaling up investments needed to achieve climate targets. Not doing so could lead to a 
disorderly transition leading to increasing liabilities and stranding risk for both public 
and private sector, generating adverse effects on financial stability and inequality.
6.5 Mainstreaming of Climate Risk Analysis in Public Financial Management and 
Supporting the Development of a Climate Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance 
Architecture
Through policy advice and technical assistance, the IMF can support climate vulnerable 
countries in climate-proofing public finances. In particular, the IMF can encourage and 
provide advice to finance ministries on how to analyse the potential impacts of climate 
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Source: Volz (2020a).
Note: Included are all the published staff reports of Article IV consultations that took place between 
January 2000 and June 2020 that include the words ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, ‘climate-related’ or 
‘climate risk’. Article IV reports which show at least ten references to ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, 
‘climate risk’ and/or ‘climate-related’ or provide at least one whole paragraph, box or section on the 
topic are categorised as making “substantial reference” to climate change. All others are categorised 
as making “some reference” to climate change. The year refers to the year in which the consultation 
was held, not the year of first publication as a staff report.
At the country level, the IMF conducts two surveillance activities jointly with the World 
Bank: Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and Debt Sustainability Analyses for 
low-income countries. To date, climate change has played no or little role in the 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and where it does, it is covered in the parts 
produced by the World Bank. Likewise, the joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability 
Analyses for low-income countries, which are structured examinations of developing 
country debt based on the Debt Sustainability Framework, do not systematically 
address climate risk analysis for the time being. The latest Debt Sustainability Analysis 
that was carried out for Somalia as part of the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative in 2020, however, did include a simulation of a climate shock 
scenario (IMF 2020c).
At the regional level, the IMF has organised a number or regional dialogues for Pacific 
islands and the Caribbean.9 Among the flagship publications for regional surveillance, 
the Regional Economic Outlooks (REO), to date only the 2020 REO for Sub-Saharan 
Africa had a special chapter dedicated to ‘Adapting to Climate Change in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’ (IMF 2020a).
The IMF’s global surveillance has to date not systematically addressed climate-related 
macrofinancial risks in a major report or integrated this issue in its regular monitoring 
exercises. The IMF published the already-mentioned chapter on the impact of weather 
shocks on economic activity in low-income countries in the 2017 World Economic 
Outlook report (IMF 2017), a chapter on sustainable finance in the 2019 Global 
Financial Stability Report (IMF 2019c) and an analysis of mitigating climate change in 
the 2019 Fiscal Monitor, which focused on carbon pricing. 
With respect to technical assistance, the IMF – together with the World Bank – has thus 
far conducted so-called Climate Change Policy Assessments for six countries: the 
Seychelles (June 2017), St. Lucia (June 2018), Belize (November 2018), Grenada (July 
2019), the Federated States of Micronesia (September 2019), and Tonga (June 2020). 
Climate Change Policy Assessments provide “an overarching assessment of countries’ 
climate strategies—as articulated in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
and other government documents” and “are intended to help countries build coherent 
macro-frameworks for responding to climate change, which could improve prospects 
for attracting external finance and put future revisions to NDCs on a sound footing” (IMF 
2020b).
Regarding the IMF’s third main area of work, supporting member countries facing 
balance of payments difficulties and providing temporary financing, the IMF has a 
Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) and a Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) which can be each 
used in catastrophe situations including climate disasters. The RCF “provides rapid 
concessional financial assistance with limited conditionality to low-income countries 
(LICs) facing an urgent balance of payments need” (IMF 2020d). The RCF’s 
concessional financial support is provided exclusively to LICs through the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT). Member countries that are not PRGT-eligible can 
access the RFI.10 However, while both the RCF and RFI provide quick access to finance, 
they are both quota-based and provide only small emergency support. The IMF has not 
yet had a meaningful discussion about adjusting these facilities or create a new facility 
that would be tailored to support members in responding to shocks related to climate 
change.
The IMF toolkit also comprises the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT), 
which enables the Fund “to provide grants for debt relief for the poorest and most 
vulnerable countries hit by catastrophic natural disasters or public health disasters” 
(IMF 2020e). However, for the time being only 33 countries are eligible for support from 
the CCRT (IMF 2020f).11 For the majority of member countries, including climate 
vulnerable developing countries, the IMF has no specific frameworks or instruments to 
deal with climate-related debt.
Overall, despite growing research evidence and financial supervisors’ awareness of the 
materiality of climate-related financial risks (NGFS 2019), climate risk considerations 
have thus far been largely excluded from the IMF’s policies. The IMF’s own publications 
have established that “climate change is potentially macro-critical” (IMF 2019a), but 
also reveal that staff may still consider climate change to not be macro-critical in some 
countries. The macro-criticality standard as used by the IMF towards questions of 
engagement on macro-structural issues needs to be discussed, especially in the 
context of the IMF’s dealing with climate vulnerable countries.
In the case of climate-related surveillance, the Fund has indicated it will focus on two 
principal types of climate risks: physical risks posed by the increasing severity of 
climate impacts, and transition risks posed by a change in the value of fossil-fuel 
assets. However, the Fund has also indicated that surveillance on climate issues will not 
be mandatory in Article IV consultations, raising the prospect of climate risk being 
evaluated from some countries, but not others. It is understood that a staff guidance 
note on operationalising climate issues at country level, in particular in surveillance, is 
in development.
5. Results from interviews and a survey among the V20
To explore the views and preferences of V20 countries regarding the IMF’s role, a 
written survey was sent to all ministries of finance and central banks of V20 countries 
(as well as a few selected other climate vulnerable countries) in August 2020. The 
complete questionnaire is presented in Annex 1. The surveys were sent to the official 
V20 contact person at the respective institution. As of 23 September 2020, 12 
completed surveys were returned by 6 ministries of finance and 6 central banks from 10 
countries, including 2 non-V20 countries.
To complement the written survey, structured interviews were conducted with senior 
officials from finance ministries and central banks of several V20 countries between 
June and September 2020, including from institutions and countries that did not 
respond to the written survey. The responses in the interviews are in line with the written 
survey responses presented in the following. Given the small sample of respondents 
and potential self-selection bias, the survey responses should not be seen as 
representative of the V20 group as a whole. Still, they provide interesting insights how 
finance ministries and central banks of climate vulnerable countries are coping with 
climate-related risks.
General questions
All institutions have already taken steps to understand potential climate impacts and 
risks over the next 10-20 years, although the majority stated that they have conducted 
only “some analysis”. Only two respondents stated that their institutions had 
undertaken extensive/comprehensive analysis to date. All respondents stated that their 
organisation has been involved in efforts to reduce adverse impacts of climate change, 
e.g. through better planning and investing in a more climate-resilient economy, financial 
sector, and infrastructure. Seven organisations have already taken steps to better 
manage the residual impacts that can’t be reduced, such as through scaled up reserves, 
contingency finance or financial safety nets. 7 institutions (from 6 countries) have thus 
far discussed climate impacts and risks in previous exchanges with the IMF, including 
in technical assistance discussions and Article IV consultations. Of those who did, most 
had the impression that IMF staff are knowledgeable in matters relating to 
macrofinancial risks of climate change, but one was not sure and one negated this.
Surveillance
8 out of 12 respondents expressed the view that the IMF should include a mandatory 
section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all member countries. One 
did not know, while 2 were against making climate risks section in Article IV 
consultations mandatory. One expressed that this should depend on the circumstances 
of each country, with some countries facing important macroeconomic risks that are 
driven by climatic factors while for others those risks are less significant. Using scarce 
Fund resources in the latter cases for this purpose could deviate attention from more 
pressing issues. There was, however, full consensus that the IMF should include a 
mandatory section on climate-related financial risks in the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program assessments it conducts together with the World Bank. 
Moreover, except for one respondent who was not sure, all agreed that the joint World 
Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for low-income economies should be 
enhanced by an analysis of the impact of climate-related financing needs and risks on 
debt sustainability.
Technical assistance and training
To date, only 4 institutions among the respondents had received technical advice on 
mitigating climate risks for public finances and the economy, or on developing disaster 
risk management from the IMF. Regarding technical support on the design of carbon 
taxes, 8 institutions would like to see support from the IMF for their country, 3 were 
unsure, and 2 were against IMF involvement in this. A large majority (10 institutions) 
said they would like to receive support from the IMF in developing a national approach 
for “greening” the financial sector and help them to better address climate-related 
financial risks; one central bank said that this would be an issue for the ministry of 
finance but thought that combined support by the IMF and the World Bank may be 
desirable. One institution was negative regarding a possible role of the IMF in this. The 
picture was almost the same regarding potential support from the IMF in developing an 
energy transition scenario analysis, with 8 institutions indicating interest, while two 
institutions did not see a role for the IMF in this.
10 out of 12 respondents think the IMF should support its member countries’ financial 
and monetary authorities in developing capacities to better assess climate risks, e.g. via 
climate stress-testing, to inform the design of fiscal, monetary or prudential policies, 
while two were against this. 11 out of 12 respondents believe the IMF should support 
member countries in strengthening public debt management to enable them to better 
account for climate risks in public budgets, with one opposing. 9 respondents think the 
IMF should support governments in developing contingency plans and securing 
pre-arranged contingent financing facilities from different sources, as well as 
insurance-based solutions. While one respondent was unsure, one was against IMF 
involvement and highlighted that it was a problem that contingencies are accounted for 
as expenditures, reducing the already limited fiscal space.
Emergency lending and crisis support
When asked about the biggest financing constraints countries face in terms of 
investing in pre-disaster resilience, disaster preparedness, and ex-post disaster 
response, several respondents highlighted a general constrained fiscal space and 
limited access to concessional funds. Among the 10 countries represented in the 
survey, only one country has to date received emergency support from the IMF in the 
context of a natural (geological/hydrological) disaster. On the question whether the IMF 
should adjust its lending facilities or develop new instruments to support climate 
vulnerable countries, 10 respondents answered yes, one no, and one wasn’t sure. One 
respondent highlighted that vulnerable countries may need grants as opposed to 
changing lending conditions, as most of them have high debt already and are 
experiencing growing problems in managing debt payments. 8 respondents think that 
the IMF should raise access under the RCF and the RFI, 2 were unsure and two did not 
answer this question. 9 respondents thought the IMF should explore linking a new 
climate disaster facility to an issuance of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which would 
benefit only countries hit by climate disasters; 2 respondents were unsure about this; 
and 1 respondent did not answer this.
Debt sustainability
Regarding debt sustainability, 9 respondents expressed the view that the IMF should 
explore options for a special treatment of climate debt (i.e. public debt that has been 
incurred as a direct result of climate disasters or necessary adaptation measures), 
while one was unsure and one thought that there should be no special treatment of 
climate-related debt but new metrics for debt in general. 7 respondents think the IMF 
should promote the inclusion of natural disaster clauses in sovereign debt contracts, 
while 3 were unsure, one against, and one did not respond. 8 respondents think the IMF 
should promote the use of instruments such as GDP-linked bonds or catastrophe 
bonds that reduce debt burdens in case of a (climate) disaster, while 2 were unsure, one 
against, and one did not respond. The majority of respondents – 8 – also thought that 
the IMF should work on developing a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, while 2 
were unsure, one against, and one did not respond. Lastly, 9 respondents consider it 
helpful to have an overview of critical metrics on what can be considered 
“unsustainable debt” vs. “sustainable debt”, with 2 respondents unsure on this and one 
did not respond.
Overall, the survey results – as well as the interviews – indicate that most V20 countries 
would like to see more support from the IMF in addressing climate vulnerabilities. Most 
finance ministries and central banks in V20 countries are still in early stages when it 
comes to analysing climate-related macrofinancial risks and would benefit from greater 
support in this area from the IMF. Most thought that the IMF should integrate climate 
risk analysis in its surveillance activities, including Article IV consultations as well as 
Financial Sector Assessment Program assessments and Debt Sustainability 
Framework analysis conducted together with the World Bank. There was also a 
widespread interest in receiving technical support from the IMF for climate-proofing 
public finances and developing disaster risk management. Last but not least, countries 
see a need for better frameworks for dealing with debt in general and climate-related 
debt in particular.
6. Considerations for a V20-IMF Joint Action Agenda
For mainstreaming climate-related financial risks assessment in its operations, the IMF 
needs to recognise that climate risks are different from the traditional type of risk 
addressed in financial risk analyses. Traditional financial risk evaluation and 
benchmarks are backward-looking, i.e. based on historical performances, while climate 
risks are forward-looking and characterised by deep uncertainty, non-linearity and 
endogeneity (Battiston and Monasterolo 2019). Importantly, climate risks can be 
amplified by the complexity of the financial system. 
Ignoring forward-looking climate risks in policy design and implementation could lead 
to unintended effects on financial stability and inequality and broaden countries’ 
distance to their climate and economic targets. This, in turn, may create new sources of 
risk for countries’ macroeconomic and financial stability. Thus, assessing countries’ 
exposures to climate-related macrofinancial risks should be at the core of the IMF’s 
work (Volz 2020a). However, traditional financial risk approaches as currently used by 
the IMF are not designed to consider such characteristics and need to be 
complemented to assess the private and public sectors’ exposure (either via the 
physical or transition risk channel) to forward-looking climate-related risks; to analyse 
the largest sources of macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances induced by countries’ 
exposures to climate-related risks; and to design tailored measures to mitigate such 
risks, while addressing potential trade-offs on sustainable development and inequality.
A V20-IMF collaboration could establish a programme of work involving both the IMF 
and the V20 economies aimed at promoting actions to enhance resilience to climate 
change. A Joint Action Agenda has the potential to drive transformational action to 
minimise climate risks. Some questions to consider in the framing of the Joint Action 
Agenda include: . What further steps could the IMF take to further strengthen the treatment of 
climate     risks in its operations, including in surveillance, policy support and 
financial  assistance? . What policy options are available to V20 members in order to accelerate efforts  
to tac kle climate risks to the economy during the pandemic response and 
recovery, as well as in the longer-term?.   What avenues of international support needs in terms of finance and policy 
assistance could the IMF explore in order to ensure highly vulnerable 
economies are effectively supported to pursue these policy options?
Building on the preceding discussion, the following ten areas could form the basis for a 
Joint Action Agenda by the V20 and IMF.
6.1 Mainstreaming Systematic and Transparent Assessment of Climate-related 
Financial Risks in all IMF Operations
The IMF should mainstream a transparent assessment of climate-related financial 
risks in its operations. As the availability and sophistication of science-based climate 
financial risk metrics and methods such as climate stress-testing and climate-financial 
pricing models increase, the IMF has a solid ground for starting its assessment of 
climate-related financial risks, in order to better anchor and inform its policy work. Given 
the role of the financial sector in the economy and society, the assessment of 
climate-related financial risks and opportunities should be implemented in a 
transparent and independent way.
6.2 Consistent, Systematic, and Universal Appraisal and Treatment of Physical 
Climate Risks and Transition Risks for All Countries in Article IV Consultations and 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs
By including a mandatory section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all 
member countries, the IMF can mainstream the assessment of climate risks in 
countries’ financial stability analyses. A consistent, systematic, and universal treatment 
of climate risks in Article IV consultations will facilitate better management and 
mitigation of macrofinancial risks through governments and enhance the recognition of 
such risks by the financial sector.
The IMF could also introduce a mandatory section on climate-related financial risks to 
the Financial Sector Assessment Programs it conducts jointly with the World Bank. 
Importantly, the IMF should recognise the unique susceptibilities of climate vulnerable 
countries, stemming from both physical and transition risks, and support their financial 
and monetary authorities in developing capacities to better assess and respond to 
climate risks, e.g. via climate stress-testing to inform the design of prudential policies, 
when needed.
A better analysis of climate-related macrofinancial risks will not only enable better 
micro- and macroprudential policies to safeguard macrofinancial stability, it should also 
lead to better pricing of these risks by financial markets, which will contribute to 
overcoming barriers to scaling-up sustainable investment (Monasterolo and Volz 
2020).
6.3 Advancing Disclosure of Climate-related Financial Risks and Promoting 
Sustainable Finance and Investment Practices
Aligning financial markets with sustainable development and the Paris climate goals 
will be crucial for enhancing resilience of climate vulnerable countries. The IMF’s 2020 
Global Financial Stability Report highlights the way investors and equity markets have 
long ignored the growing risk of financial losses associated with climate risk (IMF, 
2020h). The IMF could use its unique role in international finance to promote the 
disclosure of climate-related financial risks and the development of sustainable finance 
and investment practices. Well-developed financial markets that account for 
sustainability risks facilitate climate-friendly private sector investment.
  
change on the medium- to long-term quality and sustainability of public finances and 
mainstream climate risk analysis in public financial management. Based on climate 
vulnerability assessments, the IMF can help finance ministries identify potential risks 
on the expenditure and revenue side. The IMF could also support V20 countries in 
incorporating fiscal buffers for climate-related risks in budget planning. In particular, it 
could help promote budgetary instruments for ex ante disaster financing, including 
contingency lines and disaster, reserve, or contingency savings funds (Cevik and Huang 
2018).
Since debt sustainability can be affected by a country’s ability to absorb shocks, it is 
important that governments of climate vulnerable countries are supported in 
developing contingency plans including options for securing pre-arranged and 
pre-agreed pricing of risk transfer instruments. The IMF could support the development 
of an international climate disaster risk financing and insurance architecture that 
addresses different layers of risks and provides vulnerable countries with instruments 
for climate and disaster financing (Ahmed et al. 2020).
To enhance debt sustainability, the IMF could promote a discussion around adding 
natural disaster clauses to sovereign debt contracts and the use of instruments such as 
GDP-linked bonds. Moreover, the IMF could seek to enhance transparency of public 
debt contracts, and support governments in asserting that assumptions and terms or 
clauses of debt contracts are realistic and sustainable.
By supporting climate vulnerable countries in strengthening public debt management, 
the IMF can contribute to enhanced debt sustainability and enable a better accounting 
for climate risks and investment opportunities that deliver high socio-economic and 
adaptation dividends in public budgets.
6.6 Supporting Climate Vulnerable Countries with Debt Sustainability Problems
The IMF could play an important role in supporting climate vulnerable countries that are 
facing debt sustainability challenges or are already in debt distress. As recently 
highlighted by Georgieva et al. (2020), a “reform of the international debt architecture is 
urgently needed”. The IMF (2020i) has recently put forward reform options for the 
international architecture for resolving sovereign debt involving private-sector creditors. 
Together with the V20, the IMF could explore options for the treatment of climate debt, 
i.e. public debt that has been incurred as a direct result of climate disasters or 
necessary adaptation measures (Volz 2020). This is particularly relevant for Small 
Island Developing States, where single events can have devastating effects on the 
economy and public finances.12
The joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries 
could be enhanced by a mandatory analysis of the impact of climate-related risks on 
debt sustainability. Such assessment could also be rolled out to climate vulnerable 
middle income countries.
The COVID-19 crisis has worsened public finances in V20 countries. Going forward, 
many developing countries will require debt relief to respond effectively to the crisis and 
undertake meaningful investment to climate-proof their economies. For now, the 
international financial architecture still lacks an adequate system for addressing 
situations where sovereign debt becomes unsustainable. The IMF could explore 
options for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, as was originally proposed by 
the IMF two decades ago (IMF 2003), to deal with debt crises. In this context, the IMF 
could also investigate options for developing a new framework for debt restructuring 
that facilitate a green recovery, including through tools such as debt-for-climate swaps 
(Akhtar et al. 2020).
6.7 Developing the IMF Toolkit for Climate Emergency Financing
The IMF can further develop its existing emergency financing facilities or generate 
options for a new climate emergency financing facility. This is particularly relevant for 
Small Island Developing States though options should be explored as well to include 
other climate vulnerable countries.
One option is to raise access under the RCF/RFI, e.g. up to 400-500 percent of quota. 
Moreover, options should be explored to convert these facilities into grants, particularly 
for PRGT-eligible countries. A further option would be to establish an entirely new 
climate emergency facility. The IMF could consider linking a climate disaster facility to 
the issuance of SDRs, which would benefit only countries hit by climate disasters.
6.8 Exploring Options to Use SDRs to Support Climate Vulnerable Countries
The IMF could consider the possibility of allocating new SDRs as a way of providing 
vulnerable countries with enhanced liquidity. While a general SDR allocation would 
primarily benefit large economies,13 options could be explored where rich countries, 
whose historic carbon emissions are the main cause of anthropogenic climate change, 
make their SDRs available to a new multilateral swap facility or donate their SDRs to a 
trust fund at the IMF, which could use them in a way that benefits climate vulnerable 
countries. Another option would be to develop a mechanism where new SDRs are 
issued exclusively to climate vulnerable countries. Such an SDR issuance could be 
linked to exogenous shocks such as climate-induced disasters, eliminating problems 
with moral hazard. As climate vulnerable countries that have hardly contributed to 
global climate change suffer the biggest impacts, SDR issuances for climate vulnerable 
countries could be a way of enhancing resilience and global climate justice at the same 
time. 
6.9 Supporting the Design and Implementation of Carbon Pricing Mechanisms
The second V20 Ministerial Dialogue in Washington, DC in April 2016 reiterated strong 
support for innovative revenue generating fiscal and financial measures to raise 
finance, stimulate technological innovation and redirect investment toward climate 
resilient and low-emissions development. In this respect, the V20 committed to support 
carbon pricing by working to establish pricing regimes by 2026 taking due 
consideration of each country’s respective capabilities.
Building on its work on its work in using fiscal tools to mitigate climate change (IMF, 
2019b), the IMF could support V20 countries in strengthening their fiscal framework 
and revenue outcomes through the design and implementation of appropriate carbon 
pricing mechanisms. Carbon tax revenues could be redistributed to support 
low-income households or communities affected by the low carbon transition or that 
are hit particularly hard by the physical effects of climate change.
6.10 Institutionalising Collaboration between the Fund and the V20
The current governance structure of multilateral development institutions, including the 
IMF, provides, for the most part, relatively little influence to vulnerable developing 
countries. This poor representation means that when agendas are set and decisions 
are made, vulnerable developing countries do not have the same voice as large 
countries or groups such as the G7 and G20. This matters not just in terms of securing 
robust country ownership of global financial responses but also in terms of establishing 
measures more responsive to distinct national circumstances.
The V20 has the ability to coordinate the position of vulnerable developing countries 
including small island developing states and nations that typically lack representation 
on monetary and development issues in the deliberations and decisions of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions. In particular, the V20 can feed into the agendas of the International 
Monetary and Financial Committee and the joint World Bank-IMF Development 
Committee, as well as in other relevant fora.
To provide a platform to climate vulnerable developing countries to articulate their 
views and interests, the IMF should recognise the V20 as an official stakeholder and 
hold regular consultations with the V20. Joint agendas are critical in order to develop a 
joint understanding and solutions to the problems created by climate change. Since 
October 2015, the V20 finance ministers have met biannually with the World Bank at the 
Annual and Spring Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank Group. The IMF could join 
the World Bank in holding regular, bi-annual meetings with the V20. A continuous 
exchange between the IMF and the V20 would provide the opportunity to develop and 
implement a joint action agenda.
7. Conclusion
The V20 economies face considerable macrofinancial risks that can undermine debt 
sustainability, constrain fiscal space, and worsen sovereign risk, among other effects. 
Most financial and monetary authorities of climate vulnerable countries are in the early 
stages of analysing these risks and incorporating them in their macrofinancial 
frameworks. They also face the urgent and growing need to develop more effective 
approaches that climate-proof public finances and establish climate and disaster risk 
management structures.
The IMF has a critical role in addressing climate change through its policy advice and 
capacity building functions, surveillance, and the promotion of policy frameworks to 
mobilise investments. The IMF has recently started to put greater emphasis on climate 
risk and is in the process of developing its strategy and capacities in this area. There 
seems to be a clear demand among climate vulnerable countries for support from the 
IMF in all three areas of its operational work, i.e. surveillance, technical assistance and 
training, and emergency lending and crisis support. A partnership between the V20 and 
IMF could help climate vulnerable countries to better mitigate and manage systemic 
climate risks, and enable a macroeconomic environment that can facilitate investments 
in adaptation and development.
6.4 Exploring synergies between Fiscal and Monetary Policies 
The IMF could explore synergies between fiscal and monetary policies as well as 
macroprudential regulations to identify an optimal policy mix that would enhance 
finance for development oriented towards just transition outcomes while improving 
economic competitiveness and ensuring macrofinancial stability. In this regard, closer 
collaboration between financial institutions acting on climate finance, including 
development finance institutions, central banks and financial regulators, would be 
crucial. By considering the materiality of forward-looking climate risks in the design of 
fiscal and financial policies, the IMF could support its membership in general, and 
climate vulnerable countries in particular, in building resilience to such risks while 
scaling up investments needed to achieve climate targets. Not doing so could lead to a 
disorderly transition leading to increasing liabilities and stranding risk for both public 
and private sector, generating adverse effects on financial stability and inequality.
6.5 Mainstreaming of Climate Risk Analysis in Public Financial Management and 
Supporting the Development of a Climate Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance 
Architecture
Through policy advice and technical assistance, the IMF can support climate vulnerable 
countries in climate-proofing public finances. In particular, the IMF can encourage and 
provide advice to finance ministries on how to analyse the potential impacts of climate 
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Source: Volz (2020a).
Note: Included are all the published staff reports of Article IV consultations that took place between 
January 2000 and June 2020 that include the words ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, ‘climate-related’ or 
‘climate risk’. Article IV reports which show at least ten references to ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, 
‘climate risk’ and/or ‘climate-related’ or provide at least one whole paragraph, box or section on the 
topic are categorised as making “substantial reference” to climate change. All others are categorised 
as making “some reference” to climate change. The year refers to the year in which the consultation 
was held, not the year of first publication as a staff report.
At the country level, the IMF conducts two surveillance activities jointly with the World 
Bank: Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and Debt Sustainability Analyses for 
low-income countries. To date, climate change has played no or little role in the 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and where it does, it is covered in the parts 
produced by the World Bank. Likewise, the joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability 
Analyses for low-income countries, which are structured examinations of developing 
country debt based on the Debt Sustainability Framework, do not systematically 
address climate risk analysis for the time being. The latest Debt Sustainability Analysis 
that was carried out for Somalia as part of the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative in 2020, however, did include a simulation of a climate shock 
scenario (IMF 2020c).
At the regional level, the IMF has organised a number or regional dialogues for Pacific 
islands and the Caribbean.9 Among the flagship publications for regional surveillance, 
the Regional Economic Outlooks (REO), to date only the 2020 REO for Sub-Saharan 
Africa had a special chapter dedicated to ‘Adapting to Climate Change in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’ (IMF 2020a).
The IMF’s global surveillance has to date not systematically addressed climate-related 
macrofinancial risks in a major report or integrated this issue in its regular monitoring 
exercises. The IMF published the already-mentioned chapter on the impact of weather 
shocks on economic activity in low-income countries in the 2017 World Economic 
Outlook report (IMF 2017), a chapter on sustainable finance in the 2019 Global 
Financial Stability Report (IMF 2019c) and an analysis of mitigating climate change in 
the 2019 Fiscal Monitor, which focused on carbon pricing. 
With respect to technical assistance, the IMF – together with the World Bank – has thus 
far conducted so-called Climate Change Policy Assessments for six countries: the 
Seychelles (June 2017), St. Lucia (June 2018), Belize (November 2018), Grenada (July 
2019), the Federated States of Micronesia (September 2019), and Tonga (June 2020). 
Climate Change Policy Assessments provide “an overarching assessment of countries’ 
climate strategies—as articulated in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
and other government documents” and “are intended to help countries build coherent 
macro-frameworks for responding to climate change, which could improve prospects 
for attracting external finance and put future revisions to NDCs on a sound footing” (IMF 
2020b).
Regarding the IMF’s third main area of work, supporting member countries facing 
balance of payments difficulties and providing temporary financing, the IMF has a 
Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) and a Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) which can be each 
used in catastrophe situations including climate disasters. The RCF “provides rapid 
concessional financial assistance with limited conditionality to low-income countries 
(LICs) facing an urgent balance of payments need” (IMF 2020d). The RCF’s 
concessional financial support is provided exclusively to LICs through the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT). Member countries that are not PRGT-eligible can 
access the RFI.10 However, while both the RCF and RFI provide quick access to finance, 
they are both quota-based and provide only small emergency support. The IMF has not 
yet had a meaningful discussion about adjusting these facilities or create a new facility 
that would be tailored to support members in responding to shocks related to climate 
change.
The IMF toolkit also comprises the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT), 
which enables the Fund “to provide grants for debt relief for the poorest and most 
vulnerable countries hit by catastrophic natural disasters or public health disasters” 
(IMF 2020e). However, for the time being only 33 countries are eligible for support from 
the CCRT (IMF 2020f).11 For the majority of member countries, including climate 
vulnerable developing countries, the IMF has no specific frameworks or instruments to 
deal with climate-related debt.
Overall, despite growing research evidence and financial supervisors’ awareness of the 
materiality of climate-related financial risks (NGFS 2019), climate risk considerations 
have thus far been largely excluded from the IMF’s policies. The IMF’s own publications 
have established that “climate change is potentially macro-critical” (IMF 2019a), but 
also reveal that staff may still consider climate change to not be macro-critical in some 
countries. The macro-criticality standard as used by the IMF towards questions of 
engagement on macro-structural issues needs to be discussed, especially in the 
context of the IMF’s dealing with climate vulnerable countries.
In the case of climate-related surveillance, the Fund has indicated it will focus on two 
principal types of climate risks: physical risks posed by the increasing severity of 
climate impacts, and transition risks posed by a change in the value of fossil-fuel 
assets. However, the Fund has also indicated that surveillance on climate issues will not 
be mandatory in Article IV consultations, raising the prospect of climate risk being 
evaluated from some countries, but not others. It is understood that a staff guidance 
note on operationalising climate issues at country level, in particular in surveillance, is 
in development.
5. Results from interviews and a survey among the V20
To explore the views and preferences of V20 countries regarding the IMF’s role, a 
written survey was sent to all ministries of finance and central banks of V20 countries 
(as well as a few selected other climate vulnerable countries) in August 2020. The 
complete questionnaire is presented in Annex 1. The surveys were sent to the official 
V20 contact person at the respective institution. As of 23 September 2020, 12 
completed surveys were returned by 6 ministries of finance and 6 central banks from 10 
countries, including 2 non-V20 countries.
To complement the written survey, structured interviews were conducted with senior 
officials from finance ministries and central banks of several V20 countries between 
June and September 2020, including from institutions and countries that did not 
respond to the written survey. The responses in the interviews are in line with the written 
survey responses presented in the following. Given the small sample of respondents 
and potential self-selection bias, the survey responses should not be seen as 
representative of the V20 group as a whole. Still, they provide interesting insights how 
finance ministries and central banks of climate vulnerable countries are coping with 
climate-related risks.
General questions
All institutions have already taken steps to understand potential climate impacts and 
risks over the next 10-20 years, although the majority stated that they have conducted 
only “some analysis”. Only two respondents stated that their institutions had 
undertaken extensive/comprehensive analysis to date. All respondents stated that their 
organisation has been involved in efforts to reduce adverse impacts of climate change, 
e.g. through better planning and investing in a more climate-resilient economy, financial 
sector, and infrastructure. Seven organisations have already taken steps to better 
manage the residual impacts that can’t be reduced, such as through scaled up reserves, 
contingency finance or financial safety nets. 7 institutions (from 6 countries) have thus 
far discussed climate impacts and risks in previous exchanges with the IMF, including 
in technical assistance discussions and Article IV consultations. Of those who did, most 
had the impression that IMF staff are knowledgeable in matters relating to 
macrofinancial risks of climate change, but one was not sure and one negated this.
Surveillance
8 out of 12 respondents expressed the view that the IMF should include a mandatory 
section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all member countries. One 
did not know, while 2 were against making climate risks section in Article IV 
consultations mandatory. One expressed that this should depend on the circumstances 
of each country, with some countries facing important macroeconomic risks that are 
driven by climatic factors while for others those risks are less significant. Using scarce 
Fund resources in the latter cases for this purpose could deviate attention from more 
pressing issues. There was, however, full consensus that the IMF should include a 
mandatory section on climate-related financial risks in the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program assessments it conducts together with the World Bank. 
Moreover, except for one respondent who was not sure, all agreed that the joint World 
Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for low-income economies should be 
enhanced by an analysis of the impact of climate-related financing needs and risks on 
debt sustainability.
Technical assistance and training
To date, only 4 institutions among the respondents had received technical advice on 
mitigating climate risks for public finances and the economy, or on developing disaster 
risk management from the IMF. Regarding technical support on the design of carbon 
taxes, 8 institutions would like to see support from the IMF for their country, 3 were 
unsure, and 2 were against IMF involvement in this. A large majority (10 institutions) 
said they would like to receive support from the IMF in developing a national approach 
for “greening” the financial sector and help them to better address climate-related 
financial risks; one central bank said that this would be an issue for the ministry of 
finance but thought that combined support by the IMF and the World Bank may be 
desirable. One institution was negative regarding a possible role of the IMF in this. The 
picture was almost the same regarding potential support from the IMF in developing an 
energy transition scenario analysis, with 8 institutions indicating interest, while two 
institutions did not see a role for the IMF in this.
10 out of 12 respondents think the IMF should support its member countries’ financial 
and monetary authorities in developing capacities to better assess climate risks, e.g. via 
climate stress-testing, to inform the design of fiscal, monetary or prudential policies, 
while two were against this. 11 out of 12 respondents believe the IMF should support 
member countries in strengthening public debt management to enable them to better 
account for climate risks in public budgets, with one opposing. 9 respondents think the 
IMF should support governments in developing contingency plans and securing 
pre-arranged contingent financing facilities from different sources, as well as 
insurance-based solutions. While one respondent was unsure, one was against IMF 
involvement and highlighted that it was a problem that contingencies are accounted for 
as expenditures, reducing the already limited fiscal space.
Emergency lending and crisis support
When asked about the biggest financing constraints countries face in terms of 
investing in pre-disaster resilience, disaster preparedness, and ex-post disaster 
response, several respondents highlighted a general constrained fiscal space and 
limited access to concessional funds. Among the 10 countries represented in the 
survey, only one country has to date received emergency support from the IMF in the 
context of a natural (geological/hydrological) disaster. On the question whether the IMF 
should adjust its lending facilities or develop new instruments to support climate 
vulnerable countries, 10 respondents answered yes, one no, and one wasn’t sure. One 
respondent highlighted that vulnerable countries may need grants as opposed to 
changing lending conditions, as most of them have high debt already and are 
experiencing growing problems in managing debt payments. 8 respondents think that 
the IMF should raise access under the RCF and the RFI, 2 were unsure and two did not 
answer this question. 9 respondents thought the IMF should explore linking a new 
climate disaster facility to an issuance of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which would 
benefit only countries hit by climate disasters; 2 respondents were unsure about this; 
and 1 respondent did not answer this.
Debt sustainability
Regarding debt sustainability, 9 respondents expressed the view that the IMF should 
explore options for a special treatment of climate debt (i.e. public debt that has been 
incurred as a direct result of climate disasters or necessary adaptation measures), 
while one was unsure and one thought that there should be no special treatment of 
climate-related debt but new metrics for debt in general. 7 respondents think the IMF 
should promote the inclusion of natural disaster clauses in sovereign debt contracts, 
while 3 were unsure, one against, and one did not respond. 8 respondents think the IMF 
should promote the use of instruments such as GDP-linked bonds or catastrophe 
bonds that reduce debt burdens in case of a (climate) disaster, while 2 were unsure, one 
against, and one did not respond. The majority of respondents – 8 – also thought that 
the IMF should work on developing a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, while 2 
were unsure, one against, and one did not respond. Lastly, 9 respondents consider it 
helpful to have an overview of critical metrics on what can be considered 
“unsustainable debt” vs. “sustainable debt”, with 2 respondents unsure on this and one 
did not respond.
Overall, the survey results – as well as the interviews – indicate that most V20 countries 
would like to see more support from the IMF in addressing climate vulnerabilities. Most 
finance ministries and central banks in V20 countries are still in early stages when it 
comes to analysing climate-related macrofinancial risks and would benefit from greater 
support in this area from the IMF. Most thought that the IMF should integrate climate 
risk analysis in its surveillance activities, including Article IV consultations as well as 
Financial Sector Assessment Program assessments and Debt Sustainability 
Framework analysis conducted together with the World Bank. There was also a 
widespread interest in receiving technical support from the IMF for climate-proofing 
public finances and developing disaster risk management. Last but not least, countries 
see a need for better frameworks for dealing with debt in general and climate-related 
debt in particular.
6. Considerations for a V20-IMF Joint Action Agenda
For mainstreaming climate-related financial risks assessment in its operations, the IMF 
needs to recognise that climate risks are different from the traditional type of risk 
addressed in financial risk analyses. Traditional financial risk evaluation and 
benchmarks are backward-looking, i.e. based on historical performances, while climate 
risks are forward-looking and characterised by deep uncertainty, non-linearity and 
endogeneity (Battiston and Monasterolo 2019). Importantly, climate risks can be 
amplified by the complexity of the financial system. 
Ignoring forward-looking climate risks in policy design and implementation could lead 
to unintended effects on financial stability and inequality and broaden countries’ 
distance to their climate and economic targets. This, in turn, may create new sources of 
risk for countries’ macroeconomic and financial stability. Thus, assessing countries’ 
exposures to climate-related macrofinancial risks should be at the core of the IMF’s 
work (Volz 2020a). However, traditional financial risk approaches as currently used by 
the IMF are not designed to consider such characteristics and need to be 
complemented to assess the private and public sectors’ exposure (either via the 
physical or transition risk channel) to forward-looking climate-related risks; to analyse 
the largest sources of macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances induced by countries’ 
exposures to climate-related risks; and to design tailored measures to mitigate such 
risks, while addressing potential trade-offs on sustainable development and inequality.
A V20-IMF collaboration could establish a programme of work involving both the IMF 
and the V20 economies aimed at promoting actions to enhance resilience to climate 
change. A Joint Action Agenda has the potential to drive transformational action to 
minimise climate risks. Some questions to consider in the framing of the Joint Action 
Agenda include: . What further steps could the IMF take to further strengthen the treatment of 
climate     risks in its operations, including in surveillance, policy support and 
financial  assistance? . What policy options are available to V20 members in order to accelerate efforts  
to tac kle climate risks to the economy during the pandemic response and 
recovery, as well as in the longer-term?.   What avenues of international support needs in terms of finance and policy 
assistance could the IMF explore in order to ensure highly vulnerable 
economies are effectively supported to pursue these policy options?
Building on the preceding discussion, the following ten areas could form the basis for a 
Joint Action Agenda by the V20 and IMF.
6.1 Mainstreaming Systematic and Transparent Assessment of Climate-related 
Financial Risks in all IMF Operations
The IMF should mainstream a transparent assessment of climate-related financial 
risks in its operations. As the availability and sophistication of science-based climate 
financial risk metrics and methods such as climate stress-testing and climate-financial 
pricing models increase, the IMF has a solid ground for starting its assessment of 
climate-related financial risks, in order to better anchor and inform its policy work. Given 
the role of the financial sector in the economy and society, the assessment of 
climate-related financial risks and opportunities should be implemented in a 
transparent and independent way.
6.2 Consistent, Systematic, and Universal Appraisal and Treatment of Physical 
Climate Risks and Transition Risks for All Countries in Article IV Consultations and 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs
By including a mandatory section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all 
member countries, the IMF can mainstream the assessment of climate risks in 
countries’ financial stability analyses. A consistent, systematic, and universal treatment 
of climate risks in Article IV consultations will facilitate better management and 
mitigation of macrofinancial risks through governments and enhance the recognition of 
such risks by the financial sector.
The IMF could also introduce a mandatory section on climate-related financial risks to 
the Financial Sector Assessment Programs it conducts jointly with the World Bank. 
Importantly, the IMF should recognise the unique susceptibilities of climate vulnerable 
countries, stemming from both physical and transition risks, and support their financial 
and monetary authorities in developing capacities to better assess and respond to 
climate risks, e.g. via climate stress-testing to inform the design of prudential policies, 
when needed.
A better analysis of climate-related macrofinancial risks will not only enable better 
micro- and macroprudential policies to safeguard macrofinancial stability, it should also 
lead to better pricing of these risks by financial markets, which will contribute to 
overcoming barriers to scaling-up sustainable investment (Monasterolo and Volz 
2020).
6.3 Advancing Disclosure of Climate-related Financial Risks and Promoting 
Sustainable Finance and Investment Practices
Aligning financial markets with sustainable development and the Paris climate goals 
will be crucial for enhancing resilience of climate vulnerable countries. The IMF’s 2020 
Global Financial Stability Report highlights the way investors and equity markets have 
long ignored the growing risk of financial losses associated with climate risk (IMF, 
2020h). The IMF could use its unique role in international finance to promote the 
disclosure of climate-related financial risks and the development of sustainable finance 
and investment practices. Well-developed financial markets that account for 
sustainability risks facilitate climate-friendly private sector investment.
  
change on the medium- to long-term quality and sustainability of public finances and 
mainstream climate risk analysis in public financial management. Based on climate 
vulnerability assessments, the IMF can help finance ministries identify potential risks 
on the expenditure and revenue side. The IMF could also support V20 countries in 
incorporating fiscal buffers for climate-related risks in budget planning. In particular, it 
could help promote budgetary instruments for ex ante disaster financing, including 
contingency lines and disaster, reserve, or contingency savings funds (Cevik and Huang 
2018).
Since debt sustainability can be affected by a country’s ability to absorb shocks, it is 
important that governments of climate vulnerable countries are supported in 
developing contingency plans including options for securing pre-arranged and 
pre-agreed pricing of risk transfer instruments. The IMF could support the development 
of an international climate disaster risk financing and insurance architecture that 
addresses different layers of risks and provides vulnerable countries with instruments 
for climate and disaster financing (Ahmed et al. 2020).
To enhance debt sustainability, the IMF could promote a discussion around adding 
natural disaster clauses to sovereign debt contracts and the use of instruments such as 
GDP-linked bonds. Moreover, the IMF could seek to enhance transparency of public 
debt contracts, and support governments in asserting that assumptions and terms or 
clauses of debt contracts are realistic and sustainable.
By supporting climate vulnerable countries in strengthening public debt management, 
the IMF can contribute to enhanced debt sustainability and enable a better accounting 
for climate risks and investment opportunities that deliver high socio-economic and 
adaptation dividends in public budgets.
6.6 Supporting Climate Vulnerable Countries with Debt Sustainability Problems
The IMF could play an important role in supporting climate vulnerable countries that are 
facing debt sustainability challenges or are already in debt distress. As recently 
highlighted by Georgieva et al. (2020), a “reform of the international debt architecture is 
urgently needed”. The IMF (2020i) has recently put forward reform options for the 
international architecture for resolving sovereign debt involving private-sector creditors. 
Together with the V20, the IMF could explore options for the treatment of climate debt, 
i.e. public debt that has been incurred as a direct result of climate disasters or 
necessary adaptation measures (Volz 2020). This is particularly relevant for Small 
Island Developing States, where single events can have devastating effects on the 
economy and public finances.12
The joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries 
could be enhanced by a mandatory analysis of the impact of climate-related risks on 
debt sustainability. Such assessment could also be rolled out to climate vulnerable 
middle income countries.
The COVID-19 crisis has worsened public finances in V20 countries. Going forward, 
many developing countries will require debt relief to respond effectively to the crisis and 
undertake meaningful investment to climate-proof their economies. For now, the 
international financial architecture still lacks an adequate system for addressing 
situations where sovereign debt becomes unsustainable. The IMF could explore 
options for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, as was originally proposed by 
the IMF two decades ago (IMF 2003), to deal with debt crises. In this context, the IMF 
could also investigate options for developing a new framework for debt restructuring 
that facilitate a green recovery, including through tools such as debt-for-climate swaps 
(Akhtar et al. 2020).
6.7 Developing the IMF Toolkit for Climate Emergency Financing
The IMF can further develop its existing emergency financing facilities or generate 
options for a new climate emergency financing facility. This is particularly relevant for 
Small Island Developing States though options should be explored as well to include 
other climate vulnerable countries.
One option is to raise access under the RCF/RFI, e.g. up to 400-500 percent of quota. 
Moreover, options should be explored to convert these facilities into grants, particularly 
for PRGT-eligible countries. A further option would be to establish an entirely new 
climate emergency facility. The IMF could consider linking a climate disaster facility to 
the issuance of SDRs, which would benefit only countries hit by climate disasters.
6.8 Exploring Options to Use SDRs to Support Climate Vulnerable Countries
The IMF could consider the possibility of allocating new SDRs as a way of providing 
vulnerable countries with enhanced liquidity. While a general SDR allocation would 
primarily benefit large economies,13 options could be explored where rich countries, 
whose historic carbon emissions are the main cause of anthropogenic climate change, 
make their SDRs available to a new multilateral swap facility or donate their SDRs to a 
trust fund at the IMF, which could use them in a way that benefits climate vulnerable 
countries. Another option would be to develop a mechanism where new SDRs are 
issued exclusively to climate vulnerable countries. Such an SDR issuance could be 
linked to exogenous shocks such as climate-induced disasters, eliminating problems 
with moral hazard. As climate vulnerable countries that have hardly contributed to 
global climate change suffer the biggest impacts, SDR issuances for climate vulnerable 
countries could be a way of enhancing resilience and global climate justice at the same 
time. 
6.9 Supporting the Design and Implementation of Carbon Pricing Mechanisms
The second V20 Ministerial Dialogue in Washington, DC in April 2016 reiterated strong 
support for innovative revenue generating fiscal and financial measures to raise 
finance, stimulate technological innovation and redirect investment toward climate 
resilient and low-emissions development. In this respect, the V20 committed to support 
carbon pricing by working to establish pricing regimes by 2026 taking due 
consideration of each country’s respective capabilities.
Building on its work on its work in using fiscal tools to mitigate climate change (IMF, 
2019b), the IMF could support V20 countries in strengthening their fiscal framework 
and revenue outcomes through the design and implementation of appropriate carbon 
pricing mechanisms. Carbon tax revenues could be redistributed to support 
low-income households or communities affected by the low carbon transition or that 
are hit particularly hard by the physical effects of climate change.
6.10 Institutionalising Collaboration between the Fund and the V20
The current governance structure of multilateral development institutions, including the 
IMF, provides, for the most part, relatively little influence to vulnerable developing 
countries. This poor representation means that when agendas are set and decisions 
are made, vulnerable developing countries do not have the same voice as large 
countries or groups such as the G7 and G20. This matters not just in terms of securing 
robust country ownership of global financial responses but also in terms of establishing 
measures more responsive to distinct national circumstances.
The V20 has the ability to coordinate the position of vulnerable developing countries 
including small island developing states and nations that typically lack representation 
on monetary and development issues in the deliberations and decisions of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions. In particular, the V20 can feed into the agendas of the International 
Monetary and Financial Committee and the joint World Bank-IMF Development 
Committee, as well as in other relevant fora.
To provide a platform to climate vulnerable developing countries to articulate their 
views and interests, the IMF should recognise the V20 as an official stakeholder and 
hold regular consultations with the V20. Joint agendas are critical in order to develop a 
joint understanding and solutions to the problems created by climate change. Since 
October 2015, the V20 finance ministers have met biannually with the World Bank at the 
Annual and Spring Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank Group. The IMF could join 
the World Bank in holding regular, bi-annual meetings with the V20. A continuous 
exchange between the IMF and the V20 would provide the opportunity to develop and 
implement a joint action agenda.
7. Conclusion
The V20 economies face considerable macrofinancial risks that can undermine debt 
sustainability, constrain fiscal space, and worsen sovereign risk, among other effects. 
Most financial and monetary authorities of climate vulnerable countries are in the early 
stages of analysing these risks and incorporating them in their macrofinancial 
frameworks. They also face the urgent and growing need to develop more effective 
approaches that climate-proof public finances and establish climate and disaster risk 
management structures.
The IMF has a critical role in addressing climate change through its policy advice and 
capacity building functions, surveillance, and the promotion of policy frameworks to 
mobilise investments. The IMF has recently started to put greater emphasis on climate 
risk and is in the process of developing its strategy and capacities in this area. There 
seems to be a clear demand among climate vulnerable countries for support from the 
IMF in all three areas of its operational work, i.e. surveillance, technical assistance and 
training, and emergency lending and crisis support. A partnership between the V20 and 
IMF could help climate vulnerable countries to better mitigate and manage systemic 
climate risks, and enable a macroeconomic environment that can facilitate investments 
in adaptation and development.
6.4 Exploring synergies between Fiscal and Monetary Policies 
The IMF could explore synergies between fiscal and monetary policies as well as 
macroprudential regulations to identify an optimal policy mix that would enhance 
finance for development oriented towards just transition outcomes while improving 
economic competitiveness and ensuring macrofinancial stability. In this regard, closer 
collaboration between financial institutions acting on climate finance, including 
development finance institutions, central banks and financial regulators, would be 
crucial. By considering the materiality of forward-looking climate risks in the design of 
fiscal and financial policies, the IMF could support its membership in general, and 
climate vulnerable countries in particular, in building resilience to such risks while 
scaling up investments needed to achieve climate targets. Not doing so could lead to a 
disorderly transition leading to increasing liabilities and stranding risk for both public 
and private sector, generating adverse effects on financial stability and inequality.
6.5 Mainstreaming of Climate Risk Analysis in Public Financial Management and 
Supporting the Development of a Climate Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance 
Architecture
Through policy advice and technical assistance, the IMF can support climate vulnerable 
countries in climate-proofing public finances. In particular, the IMF can encourage and 
provide advice to finance ministries on how to analyse the potential impacts of climate 
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Source: Volz (2020a).
Note: Included are all the published staff reports of Article IV consultations that took place between 
January 2000 and June 2020 that include the words ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, ‘climate-related’ or 
‘climate risk’. Article IV reports which show at least ten references to ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, 
‘climate risk’ and/or ‘climate-related’ or provide at least one whole paragraph, box or section on the 
topic are categorised as making “substantial reference” to climate change. All others are categorised 
as making “some reference” to climate change. The year refers to the year in which the consultation 
was held, not the year of first publication as a staff report.
At the country level, the IMF conducts two surveillance activities jointly with the World 
Bank: Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and Debt Sustainability Analyses for 
low-income countries. To date, climate change has played no or little role in the 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and where it does, it is covered in the parts 
produced by the World Bank. Likewise, the joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability 
Analyses for low-income countries, which are structured examinations of developing 
country debt based on the Debt Sustainability Framework, do not systematically 
address climate risk analysis for the time being. The latest Debt Sustainability Analysis 
that was carried out for Somalia as part of the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative in 2020, however, did include a simulation of a climate shock 
scenario (IMF 2020c).
At the regional level, the IMF has organised a number or regional dialogues for Pacific 
islands and the Caribbean.9 Among the flagship publications for regional surveillance, 
the Regional Economic Outlooks (REO), to date only the 2020 REO for Sub-Saharan 
Africa had a special chapter dedicated to ‘Adapting to Climate Change in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’ (IMF 2020a).
The IMF’s global surveillance has to date not systematically addressed climate-related 
macrofinancial risks in a major report or integrated this issue in its regular monitoring 
exercises. The IMF published the already-mentioned chapter on the impact of weather 
shocks on economic activity in low-income countries in the 2017 World Economic 
Outlook report (IMF 2017), a chapter on sustainable finance in the 2019 Global 
Financial Stability Report (IMF 2019c) and an analysis of mitigating climate change in 
the 2019 Fiscal Monitor, which focused on carbon pricing. 
With respect to technical assistance, the IMF – together with the World Bank – has thus 
far conducted so-called Climate Change Policy Assessments for six countries: the 
Seychelles (June 2017), St. Lucia (June 2018), Belize (November 2018), Grenada (July 
2019), the Federated States of Micronesia (September 2019), and Tonga (June 2020). 
Climate Change Policy Assessments provide “an overarching assessment of countries’ 
climate strategies—as articulated in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
and other government documents” and “are intended to help countries build coherent 
macro-frameworks for responding to climate change, which could improve prospects 
for attracting external finance and put future revisions to NDCs on a sound footing” (IMF 
2020b).
Regarding the IMF’s third main area of work, supporting member countries facing 
balance of payments difficulties and providing temporary financing, the IMF has a 
Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) and a Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) which can be each 
used in catastrophe situations including climate disasters. The RCF “provides rapid 
concessional financial assistance with limited conditionality to low-income countries 
(LICs) facing an urgent balance of payments need” (IMF 2020d). The RCF’s 
concessional financial support is provided exclusively to LICs through the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT). Member countries that are not PRGT-eligible can 
access the RFI.10 However, while both the RCF and RFI provide quick access to finance, 
they are both quota-based and provide only small emergency support. The IMF has not 
yet had a meaningful discussion about adjusting these facilities or create a new facility 
that would be tailored to support members in responding to shocks related to climate 
change.
The IMF toolkit also comprises the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT), 
which enables the Fund “to provide grants for debt relief for the poorest and most 
vulnerable countries hit by catastrophic natural disasters or public health disasters” 
(IMF 2020e). However, for the time being only 33 countries are eligible for support from 
the CCRT (IMF 2020f).11 For the majority of member countries, including climate 
vulnerable developing countries, the IMF has no specific frameworks or instruments to 
deal with climate-related debt.
Overall, despite growing research evidence and financial supervisors’ awareness of the 
materiality of climate-related financial risks (NGFS 2019), climate risk considerations 
have thus far been largely excluded from the IMF’s policies. The IMF’s own publications 
have established that “climate change is potentially macro-critical” (IMF 2019a), but 
also reveal that staff may still consider climate change to not be macro-critical in some 
countries. The macro-criticality standard as used by the IMF towards questions of 
engagement on macro-structural issues needs to be discussed, especially in the 
context of the IMF’s dealing with climate vulnerable countries.
In the case of climate-related surveillance, the Fund has indicated it will focus on two 
principal types of climate risks: physical risks posed by the increasing severity of 
climate impacts, and transition risks posed by a change in the value of fossil-fuel 
assets. However, the Fund has also indicated that surveillance on climate issues will not 
be mandatory in Article IV consultations, raising the prospect of climate risk being 
evaluated from some countries, but not others. It is understood that a staff guidance 
note on operationalising climate issues at country level, in particular in surveillance, is 
in development.
5. Results from interviews and a survey among the V20
To explore the views and preferences of V20 countries regarding the IMF’s role, a 
written survey was sent to all ministries of finance and central banks of V20 countries 
(as well as a few selected other climate vulnerable countries) in August 2020. The 
complete questionnaire is presented in Annex 1. The surveys were sent to the official 
V20 contact person at the respective institution. As of 23 September 2020, 12 
completed surveys were returned by 6 ministries of finance and 6 central banks from 10 
countries, including 2 non-V20 countries.
To complement the written survey, structured interviews were conducted with senior 
officials from finance ministries and central banks of several V20 countries between 
June and September 2020, including from institutions and countries that did not 
respond to the written survey. The responses in the interviews are in line with the written 
survey responses presented in the following. Given the small sample of respondents 
and potential self-selection bias, the survey responses should not be seen as 
representative of the V20 group as a whole. Still, they provide interesting insights how 
finance ministries and central banks of climate vulnerable countries are coping with 
climate-related risks.
General questions
All institutions have already taken steps to understand potential climate impacts and 
risks over the next 10-20 years, although the majority stated that they have conducted 
only “some analysis”. Only two respondents stated that their institutions had 
undertaken extensive/comprehensive analysis to date. All respondents stated that their 
organisation has been involved in efforts to reduce adverse impacts of climate change, 
e.g. through better planning and investing in a more climate-resilient economy, financial 
sector, and infrastructure. Seven organisations have already taken steps to better 
manage the residual impacts that can’t be reduced, such as through scaled up reserves, 
contingency finance or financial safety nets. 7 institutions (from 6 countries) have thus 
far discussed climate impacts and risks in previous exchanges with the IMF, including 
in technical assistance discussions and Article IV consultations. Of those who did, most 
had the impression that IMF staff are knowledgeable in matters relating to 
macrofinancial risks of climate change, but one was not sure and one negated this.
Surveillance
8 out of 12 respondents expressed the view that the IMF should include a mandatory 
section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all member countries. One 
did not know, while 2 were against making climate risks section in Article IV 
consultations mandatory. One expressed that this should depend on the circumstances 
of each country, with some countries facing important macroeconomic risks that are 
driven by climatic factors while for others those risks are less significant. Using scarce 
Fund resources in the latter cases for this purpose could deviate attention from more 
pressing issues. There was, however, full consensus that the IMF should include a 
mandatory section on climate-related financial risks in the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program assessments it conducts together with the World Bank. 
Moreover, except for one respondent who was not sure, all agreed that the joint World 
Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for low-income economies should be 
enhanced by an analysis of the impact of climate-related financing needs and risks on 
debt sustainability.
Technical assistance and training
To date, only 4 institutions among the respondents had received technical advice on 
mitigating climate risks for public finances and the economy, or on developing disaster 
risk management from the IMF. Regarding technical support on the design of carbon 
taxes, 8 institutions would like to see support from the IMF for their country, 3 were 
unsure, and 2 were against IMF involvement in this. A large majority (10 institutions) 
said they would like to receive support from the IMF in developing a national approach 
for “greening” the financial sector and help them to better address climate-related 
financial risks; one central bank said that this would be an issue for the ministry of 
finance but thought that combined support by the IMF and the World Bank may be 
desirable. One institution was negative regarding a possible role of the IMF in this. The 
picture was almost the same regarding potential support from the IMF in developing an 
energy transition scenario analysis, with 8 institutions indicating interest, while two 
institutions did not see a role for the IMF in this.
10 out of 12 respondents think the IMF should support its member countries’ financial 
and monetary authorities in developing capacities to better assess climate risks, e.g. via 
climate stress-testing, to inform the design of fiscal, monetary or prudential policies, 
while two were against this. 11 out of 12 respondents believe the IMF should support 
member countries in strengthening public debt management to enable them to better 
account for climate risks in public budgets, with one opposing. 9 respondents think the 
IMF should support governments in developing contingency plans and securing 
pre-arranged contingent financing facilities from different sources, as well as 
insurance-based solutions. While one respondent was unsure, one was against IMF 
involvement and highlighted that it was a problem that contingencies are accounted for 
as expenditures, reducing the already limited fiscal space.
Emergency lending and crisis support
When asked about the biggest financing constraints countries face in terms of 
investing in pre-disaster resilience, disaster preparedness, and ex-post disaster 
response, several respondents highlighted a general constrained fiscal space and 
limited access to concessional funds. Among the 10 countries represented in the 
survey, only one country has to date received emergency support from the IMF in the 
context of a natural (geological/hydrological) disaster. On the question whether the IMF 
should adjust its lending facilities or develop new instruments to support climate 
vulnerable countries, 10 respondents answered yes, one no, and one wasn’t sure. One 
respondent highlighted that vulnerable countries may need grants as opposed to 
changing lending conditions, as most of them have high debt already and are 
experiencing growing problems in managing debt payments. 8 respondents think that 
the IMF should raise access under the RCF and the RFI, 2 were unsure and two did not 
answer this question. 9 respondents thought the IMF should explore linking a new 
climate disaster facility to an issuance of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which would 
benefit only countries hit by climate disasters; 2 respondents were unsure about this; 
and 1 respondent did not answer this.
Debt sustainability
Regarding debt sustainability, 9 respondents expressed the view that the IMF should 
explore options for a special treatment of climate debt (i.e. public debt that has been 
incurred as a direct result of climate disasters or necessary adaptation measures), 
while one was unsure and one thought that there should be no special treatment of 
climate-related debt but new metrics for debt in general. 7 respondents think the IMF 
should promote the inclusion of natural disaster clauses in sovereign debt contracts, 
while 3 were unsure, one against, and one did not respond. 8 respondents think the IMF 
should promote the use of instruments such as GDP-linked bonds or catastrophe 
bonds that reduce debt burdens in case of a (climate) disaster, while 2 were unsure, one 
against, and one did not respond. The majority of respondents – 8 – also thought that 
the IMF should work on developing a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, while 2 
were unsure, one against, and one did not respond. Lastly, 9 respondents consider it 
helpful to have an overview of critical metrics on what can be considered 
“unsustainable debt” vs. “sustainable debt”, with 2 respondents unsure on this and one 
did not respond.
Overall, the survey results – as well as the interviews – indicate that most V20 countries 
would like to see more support from the IMF in addressing climate vulnerabilities. Most 
finance ministries and central banks in V20 countries are still in early stages when it 
comes to analysing climate-related macrofinancial risks and would benefit from greater 
support in this area from the IMF. Most thought that the IMF should integrate climate 
risk analysis in its surveillance activities, including Article IV consultations as well as 
Financial Sector Assessment Program assessments and Debt Sustainability 
Framework analysis conducted together with the World Bank. There was also a 
widespread interest in receiving technical support from the IMF for climate-proofing 
public finances and developing disaster risk management. Last but not least, countries 
see a need for better frameworks for dealing with debt in general and climate-related 
debt in particular.
6. Considerations for a V20-IMF Joint Action Agenda
For mainstreaming climate-related financial risks assessment in its operations, the IMF 
needs to recognise that climate risks are different from the traditional type of risk 
addressed in financial risk analyses. Traditional financial risk evaluation and 
benchmarks are backward-looking, i.e. based on historical performances, while climate 
risks are forward-looking and characterised by deep uncertainty, non-linearity and 
endogeneity (Battiston and Monasterolo 2019). Importantly, climate risks can be 
amplified by the complexity of the financial system. 
Ignoring forward-looking climate risks in policy design and implementation could lead 
to unintended effects on financial stability and inequality and broaden countries’ 
distance to their climate and economic targets. This, in turn, may create new sources of 
risk for countries’ macroeconomic and financial stability. Thus, assessing countries’ 
exposures to climate-related macrofinancial risks should be at the core of the IMF’s 
work (Volz 2020a). However, traditional financial risk approaches as currently used by 
the IMF are not designed to consider such characteristics and need to be 
complemented to assess the private and public sectors’ exposure (either via the 
physical or transition risk channel) to forward-looking climate-related risks; to analyse 
the largest sources of macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances induced by countries’ 
exposures to climate-related risks; and to design tailored measures to mitigate such 
risks, while addressing potential trade-offs on sustainable development and inequality.
A V20-IMF collaboration could establish a programme of work involving both the IMF 
and the V20 economies aimed at promoting actions to enhance resilience to climate 
change. A Joint Action Agenda has the potential to drive transformational action to 
minimise climate risks. Some questions to consider in the framing of the Joint Action 
Agenda include: . What further steps could the IMF take to further strengthen the treatment of 
climate     risks in its operations, including in surveillance, policy support and 
financial  assistance? . What policy options are available to V20 members in order to accelerate efforts  
to tac kle climate risks to the economy during the pandemic response and 
recovery, as well as in the longer-term?.   What avenues of international support needs in terms of finance and policy 
assistance could the IMF explore in order to ensure highly vulnerable 
economies are effectively supported to pursue these policy options?
Building on the preceding discussion, the following ten areas could form the basis for a 
Joint Action Agenda by the V20 and IMF.
6.1 Mainstreaming Systematic and Transparent Assessment of Climate-related 
Financial Risks in all IMF Operations
The IMF should mainstream a transparent assessment of climate-related financial 
risks in its operations. As the availability and sophistication of science-based climate 
financial risk metrics and methods such as climate stress-testing and climate-financial 
pricing models increase, the IMF has a solid ground for starting its assessment of 
climate-related financial risks, in order to better anchor and inform its policy work. Given 
the role of the financial sector in the economy and society, the assessment of 
climate-related financial risks and opportunities should be implemented in a 
transparent and independent way.
6.2 Consistent, Systematic, and Universal Appraisal and Treatment of Physical 
Climate Risks and Transition Risks for All Countries in Article IV Consultations and 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs
By including a mandatory section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all 
member countries, the IMF can mainstream the assessment of climate risks in 
countries’ financial stability analyses. A consistent, systematic, and universal treatment 
of climate risks in Article IV consultations will facilitate better management and 
mitigation of macrofinancial risks through governments and enhance the recognition of 
such risks by the financial sector.
The IMF could also introduce a mandatory section on climate-related financial risks to 
the Financial Sector Assessment Programs it conducts jointly with the World Bank. 
Importantly, the IMF should recognise the unique susceptibilities of climate vulnerable 
countries, stemming from both physical and transition risks, and support their financial 
and monetary authorities in developing capacities to better assess and respond to 
climate risks, e.g. via climate stress-testing to inform the design of prudential policies, 
when needed.
A better analysis of climate-related macrofinancial risks will not only enable better 
micro- and macroprudential policies to safeguard macrofinancial stability, it should also 
lead to better pricing of these risks by financial markets, which will contribute to 
overcoming barriers to scaling-up sustainable investment (Monasterolo and Volz 
2020).
6.3 Advancing Disclosure of Climate-related Financial Risks and Promoting 
Sustainable Finance and Investment Practices
Aligning financial markets with sustainable development and the Paris climate goals 
will be crucial for enhancing resilience of climate vulnerable countries. The IMF’s 2020 
Global Financial Stability Report highlights the way investors and equity markets have 
long ignored the growing risk of financial losses associated with climate risk (IMF, 
2020h). The IMF could use its unique role in international finance to promote the 
disclosure of climate-related financial risks and the development of sustainable finance 
and investment practices. Well-developed financial markets that account for 
sustainability risks facilitate climate-friendly private sector investment.
  
Box 2: Assessing Financial Liabilities
Accurate assessments of financial liabilities is becoming more challenging due to the complex 
impacts of climate change. It is time to prioritise efforts to modernise and integrate into 
financial policy frameworks climate and transition risks in order to limit if not contain 
vulnerabilities to stranded risk and rapid onset and slow onset climate events. This is critical for 
developing policies tailored to crowd-in low-carbon and climate-resilient investments and value. 
Due to the fixed nature of conventional fossil fuel power contracts that “lock-in” long-term 
liabilities, countries may be at risk of stranded assets or stranded debt in the power sector which 
could lead to increased subsidy requirements or an increase in power tariffs which can 
negatively impact cost-competitiveness. Because many fossil fuel contracts are backed by 
sovereign guarantees to cover fixed capacity payments, power sector funding practices have a 
direct impact on public-sector balance sheets in terms of what the state owns and owes. 
Moreover, given the rapid pace of innovation in the power and energy sector, many of the 
conventional power facilities backed by export credit agencies (ECAs) from major economies 
are at risk of early obsolescence.
The IMF could help vulnerable developing countries determine which parties hold the affected 
assets and related liabilities. A mixed ownership dynamic can distort the traditional risk-reward 
dynamic for ECAs from major economies, especially if the project sponsor has failed to capture 
or reflect relevant market risks correctly and when an ECA steps in to support a failed project 
that could in turn exacerbate financial and climate risks at the country level. This also raises 
questions about risk management in the event the government or the IMF are called upon to 
support a bailout. Without intervention, bailout funds could be claimed to service contractual 
obligations related to loans or financing originating from or backed by the major economy.
The scenarios highlighted above underscore the importance of ensuring the IMF is positioned to 
engage proactively with countries in order to ascertain the degree of exposure of the financial 
change on the medium- to long-term quality and sustainability of public finances and 
mainstream climate risk analysis in public financial management. Based on climate 
vulnerability assessments, the IMF can help finance ministries identify potential risks 
on the expenditure and revenue side. The IMF could also support V20 countries in 
incorporating fiscal buffers for climate-related risks in budget planning. In particular, it 
could help promote budgetary instruments for ex ante disaster financing, including 
contingency lines and disaster, reserve, or contingency savings funds (Cevik and Huang 
2018).
Since debt sustainability can be affected by a country’s ability to absorb shocks, it is 
important that governments of climate vulnerable countries are supported in 
developing contingency plans including options for securing pre-arranged and 
pre-agreed pricing of risk transfer instruments. The IMF could support the development 
of an international climate disaster risk financing and insurance architecture that 
addresses different layers of risks and provides vulnerable countries with instruments 
for climate and disaster financing (Ahmed et al. 2020).
To enhance debt sustainability, the IMF could promote a discussion around adding 
natural disaster clauses to sovereign debt contracts and the use of instruments such as 
GDP-linked bonds. Moreover, the IMF could seek to enhance transparency of public 
debt contracts, and support governments in asserting that assumptions and terms or 
clauses of debt contracts are realistic and sustainable.
By supporting climate vulnerable countries in strengthening public debt management, 
the IMF can contribute to enhanced debt sustainability and enable a better accounting 
for climate risks and investment opportunities that deliver high socio-economic and 
adaptation dividends in public budgets.
6.6 Supporting Climate Vulnerable Countries with Debt Sustainability Problems
The IMF could play an important role in supporting climate vulnerable countries that are 
facing debt sustainability challenges or are already in debt distress. As recently 
highlighted by Georgieva et al. (2020), a “reform of the international debt architecture is 
urgently needed”. The IMF (2020i) has recently put forward reform options for the 
international architecture for resolving sovereign debt involving private-sector creditors. 
Together with the V20, the IMF could explore options for the treatment of climate debt, 
i.e. public debt that has been incurred as a direct result of climate disasters or 
necessary adaptation measures (Volz 2020). This is particularly relevant for Small 
Island Developing States, where single events can have devastating effects on the 
economy and public finances.12
The joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries 
could be enhanced by a mandatory analysis of the impact of climate-related risks on 
debt sustainability. Such assessment could also be rolled out to climate vulnerable 
middle income countries.
The COVID-19 crisis has worsened public finances in V20 countries. Going forward, 
many developing countries will require debt relief to respond effectively to the crisis and 
undertake meaningful investment to climate-proof their economies. For now, the 
international financial architecture still lacks an adequate system for addressing 
situations where sovereign debt becomes unsustainable. The IMF could explore 
options for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, as was originally proposed by 
the IMF two decades ago (IMF 2003), to deal with debt crises. In this context, the IMF 
could also investigate options for developing a new framework for debt restructuring 
that facilitate a green recovery, including through tools such as debt-for-climate swaps 
(Akhtar et al. 2020).
6.7 Developing the IMF Toolkit for Climate Emergency Financing
The IMF can further develop its existing emergency financing facilities or generate 
options for a new climate emergency financing facility. This is particularly relevant for 
Small Island Developing States though options should be explored as well to include 
other climate vulnerable countries.
One option is to raise access under the RCF/RFI, e.g. up to 400-500 percent of quota. 
Moreover, options should be explored to convert these facilities into grants, particularly 
for PRGT-eligible countries. A further option would be to establish an entirely new 
climate emergency facility. The IMF could consider linking a climate disaster facility to 
the issuance of SDRs, which would benefit only countries hit by climate disasters.
6.8 Exploring Options to Use SDRs to Support Climate Vulnerable Countries
The IMF could consider the possibility of allocating new SDRs as a way of providing 
vulnerable countries with enhanced liquidity. While a general SDR allocation would 
primarily benefit large economies,13 options could be explored where rich countries, 
whose historic carbon emissions are the main cause of anthropogenic climate change, 
make their SDRs available to a new multilateral swap facility or donate their SDRs to a 
trust fund at the IMF, which could use them in a way that benefits climate vulnerable 
countries. Another option would be to develop a mechanism where new SDRs are 
issued exclusively to climate vulnerable countries. Such an SDR issuance could be 
linked to exogenous shocks such as climate-induced disasters, eliminating problems 
with moral hazard. As climate vulnerable countries that have hardly contributed to 
global climate change suffer the biggest impacts, SDR issuances for climate vulnerable 
countries could be a way of enhancing resilience and global climate justice at the same 
time. 
6.9 Supporting the Design and Implementation of Carbon Pricing Mechanisms
The second V20 Ministerial Dialogue in Washington, DC in April 2016 reiterated strong 
support for innovative revenue generating fiscal and financial measures to raise 
finance, stimulate technological innovation and redirect investment toward climate 
resilient and low-emissions development. In this respect, the V20 committed to support 
carbon pricing by working to establish pricing regimes by 2026 taking due 
consideration of each country’s respective capabilities.
Building on its work on its work in using fiscal tools to mitigate climate change (IMF, 
2019b), the IMF could support V20 countries in strengthening their fiscal framework 
and revenue outcomes through the design and implementation of appropriate carbon 
pricing mechanisms. Carbon tax revenues could be redistributed to support 
low-income households or communities affected by the low carbon transition or that 
are hit particularly hard by the physical effects of climate change.
6.10 Institutionalising Collaboration between the Fund and the V20
The current governance structure of multilateral development institutions, including the 
IMF, provides, for the most part, relatively little influence to vulnerable developing 
countries. This poor representation means that when agendas are set and decisions 
are made, vulnerable developing countries do not have the same voice as large 
countries or groups such as the G7 and G20. This matters not just in terms of securing 
robust country ownership of global financial responses but also in terms of establishing 
measures more responsive to distinct national circumstances.
The V20 has the ability to coordinate the position of vulnerable developing countries 
including small island developing states and nations that typically lack representation 
on monetary and development issues in the deliberations and decisions of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions. In particular, the V20 can feed into the agendas of the International 
Monetary and Financial Committee and the joint World Bank-IMF Development 
Committee, as well as in other relevant fora.
To provide a platform to climate vulnerable developing countries to articulate their 
views and interests, the IMF should recognise the V20 as an official stakeholder and 
hold regular consultations with the V20. Joint agendas are critical in order to develop a 
joint understanding and solutions to the problems created by climate change. Since 
October 2015, the V20 finance ministers have met biannually with the World Bank at the 
Annual and Spring Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank Group. The IMF could join 
the World Bank in holding regular, bi-annual meetings with the V20. A continuous 
exchange between the IMF and the V20 would provide the opportunity to develop and 
implement a joint action agenda.
7. Conclusion
The V20 economies face considerable macrofinancial risks that can undermine debt 
sustainability, constrain fiscal space, and worsen sovereign risk, among other effects. 
Most financial and monetary authorities of climate vulnerable countries are in the early 
stages of analysing these risks and incorporating them in their macrofinancial 
frameworks. They also face the urgent and growing need to develop more effective 
approaches that climate-proof public finances and establish climate and disaster risk 
management structures.
The IMF has a critical role in addressing climate change through its policy advice and 
capacity building functions, surveillance, and the promotion of policy frameworks to 
mobilise investments. The IMF has recently started to put greater emphasis on climate 
risk and is in the process of developing its strategy and capacities in this area. There 
seems to be a clear demand among climate vulnerable countries for support from the 
IMF in all three areas of its operational work, i.e. surveillance, technical assistance and 
training, and emergency lending and crisis support. A partnership between the V20 and 
IMF could help climate vulnerable countries to better mitigate and manage systemic 
climate risks, and enable a macroeconomic environment that can facilitate investments 
in adaptation and development.
6.4 Exploring synergies between Fiscal and Monetary Policies 
The IMF could explore synergies between fiscal and monetary policies as well as 
macroprudential regulations to identify an optimal policy mix that would enhance 
finance for development oriented towards just transition outcomes while improving 
economic competitiveness and ensuring macrofinancial stability. In this regard, closer 
collaboration between financial institutions acting on climate finance, including 
development finance institutions, central banks and financial regulators, would be 
crucial. By considering the materiality of forward-looking climate risks in the design of 
fiscal and financial policies, the IMF could support its membership in general, and 
climate vulnerable countries in particular, in building resilience to such risks while 
scaling up investments needed to achieve climate targets. Not doing so could lead to a 
disorderly transition leading to increasing liabilities and stranding risk for both public 
and private sector, generating adverse effects on financial stability and inequality.
6.5 Mainstreaming of Climate Risk Analysis in Public Financial Management and 
Supporting the Development of a Climate Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance 
Architecture
Through policy advice and technical assistance, the IMF can support climate vulnerable 
countries in climate-proofing public finances. In particular, the IMF can encourage and 
provide advice to finance ministries on how to analyse the potential impacts of climate 
40
Source: Volz (2020a).
Note: Included are all the published staff reports of Article IV consultations that took place between 
January 2000 and June 2020 that include the words ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, ‘climate-related’ or 
‘climate risk’. Article IV reports which show at least ten references to ‘climate change’, ‘climatic’, 
‘climate risk’ and/or ‘climate-related’ or provide at least one whole paragraph, box or section on the 
topic are categorised as making “substantial reference” to climate change. All others are categorised 
as making “some reference” to climate change. The year refers to the year in which the consultation 
was held, not the year of first publication as a staff report.
At the country level, the IMF conducts two surveillance activities jointly with the World 
Bank: Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and Debt Sustainability Analyses for 
low-income countries. To date, climate change has played no or little role in the 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and where it does, it is covered in the parts 
produced by the World Bank. Likewise, the joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability 
Analyses for low-income countries, which are structured examinations of developing 
country debt based on the Debt Sustainability Framework, do not systematically 
address climate risk analysis for the time being. The latest Debt Sustainability Analysis 
that was carried out for Somalia as part of the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative in 2020, however, did include a simulation of a climate shock 
scenario (IMF 2020c).
At the regional level, the IMF has organised a number or regional dialogues for Pacific 
islands and the Caribbean.9 Among the flagship publications for regional surveillance, 
the Regional Economic Outlooks (REO), to date only the 2020 REO for Sub-Saharan 
Africa had a special chapter dedicated to ‘Adapting to Climate Change in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’ (IMF 2020a).
The IMF’s global surveillance has to date not systematically addressed climate-related 
macrofinancial risks in a major report or integrated this issue in its regular monitoring 
exercises. The IMF published the already-mentioned chapter on the impact of weather 
shocks on economic activity in low-income countries in the 2017 World Economic 
Outlook report (IMF 2017), a chapter on sustainable finance in the 2019 Global 
Financial Stability Report (IMF 2019c) and an analysis of mitigating climate change in 
the 2019 Fiscal Monitor, which focused on carbon pricing. 
With respect to technical assistance, the IMF – together with the World Bank – has thus 
far conducted so-called Climate Change Policy Assessments for six countries: the 
Seychelles (June 2017), St. Lucia (June 2018), Belize (November 2018), Grenada (July 
2019), the Federated States of Micronesia (September 2019), and Tonga (June 2020). 
Climate Change Policy Assessments provide “an overarching assessment of countries’ 
climate strategies—as articulated in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
and other government documents” and “are intended to help countries build coherent 
macro-frameworks for responding to climate change, which could improve prospects 
for attracting external finance and put future revisions to NDCs on a sound footing” (IMF 
2020b).
Regarding the IMF’s third main area of work, supporting member countries facing 
balance of payments difficulties and providing temporary financing, the IMF has a 
Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) and a Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) which can be each 
used in catastrophe situations including climate disasters. The RCF “provides rapid 
concessional financial assistance with limited conditionality to low-income countries 
(LICs) facing an urgent balance of payments need” (IMF 2020d). The RCF’s 
concessional financial support is provided exclusively to LICs through the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT). Member countries that are not PRGT-eligible can 
access the RFI.10 However, while both the RCF and RFI provide quick access to finance, 
they are both quota-based and provide only small emergency support. The IMF has not 
yet had a meaningful discussion about adjusting these facilities or create a new facility 
that would be tailored to support members in responding to shocks related to climate 
change.
The IMF toolkit also comprises the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT), 
which enables the Fund “to provide grants for debt relief for the poorest and most 
vulnerable countries hit by catastrophic natural disasters or public health disasters” 
(IMF 2020e). However, for the time being only 33 countries are eligible for support from 
the CCRT (IMF 2020f).11 For the majority of member countries, including climate 
vulnerable developing countries, the IMF has no specific frameworks or instruments to 
deal with climate-related debt.
Overall, despite growing research evidence and financial supervisors’ awareness of the 
materiality of climate-related financial risks (NGFS 2019), climate risk considerations 
have thus far been largely excluded from the IMF’s policies. The IMF’s own publications 
have established that “climate change is potentially macro-critical” (IMF 2019a), but 
also reveal that staff may still consider climate change to not be macro-critical in some 
countries. The macro-criticality standard as used by the IMF towards questions of 
engagement on macro-structural issues needs to be discussed, especially in the 
context of the IMF’s dealing with climate vulnerable countries.
In the case of climate-related surveillance, the Fund has indicated it will focus on two 
principal types of climate risks: physical risks posed by the increasing severity of 
climate impacts, and transition risks posed by a change in the value of fossil-fuel 
assets. However, the Fund has also indicated that surveillance on climate issues will not 
be mandatory in Article IV consultations, raising the prospect of climate risk being 
evaluated from some countries, but not others. It is understood that a staff guidance 
note on operationalising climate issues at country level, in particular in surveillance, is 
in development.
5. Results from interviews and a survey among the V20
To explore the views and preferences of V20 countries regarding the IMF’s role, a 
written survey was sent to all ministries of finance and central banks of V20 countries 
(as well as a few selected other climate vulnerable countries) in August 2020. The 
complete questionnaire is presented in Annex 1. The surveys were sent to the official 
V20 contact person at the respective institution. As of 23 September 2020, 12 
completed surveys were returned by 6 ministries of finance and 6 central banks from 10 
countries, including 2 non-V20 countries.
To complement the written survey, structured interviews were conducted with senior 
officials from finance ministries and central banks of several V20 countries between 
June and September 2020, including from institutions and countries that did not 
respond to the written survey. The responses in the interviews are in line with the written 
survey responses presented in the following. Given the small sample of respondents 
and potential self-selection bias, the survey responses should not be seen as 
representative of the V20 group as a whole. Still, they provide interesting insights how 
finance ministries and central banks of climate vulnerable countries are coping with 
climate-related risks.
General questions
All institutions have already taken steps to understand potential climate impacts and 
risks over the next 10-20 years, although the majority stated that they have conducted 
only “some analysis”. Only two respondents stated that their institutions had 
undertaken extensive/comprehensive analysis to date. All respondents stated that their 
organisation has been involved in efforts to reduce adverse impacts of climate change, 
e.g. through better planning and investing in a more climate-resilient economy, financial 
sector, and infrastructure. Seven organisations have already taken steps to better 
manage the residual impacts that can’t be reduced, such as through scaled up reserves, 
contingency finance or financial safety nets. 7 institutions (from 6 countries) have thus 
far discussed climate impacts and risks in previous exchanges with the IMF, including 
in technical assistance discussions and Article IV consultations. Of those who did, most 
had the impression that IMF staff are knowledgeable in matters relating to 
macrofinancial risks of climate change, but one was not sure and one negated this.
Surveillance
8 out of 12 respondents expressed the view that the IMF should include a mandatory 
section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all member countries. One 
did not know, while 2 were against making climate risks section in Article IV 
consultations mandatory. One expressed that this should depend on the circumstances 
of each country, with some countries facing important macroeconomic risks that are 
driven by climatic factors while for others those risks are less significant. Using scarce 
Fund resources in the latter cases for this purpose could deviate attention from more 
pressing issues. There was, however, full consensus that the IMF should include a 
mandatory section on climate-related financial risks in the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program assessments it conducts together with the World Bank. 
Moreover, except for one respondent who was not sure, all agreed that the joint World 
Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for low-income economies should be 
enhanced by an analysis of the impact of climate-related financing needs and risks on 
debt sustainability.
Technical assistance and training
To date, only 4 institutions among the respondents had received technical advice on 
mitigating climate risks for public finances and the economy, or on developing disaster 
risk management from the IMF. Regarding technical support on the design of carbon 
taxes, 8 institutions would like to see support from the IMF for their country, 3 were 
unsure, and 2 were against IMF involvement in this. A large majority (10 institutions) 
said they would like to receive support from the IMF in developing a national approach 
for “greening” the financial sector and help them to better address climate-related 
financial risks; one central bank said that this would be an issue for the ministry of 
finance but thought that combined support by the IMF and the World Bank may be 
desirable. One institution was negative regarding a possible role of the IMF in this. The 
picture was almost the same regarding potential support from the IMF in developing an 
energy transition scenario analysis, with 8 institutions indicating interest, while two 
institutions did not see a role for the IMF in this.
10 out of 12 respondents think the IMF should support its member countries’ financial 
and monetary authorities in developing capacities to better assess climate risks, e.g. via 
climate stress-testing, to inform the design of fiscal, monetary or prudential policies, 
while two were against this. 11 out of 12 respondents believe the IMF should support 
member countries in strengthening public debt management to enable them to better 
account for climate risks in public budgets, with one opposing. 9 respondents think the 
IMF should support governments in developing contingency plans and securing 
pre-arranged contingent financing facilities from different sources, as well as 
insurance-based solutions. While one respondent was unsure, one was against IMF 
involvement and highlighted that it was a problem that contingencies are accounted for 
as expenditures, reducing the already limited fiscal space.
Emergency lending and crisis support
When asked about the biggest financing constraints countries face in terms of 
investing in pre-disaster resilience, disaster preparedness, and ex-post disaster 
response, several respondents highlighted a general constrained fiscal space and 
limited access to concessional funds. Among the 10 countries represented in the 
survey, only one country has to date received emergency support from the IMF in the 
context of a natural (geological/hydrological) disaster. On the question whether the IMF 
should adjust its lending facilities or develop new instruments to support climate 
vulnerable countries, 10 respondents answered yes, one no, and one wasn’t sure. One 
respondent highlighted that vulnerable countries may need grants as opposed to 
changing lending conditions, as most of them have high debt already and are 
experiencing growing problems in managing debt payments. 8 respondents think that 
the IMF should raise access under the RCF and the RFI, 2 were unsure and two did not 
answer this question. 9 respondents thought the IMF should explore linking a new 
climate disaster facility to an issuance of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which would 
benefit only countries hit by climate disasters; 2 respondents were unsure about this; 
and 1 respondent did not answer this.
Debt sustainability
Regarding debt sustainability, 9 respondents expressed the view that the IMF should 
explore options for a special treatment of climate debt (i.e. public debt that has been 
incurred as a direct result of climate disasters or necessary adaptation measures), 
while one was unsure and one thought that there should be no special treatment of 
climate-related debt but new metrics for debt in general. 7 respondents think the IMF 
should promote the inclusion of natural disaster clauses in sovereign debt contracts, 
while 3 were unsure, one against, and one did not respond. 8 respondents think the IMF 
should promote the use of instruments such as GDP-linked bonds or catastrophe 
bonds that reduce debt burdens in case of a (climate) disaster, while 2 were unsure, one 
against, and one did not respond. The majority of respondents – 8 – also thought that 
the IMF should work on developing a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, while 2 
were unsure, one against, and one did not respond. Lastly, 9 respondents consider it 
helpful to have an overview of critical metrics on what can be considered 
“unsustainable debt” vs. “sustainable debt”, with 2 respondents unsure on this and one 
did not respond.
Overall, the survey results – as well as the interviews – indicate that most V20 countries 
would like to see more support from the IMF in addressing climate vulnerabilities. Most 
finance ministries and central banks in V20 countries are still in early stages when it 
comes to analysing climate-related macrofinancial risks and would benefit from greater 
support in this area from the IMF. Most thought that the IMF should integrate climate 
risk analysis in its surveillance activities, including Article IV consultations as well as 
Financial Sector Assessment Program assessments and Debt Sustainability 
Framework analysis conducted together with the World Bank. There was also a 
widespread interest in receiving technical support from the IMF for climate-proofing 
public finances and developing disaster risk management. Last but not least, countries 
see a need for better frameworks for dealing with debt in general and climate-related 
debt in particular.
6. Considerations for a V20-IMF Joint Action Agenda
For mainstreaming climate-related financial risks assessment in its operations, the IMF 
needs to recognise that climate risks are different from the traditional type of risk 
addressed in financial risk analyses. Traditional financial risk evaluation and 
benchmarks are backward-looking, i.e. based on historical performances, while climate 
risks are forward-looking and characterised by deep uncertainty, non-linearity and 
endogeneity (Battiston and Monasterolo 2019). Importantly, climate risks can be 
amplified by the complexity of the financial system. 
Ignoring forward-looking climate risks in policy design and implementation could lead 
to unintended effects on financial stability and inequality and broaden countries’ 
distance to their climate and economic targets. This, in turn, may create new sources of 
risk for countries’ macroeconomic and financial stability. Thus, assessing countries’ 
exposures to climate-related macrofinancial risks should be at the core of the IMF’s 
work (Volz 2020a). However, traditional financial risk approaches as currently used by 
the IMF are not designed to consider such characteristics and need to be 
complemented to assess the private and public sectors’ exposure (either via the 
physical or transition risk channel) to forward-looking climate-related risks; to analyse 
the largest sources of macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances induced by countries’ 
exposures to climate-related risks; and to design tailored measures to mitigate such 
risks, while addressing potential trade-offs on sustainable development and inequality.
A V20-IMF collaboration could establish a programme of work involving both the IMF 
and the V20 economies aimed at promoting actions to enhance resilience to climate 
change. A Joint Action Agenda has the potential to drive transformational action to 
minimise climate risks. Some questions to consider in the framing of the Joint Action 
Agenda include: . What further steps could the IMF take to further strengthen the treatment of 
climate     risks in its operations, including in surveillance, policy support and 
financial  assistance? . What policy options are available to V20 members in order to accelerate efforts  
to tac kle climate risks to the economy during the pandemic response and 
recovery, as well as in the longer-term?.   What avenues of international support needs in terms of finance and policy 
assistance could the IMF explore in order to ensure highly vulnerable 
economies are effectively supported to pursue these policy options?
Building on the preceding discussion, the following ten areas could form the basis for a 
Joint Action Agenda by the V20 and IMF.
6.1 Mainstreaming Systematic and Transparent Assessment of Climate-related 
Financial Risks in all IMF Operations
The IMF should mainstream a transparent assessment of climate-related financial 
risks in its operations. As the availability and sophistication of science-based climate 
financial risk metrics and methods such as climate stress-testing and climate-financial 
pricing models increase, the IMF has a solid ground for starting its assessment of 
climate-related financial risks, in order to better anchor and inform its policy work. Given 
the role of the financial sector in the economy and society, the assessment of 
climate-related financial risks and opportunities should be implemented in a 
transparent and independent way.
6.2 Consistent, Systematic, and Universal Appraisal and Treatment of Physical 
Climate Risks and Transition Risks for All Countries in Article IV Consultations and 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs
By including a mandatory section on climate risks in its Article IV consultations with all 
member countries, the IMF can mainstream the assessment of climate risks in 
countries’ financial stability analyses. A consistent, systematic, and universal treatment 
of climate risks in Article IV consultations will facilitate better management and 
mitigation of macrofinancial risks through governments and enhance the recognition of 
such risks by the financial sector.
The IMF could also introduce a mandatory section on climate-related financial risks to 
the Financial Sector Assessment Programs it conducts jointly with the World Bank. 
Importantly, the IMF should recognise the unique susceptibilities of climate vulnerable 
countries, stemming from both physical and transition risks, and support their financial 
and monetary authorities in developing capacities to better assess and respond to 
climate risks, e.g. via climate stress-testing to inform the design of prudential policies, 
when needed.
A better analysis of climate-related macrofinancial risks will not only enable better 
micro- and macroprudential policies to safeguard macrofinancial stability, it should also 
lead to better pricing of these risks by financial markets, which will contribute to 
overcoming barriers to scaling-up sustainable investment (Monasterolo and Volz 
2020).
6.3 Advancing Disclosure of Climate-related Financial Risks and Promoting 
Sustainable Finance and Investment Practices
Aligning financial markets with sustainable development and the Paris climate goals 
will be crucial for enhancing resilience of climate vulnerable countries. The IMF’s 2020 
Global Financial Stability Report highlights the way investors and equity markets have 
long ignored the growing risk of financial losses associated with climate risk (IMF, 
2020h). The IMF could use its unique role in international finance to promote the 
disclosure of climate-related financial risks and the development of sustainable finance 
and investment practices. Well-developed financial markets that account for 
sustainability risks facilitate climate-friendly private sector investment.
  
sector, the public sector, and relevant major economy export credit agencies to fossil fuel lock-in 
and its accompanying non-performance stranded risk. These risks should also be evaluated in 
the case of other public infrastructure, e.g. ports, pipelines, and transport systems that lack 
adaptive capacity to deal with physical climate risks. In other words, the IMF could explore 
providing the analytical resources needed to assist governments to understand the size and 
nature of public assets exposed to transition risk and physical climate risk, extending guidance 
on options governments can consider to better manage risk exposures. 
This assessment would not only promote better understanding of financial system risk levels, 
but can be linked to other financing facilities to help reduce or relieve the fiscal pressures 
associated with transition risk and physical climate risk. For example, the analysis could support 
work by multilateral development banks to consider a stranded risk displacement financing 
facility for countries with fossil fuel contracts signed prior to 2020 that are causing fiscal 
pressures through refinancing or other means. Such a facility could be tailored to address fossil 
fuel displacement scenarios that occur when the average cost of new renewables is less than 
the variable cost of fossil fuel generation, and when the average cost of renewables and storage 
plus the capital recovery of an existing fossil fuel plant is less than the variable cost of the fossil 
fuel generation. This type of stranded risk displacement financing facility could also alleviate 
fiscal pressures and catalyse additional investment in climate-proofed infrastructure. 
change on the medium- to long-term quality and sustainability of public finances and 
mainstream climate risk analysis in public financial management. Based on climate 
vulnerability assessments, the IMF can help finance ministries identify potential risks 
on the expenditure and revenue side. The IMF could also support V20 countries in 
incorporating fiscal buffers for climate-related risks in budget planning. In particular, it 
could help promote budgetary instruments for ex ante disaster financing, including 
contingency lines and disaster, reserve, or contingency savings funds (Cevik and Huang 
2018).
Since debt sustainability can be affected by a country’s ability to absorb shocks, it is 
important that governments of climate vulnerable countries are supported in 
developing contingency plans including options for securing pre-arranged and 
pre-agreed pricing of risk transfer instruments. The IMF could support the development 
of an international climate disaster risk financing and insurance architecture that 
addresses different layers of risks and provides vulnerable countries with instruments 
for climate and disaster financing (Ahmed et al. 2020).
To enhance debt sustainability, the IMF could promote a discussion around adding 
natural disaster clauses to sovereign debt contracts and the use of instruments such as 
GDP-linked bonds. Moreover, the IMF could seek to enhance transparency of public 
debt contracts, and support governments in asserting that assumptions and terms or 
clauses of debt contracts are realistic and sustainable.
By supporting climate vulnerable countries in strengthening public debt management, 
the IMF can contribute to enhanced debt sustainability and enable a better accounting 
for climate risks and investment opportunities that deliver high socio-economic and 
adaptation dividends in public budgets.
6.6 Supporting Climate Vulnerable Countries with Debt Sustainability Problems
The IMF could play an important role in supporting climate vulnerable countries that are 
facing debt sustainability challenges or are already in debt distress. As recently 
highlighted by Georgieva et al. (2020), a “reform of the international debt architecture is 
urgently needed”. The IMF (2020i) has recently put forward reform options for the 
international architecture for resolving sovereign debt involving private-sector creditors. 
Together with the V20, the IMF could explore options for the treatment of climate debt, 
i.e. public debt that has been incurred as a direct result of climate disasters or 
necessary adaptation measures (Volz 2020). This is particularly relevant for Small 
Island Developing States, where single events can have devastating effects on the 
economy and public finances.12
The joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries 
could be enhanced by a mandatory analysis of the impact of climate-related risks on 
debt sustainability. Such assessment could also be rolled out to climate vulnerable 
middle income countries.
The COVID-19 crisis has worsened public finances in V20 countries. Going forward, 
many developing countries will require debt relief to respond effectively to the crisis and 
undertake meaningful investment to climate-proof their economies. For now, the 
international financial architecture still lacks an adequate system for addressing 
situations where sovereign debt becomes unsustainable. The IMF could explore 
options for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, as was originally proposed by 
the IMF two decades ago (IMF 2003), to deal with debt crises. In this context, the IMF 
could also investigate options for developing a new framework for debt restructuring 
that facilitate a green recovery, including through tools such as debt-for-climate swaps 
(Akhtar et al. 2020).
6.7 Developing the IMF Toolkit for Climate Emergency Financing
The IMF can further develop its existing emergency financing facilities or generate 
options for a new climate emergency financing facility. This is particularly relevant for 
Small Island Developing States though options should be explored as well to include 
other climate vulnerable countries.
One option is to raise access under the RCF/RFI, e.g. up to 400-500 percent of quota. 
Moreover, options should be explored to convert these facilities into grants, particularly 
for PRGT-eligible countries. A further option would be to establish an entirely new 
climate emergency facility. The IMF could consider linking a climate disaster facility to 
the issuance of SDRs, which would benefit only countries hit by climate disasters.
6.8 Exploring Options to Use SDRs to Support Climate Vulnerable Countries
The IMF could consider the possibility of allocating new SDRs as a way of providing 
vulnerable countries with enhanced liquidity. While a general SDR allocation would 
primarily benefit large economies,13 options could be explored where rich countries, 
whose historic carbon emissions are the main cause of anthropogenic climate change, 
make their SDRs available to a new multilateral swap facility or donate their SDRs to a 
trust fund at the IMF, which could use them in a way that benefits climate vulnerable 
countries. Another option would be to develop a mechanism where new SDRs are 
issued exclusively to climate vulnerable countries. Such an SDR issuance could be 
linked to exogenous shocks such as climate-induced disasters, eliminating problems 
with moral hazard. As climate vulnerable countries that have hardly contributed to 
global climate change suffer the biggest impacts, SDR issuances for climate vulnerable 
countries could be a way of enhancing resilience and global climate justice at the same 
time. 
6.9 Supporting the Design and Implementation of Carbon Pricing Mechanisms
The second V20 Ministerial Dialogue in Washington, DC in April 2016 reiterated strong 
support for innovative revenue generating fiscal and financial measures to raise 
finance, stimulate technological innovation and redirect investment toward climate 
resilient and low-emissions development. In this respect, the V20 committed to support 
carbon pricing by working to establish pricing regimes by 2026 taking due 
consideration of each country’s respective capabilities.
Building on its work on its work in using fiscal tools to mitigate climate change (IMF, 
2019b), the IMF could support V20 countries in strengthening their fiscal framework 
and revenue outcomes through the design and implementation of appropriate carbon 
pricing mechanisms. Carbon tax revenues could be redistributed to support 
low-income households or communities affected by the low carbon transition or that 
are hit particularly hard by the physical effects of climate change.
6.10 Institutionalising Collaboration between the Fund and the V20
The current governance structure of multilateral development institutions, including the 
IMF, provides, for the most part, relatively little influence to vulnerable developing 
countries. This poor representation means that when agendas are set and decisions 
are made, vulnerable developing countries do not have the same voice as large 
countries or groups such as the G7 and G20. This matters not just in terms of securing 
robust country ownership of global financial responses but also in terms of establishing 
measures more responsive to distinct national circumstances.
The V20 has the ability to coordinate the position of vulnerable developing countries 
including small island developing states and nations that typically lack representation 
on monetary and development issues in the deliberations and decisions of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions. In particular, the V20 can feed into the agendas of the International 
Monetary and Financial Committee and the joint World Bank-IMF Development 
Committee, as well as in other relevant fora.
To provide a platform to climate vulnerable developing countries to articulate their 
views and interests, the IMF should recognise the V20 as an official stakeholder and 
hold regular consultations with the V20. Joint agendas are critical in order to develop a 
joint understanding and solutions to the problems created by climate change. Since 
October 2015, the V20 finance ministers have met biannually with the World Bank at the 
Annual and Spring Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank Group. The IMF could join 
the World Bank in holding regular, bi-annual meetings with the V20. A continuous 
exchange between the IMF and the V20 would provide the opportunity to develop and 
implement a joint action agenda.
7. Conclusion
The V20 economies face considerable macrofinancial risks that can undermine debt 
sustainability, constrain fiscal space, and worsen sovereign risk, among other effects. 
Most financial and monetary authorities of climate vulnerable countries are in the early 
stages of analysing these risks and incorporating them in their macrofinancial 
frameworks. They also face the urgent and growing need to develop more effective 
approaches that climate-proof public finances and establish climate and disaster risk 
management structures.
The IMF has a critical role in addressing climate change through its policy advice and 
capacity building functions, surveillance, and the promotion of policy frameworks to 
mobilise investments. The IMF has recently started to put greater emphasis on climate 
risk and is in the process of developing its strategy and capacities in this area. There 
seems to be a clear demand among climate vulnerable countries for support from the 
IMF in all three areas of its operational work, i.e. surveillance, technical assistance and 
training, and emergency lending and crisis support. A partnership between the V20 and 
IMF could help climate vulnerable countries to better mitigate and manage systemic 
climate risks, and enable a macroeconomic environment that can facilitate investments 
in adaptation and development.
6.4 Exploring synergies between Fiscal and Monetary Policies 
The IMF could explore synergies between fiscal and monetary policies as well as 
macroprudential regulations to identify an optimal policy mix that would enhance 
finance for development oriented towards just transition outcomes while improving 
economic competitiveness and ensuring macrofinancial stability. In this regard, closer 
collaboration between financial institutions acting on climate finance, including 
development finance institutions, central banks and financial regulators, would be 
crucial. By considering the materiality of forward-looking climate risks in the design of 
fiscal and financial policies, the IMF could support its membership in general, and 
climate vulnerable countries in particular, in building resilience to such risks while 
scaling up investments needed to achieve climate targets. Not doing so could lead to a 
disorderly transition leading to increasing liabilities and stranding risk for both public 
and private sector, generating adverse effects on financial stability and inequality.
6.5 Mainstreaming of Climate Risk Analysis in Public Financial Management and 
Supporting the Development of a Climate Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance 
Architecture
Through policy advice and technical assistance, the IMF can support climate vulnerable 
countries in climate-proofing public finances. In particular, the IMF can encourage and 
provide advice to finance ministries on how to analyse the potential impacts of climate 
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12 For example, the total damage and losses resulting from Cyclone Winston in 2016 in Fiji was 31% of GDP (USD 1.38 billion).
change on the medium- to long-term quality and sustainability of public finances and 
mainstream climate risk analysis in public financial management. Based on climate 
vulnerability assessments, the IMF can help finance ministries identify potential risks 
on the expenditure and revenue side. The IMF could also support V20 countries in 
incorporating fiscal buffers for climate-related risks in budget planning. In particular, it 
could help promote budgetary instruments for ex ante disaster financing, including 
contingency lines and disaster, reserve, or contingency savings funds (Cevik and Huang 
2018).
Since debt sustainability can be affected by a country’s ability to absorb shocks, it is 
important that governments of climate vulnerable countries are supported in 
developing contingency plans including options for securing pre-arranged and 
pre-agreed pricing of risk transfer instruments. The IMF could support the development 
of an international climate disaster risk financing and insurance architecture that 
addresses different layers of risks and provides vulnerable countries with instruments 
for climate and disaster financing (Ahmed et al. 2020).
To enhance debt sustainability, the IMF could promote a discussion around adding 
natural disaster clauses to sovereign debt contracts and the use of instruments such as 
GDP-linked bonds. Moreover, the IMF could seek to enhance transparency of public 
debt contracts, and support governments in asserting that assumptions and terms or 
clauses of debt contracts are realistic and sustainable.
By supporting climate vulnerable countries in strengthening public debt management, 
the IMF can contribute to enhanced debt sustainability and enable a better accounting 
for climate risks and investment opportunities that deliver high socio-economic and 
adaptation dividends in public budgets.
6.6 Supporting Climate Vulnerable Countries with Debt Sustainability Problems
The IMF could play an important role in supporting climate vulnerable countries that are 
facing debt sustainability challenges or are already in debt distress. As recently 
highlighted by Georgieva et al. (2020), a “reform of the international debt architecture is 
urgently needed”. The IMF (2020i) has recently put forward reform options for the 
international architecture for resolving sovereign debt involving private-sector creditors. 
Together with the V20, the IMF could explore options for the treatment of climate debt, 
i.e. public debt that has been incurred as a direct result of climate disasters or 
necessary adaptation measures (Volz 2020). This is particularly relevant for Small 
Island Developing States, where single events can have devastating effects on the 
economy and public finances.12
The joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries 
could be enhanced by a mandatory analysis of the impact of climate-related risks on 
debt sustainability. Such assessment could also be rolled out to climate vulnerable 
middle income countries.
The COVID-19 crisis has worsened public finances in V20 countries. Going forward, 
many developing countries will require debt relief to respond effectively to the crisis and 
undertake meaningful investment to climate-proof their economies. For now, the 
international financial architecture still lacks an adequate system for addressing 
situations where sovereign debt becomes unsustainable. The IMF could explore 
options for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, as was originally proposed by 
the IMF two decades ago (IMF 2003), to deal with debt crises. In this context, the IMF 
could also investigate options for developing a new framework for debt restructuring 
that facilitate a green recovery, including through tools such as debt-for-climate swaps 
(Akhtar et al. 2020).
6.7 Developing the IMF Toolkit for Climate Emergency Financing
The IMF can further develop its existing emergency financing facilities or generate 
options for a new climate emergency financing facility. This is particularly relevant for 
Small Island Developing States though options should be explored as well to include 
other climate vulnerable countries.
One option is to raise access under the RCF/RFI, e.g. up to 400-500 percent of quota. 
Moreover, options should be explored to convert these facilities into grants, particularly 
for PRGT-eligible countries. A further option would be to establish an entirely new 
climate emergency facility. The IMF could consider linking a climate disaster facility to 
the issuance of SDRs, which would benefit only countries hit by climate disasters.
6.8 Exploring Options to Use SDRs to Support Climate Vulnerable Countries
The IMF could consider the possibility of allocating new SDRs as a way of providing 
vulnerable countries with enhanced liquidity. While a general SDR allocation would 
primarily benefit large economies,13 options could be explored where rich countries, 
whose historic carbon emissions are the main cause of anthropogenic climate change, 
make their SDRs available to a new multilateral swap facility or donate their SDRs to a 
trust fund at the IMF, which could use them in a way that benefits climate vulnerable 
countries. Another option would be to develop a mechanism where new SDRs are 
issued exclusively to climate vulnerable countries. Such an SDR issuance could be 
linked to exogenous shocks such as climate-induced disasters, eliminating problems 
with moral hazard. As climate vulnerable countries that have hardly contributed to 
global climate change suffer the biggest impacts, SDR issuances for climate vulnerable 
countries could be a way of enhancing resilience and global climate justice at the same 
time. 
6.9 Supporting the Design and Implementation of Carbon Pricing Mechanisms
The second V20 Ministerial Dialogue in Washington, DC in April 2016 reiterated strong 
support for innovative revenue generating fiscal and financial measures to raise 
finance, stimulate technological innovation and redirect investment toward climate 
resilient and low-emissions development. In this respect, the V20 committed to support 
carbon pricing by working to establish pricing regimes by 2026 taking due 
consideration of each country’s respective capabilities.
Building on its work on its work in using fiscal tools to mitigate climate change (IMF, 
2019b), the IMF could support V20 countries in strengthening their fiscal framework 
and revenue outcomes through the design and implementation of appropriate carbon 
pricing mechanisms. Carbon tax revenues could be redistributed to support 
low-income households or communities affected by the low carbon transition or that 
are hit particularly hard by the physical effects of climate change.
6.10 Institutionalising Collaboration between the Fund and the V20
The current governance structure of multilateral development institutions, including the 
IMF, provides, for the most part, relatively little influence to vulnerable developing 
countries. This poor representation means that when agendas are set and decisions 
are made, vulnerable developing countries do not have the same voice as large 
countries or groups such as the G7 and G20. This matters not just in terms of securing 
robust country ownership of global financial responses but also in terms of establishing 
measures more responsive to distinct national circumstances.
The V20 has the ability to coordinate the position of vulnerable developing countries 
including small island developing states and nations that typically lack representation 
on monetary and development issues in the deliberations and decisions of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions. In particular, the V20 can feed into the agendas of the International 
Monetary and Financial Committee and the joint World Bank-IMF Development 
Committee, as well as in other relevant fora.
To provide a platform to climate vulnerable developing countries to articulate their 
views and interests, the IMF should recognise the V20 as an official stakeholder and 
hold regular consultations with the V20. Joint agendas are critical in order to develop a 
joint understanding and solutions to the problems created by climate change. Since 
October 2015, the V20 finance ministers have met biannually with the World Bank at the 
Annual and Spring Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank Group. The IMF could join 
the World Bank in holding regular, bi-annual meetings with the V20. A continuous 
exchange between the IMF and the V20 would provide the opportunity to develop and 
implement a joint action agenda.
7. Conclusion
The V20 economies face considerable macrofinancial risks that can undermine debt 
sustainability, constrain fiscal space, and worsen sovereign risk, among other effects. 
Most financial and monetary authorities of climate vulnerable countries are in the early 
stages of analysing these risks and incorporating them in their macrofinancial 
frameworks. They also face the urgent and growing need to develop more effective 
approaches that climate-proof public finances and establish climate and disaster risk 
management structures.
The IMF has a critical role in addressing climate change through its policy advice and 
capacity building functions, surveillance, and the promotion of policy frameworks to 
mobilise investments. The IMF has recently started to put greater emphasis on climate 
risk and is in the process of developing its strategy and capacities in this area. There 
seems to be a clear demand among climate vulnerable countries for support from the 
IMF in all three areas of its operational work, i.e. surveillance, technical assistance and 
training, and emergency lending and crisis support. A partnership between the V20 and 
IMF could help climate vulnerable countries to better mitigate and manage systemic 
climate risks, and enable a macroeconomic environment that can facilitate investments 
in adaptation and development.
6.4 Exploring synergies between Fiscal and Monetary Policies 
The IMF could explore synergies between fiscal and monetary policies as well as 
macroprudential regulations to identify an optimal policy mix that would enhance 
finance for development oriented towards just transition outcomes while improving 
economic competitiveness and ensuring macrofinancial stability. In this regard, closer 
collaboration between financial institutions acting on climate finance, including 
development finance institutions, central banks and financial regulators, would be 
crucial. By considering the materiality of forward-looking climate risks in the design of 
fiscal and financial policies, the IMF could support its membership in general, and 
climate vulnerable countries in particular, in building resilience to such risks while 
scaling up investments needed to achieve climate targets. Not doing so could lead to a 
disorderly transition leading to increasing liabilities and stranding risk for both public 
and private sector, generating adverse effects on financial stability and inequality.
6.5 Mainstreaming of Climate Risk Analysis in Public Financial Management and 
Supporting the Development of a Climate Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance 
Architecture
Through policy advice and technical assistance, the IMF can support climate vulnerable 
countries in climate-proofing public finances. In particular, the IMF can encourage and 
provide advice to finance ministries on how to analyse the potential impacts of climate 
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13 SDR allocations are a function of GDP and country voting shares in the IMF. Only 3.44% of a new SDR allocation would benefit 
V20 countries, while G20 countries receive 79.27% of SDR allocation.
change on the medium- to long-term quality and sustainability of public finances and 
mainstream climate risk analysis in public financial management. Based on climate 
vulnerability assessments, the IMF can help finance ministries identify potential risks 
on the expenditure and revenue side. The IMF could also support V20 countries in 
incorporating fiscal buffers for climate-related risks in budget planning. In particular, it 
could help promote budgetary instruments for ex ante disaster financing, including 
contingency lines and disaster, reserve, or contingency savings funds (Cevik and Huang 
2018).
Since debt sustainability can be affected by a country’s ability to absorb shocks, it is 
important that governments of climate vulnerable countries are supported in 
developing contingency plans including options for securing pre-arranged and 
pre-agreed pricing of risk transfer instruments. The IMF could support the development 
of an international climate disaster risk financing and insurance architecture that 
addresses different layers of risks and provides vulnerable countries with instruments 
for climate and disaster financing (Ahmed et al. 2020).
To enhance debt sustainability, the IMF could promote a discussion around adding 
natural disaster clauses to sovereign debt contracts and the use of instruments such as 
GDP-linked bonds. Moreover, the IMF could seek to enhance transparency of public 
debt contracts, and support governments in asserting that assumptions and terms or 
clauses of debt contracts are realistic and sustainable.
By supporting climate vulnerable countries in strengthening public debt management, 
the IMF can contribute to enhanced debt sustainability and enable a better accounting 
for climate risks and investment opportunities that deliver high socio-economic and 
adaptation dividends in public budgets.
6.6 Supporting Climate Vulnerable Countries with Debt Sustainability Problems
The IMF could play an important role in supporting climate vulnerable countries that are 
facing debt sustainability challenges or are already in debt distress. As recently 
highlighted by Georgieva et al. (2020), a “reform of the international debt architecture is 
urgently needed”. The IMF (2020i) has recently put forward reform options for the 
international architecture for resolving sovereign debt involving private-sector creditors. 
Together with the V20, the IMF could explore options for the treatment of climate debt, 
i.e. public debt that has been incurred as a direct result of climate disasters or 
necessary adaptation measures (Volz 2020). This is particularly relevant for Small 
Island Developing States, where single events can have devastating effects on the 
economy and public finances.12
The joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries 
could be enhanced by a mandatory analysis of the impact of climate-related risks on 
debt sustainability. Such assessment could also be rolled out to climate vulnerable 
middle income countries.
The COVID-19 crisis has worsened public finances in V20 countries. Going forward, 
many developing countries will require debt relief to respond effectively to the crisis and 
undertake meaningful investment to climate-proof their economies. For now, the 
international financial architecture still lacks an adequate system for addressing 
situations where sovereign debt becomes unsustainable. The IMF could explore 
options for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, as was originally proposed by 
the IMF two decades ago (IMF 2003), to deal with debt crises. In this context, the IMF 
could also investigate options for developing a new framework for debt restructuring 
that facilitate a green recovery, including through tools such as debt-for-climate swaps 
(Akhtar et al. 2020).
6.7 Developing the IMF Toolkit for Climate Emergency Financing
The IMF can further develop its existing emergency financing facilities or generate 
options for a new climate emergency financing facility. This is particularly relevant for 
Small Island Developing States though options should be explored as well to include 
other climate vulnerable countries.
One option is to raise access under the RCF/RFI, e.g. up to 400-500 percent of quota. 
Moreover, options should be explored to convert these facilities into grants, particularly 
for PRGT-eligible countries. A further option would be to establish an entirely new 
climate emergency facility. The IMF could consider linking a climate disaster facility to 
the issuance of SDRs, which would benefit only countries hit by climate disasters.
6.8 Exploring Options to Use SDRs to Support Climate Vulnerable Countries
The IMF could consider the possibility of allocating new SDRs as a way of providing 
vulnerable countries with enhanced liquidity. While a general SDR allocation would 
primarily benefit large economies,13 options could be explored where rich countries, 
whose historic carbon emissions are the main cause of anthropogenic climate change, 
make their SDRs available to a new multilateral swap facility or donate their SDRs to a 
trust fund at the IMF, which could use them in a way that benefits climate vulnerable 
countries. Another option would be to develop a mechanism where new SDRs are 
issued exclusively to climate vulnerable countries. Such an SDR issuance could be 
linked to exogenous shocks such as climate-induced disasters, eliminating problems 
with moral hazard. As climate vulnerable countries that have hardly contributed to 
global climate change suffer the biggest impacts, SDR issuances for climate vulnerable 
countries could be a way of enhancing resilience and global climate justice at the same 
time. 
6.9 Supporting the Design and Implementation of Carbon Pricing Mechanisms
The second V20 Ministerial Dialogue in Washington, DC in April 2016 reiterated strong 
support for innovative revenue generating fiscal and financial measures to raise 
finance, stimulate technological innovation and redirect investment toward climate 
resilient and low-emissions development. In this respect, the V20 committed to support 
carbon pricing by working to establish pricing regimes by 2026 taking due 
consideration of each country’s respective capabilities.
Building on its work on its work in using fiscal tools to mitigate climate change (IMF, 
2019b), the IMF could support V20 countries in strengthening their fiscal framework 
and revenue outcomes through the design and implementation of appropriate carbon 
pricing mechanisms. Carbon tax revenues could be redistributed to support 
low-income households or communities affected by the low carbon transition or that 
are hit particularly hard by the physical effects of climate change.
6.10 Institutionalising Collaboration between the Fund and the V20
The current governance structure of multilateral development institutions, including the 
IMF, provides, for the most part, relatively little influence to vulnerable developing 
countries. This poor representation means that when agendas are set and decisions 
are made, vulnerable developing countries do not have the same voice as large 
countries or groups such as the G7 and G20. This matters not just in terms of securing 
robust country ownership of global financial responses but also in terms of establishing 
measures more responsive to distinct national circumstances.
The V20 has the ability to coordinate the position of vulnerable developing countries 
including small island developing states and nations that typically lack representation 
on monetary and development issues in the deliberations and decisions of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions. In particular, the V20 can feed into the agendas of the International 
Monetary and Financial Committee and the joint World Bank-IMF Development 
Committee, as well as in other relevant fora.
To provide a platform to climate vulnerable developing countries to articulate their 
views and interests, the IMF should recognise the V20 as an official stakeholder and 
hold regular consultations with the V20. Joint agendas are critical in order to develop a 
joint understanding and solutions to the problems created by climate change. Since 
October 2015, the V20 finance ministers have met biannually with the World Bank at the 
Annual and Spring Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank Group. The IMF could join 
the World Bank in holding regular, bi-annual meetings with the V20. A continuous 
exchange between the IMF and the V20 would provide the opportunity to develop and 
implement a joint action agenda.
7. Conclusion
The V20 economies face considerable macrofinancial risks that can undermine debt 
sustainability, constrain fiscal space, and worsen sovereign risk, among other effects. 
Most financial and monetary authorities of climate vulnerable countries are in the early 
stages of analysing these risks and incorporating them in their macrofinancial 
frameworks. They also face the urgent and growing need to develop more effective 
approaches that climate-proof public finances and establish climate and disaster risk 
management structures.
The IMF has a critical role in addressing climate change through its policy advice and 
capacity building functions, surveillance, and the promotion of policy frameworks to 
mobilise investments. The IMF has recently started to put greater emphasis on climate 
risk and is in the process of developing its strategy and capacities in this area. There 
seems to be a clear demand among climate vulnerable countries for support from the 
IMF in all three areas of its operational work, i.e. surveillance, technical assistance and 
training, and emergency lending and crisis support. A partnership between the V20 and 
IMF could help climate vulnerable countries to better mitigate and manage systemic 
climate risks, and enable a macroeconomic environment that can facilitate investments 
in adaptation and development.
6.4 Exploring synergies between Fiscal and Monetary Policies 
The IMF could explore synergies between fiscal and monetary policies as well as 
macroprudential regulations to identify an optimal policy mix that would enhance 
finance for development oriented towards just transition outcomes while improving 
economic competitiveness and ensuring macrofinancial stability. In this regard, closer 
collaboration between financial institutions acting on climate finance, including 
development finance institutions, central banks and financial regulators, would be 
crucial. By considering the materiality of forward-looking climate risks in the design of 
fiscal and financial policies, the IMF could support its membership in general, and 
climate vulnerable countries in particular, in building resilience to such risks while 
scaling up investments needed to achieve climate targets. Not doing so could lead to a 
disorderly transition leading to increasing liabilities and stranding risk for both public 
and private sector, generating adverse effects on financial stability and inequality.
6.5 Mainstreaming of Climate Risk Analysis in Public Financial Management and 
Supporting the Development of a Climate Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance 
Architecture
Through policy advice and technical assistance, the IMF can support climate vulnerable 
countries in climate-proofing public finances. In particular, the IMF can encourage and 
provide advice to finance ministries on how to analyse the potential impacts of climate 
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change on the medium- to long-term quality and sustainability of public finances and 
mainstream climate risk analysis in public financial management. Based on climate 
vulnerability assessments, the IMF can help finance ministries identify potential risks 
on the expenditure and revenue side. The IMF could also support V20 countries in 
incorporating fiscal buffers for climate-related risks in budget planning. In particular, it 
could help promote budgetary instruments for ex ante disaster financing, including 
contingency lines and disaster, reserve, or contingency savings funds (Cevik and Huang 
2018).
Since debt sustainability can be affected by a country’s ability to absorb shocks, it is 
important that governments of climate vulnerable countries are supported in 
developing contingency plans including options for securing pre-arranged and 
pre-agreed pricing of risk transfer instruments. The IMF could support the development 
of an international climate disaster risk financing and insurance architecture that 
addresses different layers of risks and provides vulnerable countries with instruments 
for climate and disaster financing (Ahmed et al. 2020).
To enhance debt sustainability, the IMF could promote a discussion around adding 
natural disaster clauses to sovereign debt contracts and the use of instruments such as 
GDP-linked bonds. Moreover, the IMF could seek to enhance transparency of public 
debt contracts, and support governments in asserting that assumptions and terms or 
clauses of debt contracts are realistic and sustainable.
By supporting climate vulnerable countries in strengthening public debt management, 
the IMF can contribute to enhanced debt sustainability and enable a better accounting 
for climate risks and investment opportunities that deliver high socio-economic and 
adaptation dividends in public budgets.
6.6 Supporting Climate Vulnerable Countries with Debt Sustainability Problems
The IMF could play an important role in supporting climate vulnerable countries that are 
facing debt sustainability challenges or are already in debt distress. As recently 
highlighted by Georgieva et al. (2020), a “reform of the international debt architecture is 
urgently needed”. The IMF (2020i) has recently put forward reform options for the 
international architecture for resolving sovereign debt involving private-sector creditors. 
Together with the V20, the IMF could explore options for the treatment of climate debt, 
i.e. public debt that has been incurred as a direct result of climate disasters or 
necessary adaptation measures (Volz 2020). This is particularly relevant for Small 
Island Developing States, where single events can have devastating effects on the 
economy and public finances.12
The joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries 
could be enhanced by a mandatory analysis of the impact of climate-related risks on 
debt sustainability. Such assessment could also be rolled out to climate vulnerable 
middle income countries.
The COVID-19 crisis has worsened public finances in V20 countries. Going forward, 
many developing countries will require debt relief to respond effectively to the crisis and 
undertake meaningful investment to climate-proof their economies. For now, the 
international financial architecture still lacks an adequate system for addressing 
situations where sovereign debt becomes unsustainable. The IMF could explore 
options for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, as was originally proposed by 
the IMF two decades ago (IMF 2003), to deal with debt crises. In this context, the IMF 
could also investigate options for developing a new framework for debt restructuring 
that facilitate a green recovery, including through tools such as debt-for-climate swaps 
(Akhtar et al. 2020).
6.7 Developing the IMF Toolkit for Climate Emergency Financing
The IMF can further develop its existing emergency financing facilities or generate 
options for a new climate emergency financing facility. This is particularly relevant for 
Small Island Developing States though options should be explored as well to include 
other climate vulnerable countries.
One option is to raise access under the RCF/RFI, e.g. up to 400-500 percent of quota. 
Moreover, options should be explored to convert these facilities into grants, particularly 
for PRGT-eligible countries. A further option would be to establish an entirely new 
climate emergency facility. The IMF could consider linking a climate disaster facility to 
the issuance of SDRs, which would benefit only countries hit by climate disasters.
6.8 Exploring Options to Use SDRs to Support Climate Vulnerable Countries
The IMF could consider the possibility of allocating new SDRs as a way of providing 
vulnerable countries with enhanced liquidity. While a general SDR allocation would 
primarily benefit large economies,13 options could be explored where rich countries, 
whose historic carbon emissions are the main cause of anthropogenic climate change, 
make their SDRs available to a new multilateral swap facility or donate their SDRs to a 
trust fund at the IMF, which could use them in a way that benefits climate vulnerable 
countries. Another option would be to develop a mechanism where new SDRs are 
issued exclusively to climate vulnerable countries. Such an SDR issuance could be 
linked to exogenous shocks such as climate-induced disasters, eliminating problems 
with moral hazard. As climate vulnerable countries that have hardly contributed to 
global climate change suffer the biggest impacts, SDR issuances for climate vulnerable 
countries could be a way of enhancing resilience and global climate justice at the same 
time. 
6.9 Supporting the Design and Implementation of Carbon Pricing Mechanisms
The second V20 Ministerial Dialogue in Washington, DC in April 2016 reiterated strong 
support for innovative revenue generating fiscal and financial measures to raise 
finance, stimulate technological innovation and redirect investment toward climate 
resilient and low-emissions development. In this respect, the V20 committed to support 
carbon pricing by working to establish pricing regimes by 2026 taking due 
consideration of each country’s respective capabilities.
Building on its work on its work in using fiscal tools to mitigate climate change (IMF, 
2019b), the IMF could support V20 countries in strengthening their fiscal framework 
and revenue outcomes through the design and implementation of appropriate carbon 
pricing mechanisms. Carbon tax revenues could be redistributed to support 
low-income households or communities affected by the low carbon transition or that 
are hit particularly hard by the physical effects of climate change.
6.10 Institutionalising Collaboration between the Fund and the V20
The current governance structure of multilateral development institutions, including the 
IMF, provides, for the most part, relatively little influence to vulnerable developing 
countries. This poor representation means that when agendas are set and decisions 
are made, vulnerable developing countries do not have the same voice as large 
countries or groups such as the G7 and G20. This matters not just in terms of securing 
robust country ownership of global financial responses but also in terms of establishing 
measures more responsive to distinct national circumstances.
The V20 has the ability to coordinate the position of vulnerable developing countries 
including small island developing states and nations that typically lack representation 
on monetary and development issues in the deliberations and decisions of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions. In particular, the V20 can feed into the agendas of the International 
Monetary and Financial Committee and the joint World Bank-IMF Development 
Committee, as well as in other relevant fora.
To provide a platform to climate vulnerable developing countries to articulate their 
views and interests, the IMF should recognise the V20 as an official stakeholder and 
hold regular consultations with the V20. Joint agendas are critical in order to develop a 
joint understanding and solutions to the problems created by climate change. Since 
October 2015, the V20 finance ministers have met biannually with the World Bank at the 
Annual and Spring Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank Group. The IMF could join 
the World Bank in holding regular, bi-annual meetings with the V20. A continuous 
exchange between the IMF and the V20 would provide the opportunity to develop and 
implement a joint action agenda.
7. Conclusion
The V20 economies face considerable macrofinancial risks that can undermine debt 
sustainability, constrain fiscal space, and worsen sovereign risk, among other effects. 
Most financial and monetary authorities of climate vulnerable countries are in the early 
stages of analysing these risks and incorporating them in their macrofinancial 
frameworks. They also face the urgent and growing need to develop more effective 
approaches that climate-proof public finances and establish climate and disaster risk 
management structures.
The IMF has a critical role in addressing climate change through its policy advice and 
capacity building functions, surveillance, and the promotion of policy frameworks to 
mobilise investments. The IMF has recently started to put greater emphasis on climate 
risk and is in the process of developing its strategy and capacities in this area. There 
seems to be a clear demand among climate vulnerable countries for support from the 
IMF in all three areas of its operational work, i.e. surveillance, technical assistance and 
training, and emergency lending and crisis support. A partnership between the V20 and 
IMF could help climate vulnerable countries to better mitigate and manage systemic 
climate risks, and enable a macroeconomic environment that can facilitate investments 
in adaptation and development.
6.4 Exploring synergies between Fiscal and Monetary Policies 
The IMF could explore synergies between fiscal and monetary policies as well as 
macroprudential regulations to identify an optimal policy mix that would enhance 
finance for development oriented towards just transition outcomes while improving 
economic competitiveness and ensuring macrofinancial stability. In this regard, closer 
collaboration between financial institutions acting on climate finance, including 
development finance institutions, central banks and financial regulators, would be 
crucial. By considering the materiality of forward-looking climate risks in the design of 
fiscal and financial policies, the IMF could support its membership in general, and 
climate vulnerable countries in particular, in building resilience to such risks while 
scaling up investments needed to achieve climate targets. Not doing so could lead to a 
disorderly transition leading to increasing liabilities and stranding risk for both public 
and private sector, generating adverse effects on financial stability and inequality.
6.5 Mainstreaming of Climate Risk Analysis in Public Financial Management and 
Supporting the Development of a Climate Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance 
Architecture
Through policy advice and technical assistance, the IMF can support climate vulnerable 
countries in climate-proofing public finances. In particular, the IMF can encourage and 
provide advice to finance ministries on how to analyse the potential impacts of climate 
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change on the medium- to long-term quality and sustainability of public finances and 
mainstream climate risk analysis in public financial management. Based on climate 
vulnerability assessments, the IMF can help finance ministries identify potential risks 
on the expenditure and revenue side. The IMF could also support V20 countries in 
incorporating fiscal buffers for climate-related risks in budget planning. In particular, it 
could help promote budgetary instruments for ex ante disaster financing, including 
contingency lines and disaster, reserve, or contingency savings funds (Cevik and Huang 
2018).
Since debt sustainability can be affected by a country’s ability to absorb shocks, it is 
important that governments of climate vulnerable countries are supported in 
developing contingency plans including options for securing pre-arranged and 
pre-agreed pricing of risk transfer instruments. The IMF could support the development 
of an international climate disaster risk financing and insurance architecture that 
addresses different layers of risks and provides vulnerable countries with instruments 
for climate and disaster financing (Ahmed et al. 2020).
To enhance debt sustainability, the IMF could promote a discussion around adding 
natural disaster clauses to sovereign debt contracts and the use of instruments such as 
GDP-linked bonds. Moreover, the IMF could seek to enhance transparency of public 
debt contracts, and support governments in asserting that assumptions and terms or 
clauses of debt contracts are realistic and sustainable.
By supporting climate vulnerable countries in strengthening public debt management, 
the IMF can contribute to enhanced debt sustainability and enable a better accounting 
for climate risks and investment opportunities that deliver high socio-economic and 
adaptation dividends in public budgets.
6.6 Supporting Climate Vulnerable Countries with Debt Sustainability Problems
The IMF could play an important role in supporting climate vulnerable countries that are 
facing debt sustainability challenges or are already in debt distress. As recently 
highlighted by Georgieva et al. (2020), a “reform of the international debt architecture is 
urgently needed”. The IMF (2020i) has recently put forward reform options for the 
international architecture for resolving sovereign debt involving private-sector creditors. 
Together with the V20, the IMF could explore options for the treatment of climate debt, 
i.e. public debt that has been incurred as a direct result of climate disasters or 
necessary adaptation measures (Volz 2020). This is particularly relevant for Small 
Island Developing States, where single events can have devastating effects on the 
economy and public finances.12
The joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries 
could be enhanced by a mandatory analysis of the impact of climate-related risks on 
debt sustainability. Such assessment could also be rolled out to climate vulnerable 
middle income countries.
The COVID-19 crisis has worsened public finances in V20 countries. Going forward, 
many developing countries will require debt relief to respond effectively to the crisis and 
undertake meaningful investment to climate-proof their economies. For now, the 
international financial architecture still lacks an adequate system for addressing 
situations where sovereign debt becomes unsustainable. The IMF could explore 
options for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, as was originally proposed by 
the IMF two decades ago (IMF 2003), to deal with debt crises. In this context, the IMF 
could also investigate options for developing a new framework for debt restructuring 
that facilitate a green recovery, including through tools such as debt-for-climate swaps 
(Akhtar et al. 2020).
6.7 Developing the IMF Toolkit for Climate Emergency Financing
The IMF can further develop its existing emergency financing facilities or generate 
options for a new climate emergency financing facility. This is particularly relevant for 
Small Island Developing States though options should be explored as well to include 
other climate vulnerable countries.
One option is to raise access under the RCF/RFI, e.g. up to 400-500 percent of quota. 
Moreover, options should be explored to convert these facilities into grants, particularly 
for PRGT-eligible countries. A further option would be to establish an entirely new 
climate emergency facility. The IMF could consider linking a climate disaster facility to 
the issuance of SDRs, which would benefit only countries hit by climate disasters.
6.8 Exploring Options to Use SDRs to Support Climate Vulnerable Countries
The IMF could consider the possibility of allocating new SDRs as a way of providing 
vulnerable countries with enhanced liquidity. While a general SDR allocation would 
primarily benefit large economies,13 options could be explored where rich countries, 
whose historic carbon emissions are the main cause of anthropogenic climate change, 
make their SDRs available to a new multilateral swap facility or donate their SDRs to a 
trust fund at the IMF, which could use them in a way that benefits climate vulnerable 
countries. Another option would be to develop a mechanism where new SDRs are 
issued exclusively to climate vulnerable countries. Such an SDR issuance could be 
linked to exogenous shocks such as climate-induced disasters, eliminating problems 
with moral hazard. As climate vulnerable countries that have hardly contributed to 
global climate change suffer the biggest impacts, SDR issuances for climate vulnerable 
countries could be a way of enhancing resilience and global climate justice at the same 
time. 
6.9 Supporting the Design and Implementation of Carbon Pricing Mechanisms
The second V20 Ministerial Dialogue in Washington, DC in April 2016 reiterated strong 
support for innovative revenue generating fiscal and financial measures to raise 
finance, stimulate technological innovation and redirect investment toward climate 
resilient and low-emissions development. In this respect, the V20 committed to support 
carbon pricing by working to establish pricing regimes by 2026 taking due 
consideration of each country’s respective capabilities.
Building on its work on its work in using fiscal tools to mitigate climate change (IMF, 
2019b), the IMF could support V20 countries in strengthening their fiscal framework 
and revenue outcomes through the design and implementation of appropriate carbon 
pricing mechanisms. Carbon tax revenues could be redistributed to support 
low-income households or communities affected by the low carbon transition or that 
are hit particularly hard by the physical effects of climate change.
6.10 Institutionalising Collaboration between the Fund and the V20
The current governance structure of multilateral development institutions, including the 
IMF, provides, for the most part, relatively little influence to vulnerable developing 
countries. This poor representation means that when agendas are set and decisions 
are made, vulnerable developing countries do not have the same voice as large 
countries or groups such as the G7 and G20. This matters not just in terms of securing 
robust country ownership of global financial responses but also in terms of establishing 
measures more responsive to distinct national circumstances.
The V20 has the ability to coordinate the position of vulnerable developing countries 
including small island developing states and nations that typically lack representation 
on monetary and development issues in the deliberations and decisions of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions. In particular, the V20 can feed into the agendas of the International 
Monetary and Financial Committee and the joint World Bank-IMF Development 
Committee, as well as in other relevant fora.
To provide a platform to climate vulnerable developing countries to articulate their 
views and interests, the IMF should recognise the V20 as an official stakeholder and 
hold regular consultations with the V20. Joint agendas are critical in order to develop a 
joint understanding and solutions to the problems created by climate change. Since 
October 2015, the V20 finance ministers have met biannually with the World Bank at the 
Annual and Spring Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank Group. The IMF could join 
the World Bank in holding regular, bi-annual meetings with the V20. A continuous 
exchange between the IMF and the V20 would provide the opportunity to develop and 
implement a joint action agenda.
7. Conclusion
The V20 economies face considerable macrofinancial risks that can undermine debt 
sustainability, constrain fiscal space, and worsen sovereign risk, among other effects. 
Most financial and monetary authorities of climate vulnerable countries are in the early 
stages of analysing these risks and incorporating them in their macrofinancial 
frameworks. They also face the urgent and growing need to develop more effective 
approaches that climate-proof public finances and establish climate and disaster risk 
management structures.
The IMF has a critical role in addressing climate change through its policy advice and 
capacity building functions, surveillance, and the promotion of policy frameworks to 
mobilise investments. The IMF has recently started to put greater emphasis on climate 
risk and is in the process of developing its strategy and capacities in this area. There 
seems to be a clear demand among climate vulnerable countries for support from the 
IMF in all three areas of its operational work, i.e. surveillance, technical assistance and 
training, and emergency lending and crisis support. A partnership between the V20 and 
IMF could help climate vulnerable countries to better mitigate and manage systemic 
climate risks, and enable a macroeconomic environment that can facilitate investments 
in adaptation and development.
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Annex 1: Survey questionnaire




Agency (indicate one): Ministry of Finance / Central Bank
General questions
Has your organisation taken steps to understand climate impacts and risks 
over the next 10-20 years?
Very little/Some analysis/ Extensive analysis/Don’t know
Has your organisation been involved in efforts to reduce these impacts,  
such as through better planning and investing in a more climate-resilient 
economy, financial sector, and infrastructure?
Yes/No/Don’t know
Has your organisation taken steps to better manage the residual impacts 
that can’t be reduced, such as through scaled up reserves, contingency 
finance or financial safety nets?
Yes/No/Don’t know
Climate impacts and risks have been discussed in previous exchanges with 
the IMF, whether technical assistance discussions or Article IV 
consultations. 
Yes/No/Don’t know
Do you have the impression that IMF staff are knowledgeable in matters 
relating to macrofinancial risks of climate change? 
Yes/No/Don’t know
Surveillance
Should the IMF include a mandatory section on climate risks in its Article IV 








Should the IMF include a mandatory section on climate-related financial 
risks in the Financial Sector Assessment Program assessments it conducts 
together with the World Bank? 
Yes/No/Don’t know
Should the joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for 
Low-Income Countries be enhanced by an analysis of the impact of 
climate-related financing needs and risks on debt sustainability? 
Yes/No/Don’t know
Technical assistance and training
To date, has the IMF offered any technical advice on mitigating climate risks 
for public finances and the economy, or on developing disaster risk 
management? 
Yes/No/Don’t know
If Yes: Please provide details. ______
Would you like to see support from the IMF in designing carbon taxes for 
your country? Yes/No/Don’t know
Would you like to see support from the IMF in developing a national approach 
for “greening” the financial sector and help it to better address 
climate-related financial risks? 
Yes/No/Don’t know
Is there interest to have support from the IMF in developing an energy 
transition scenario analysis? 
Yes/No/Don’t kno
Should the IMF support its member countries’ financial and monetary 
authorities in developing capacities to better assess climate risks, e.g. via 
climate stress-testing, to inform the design of fiscal, monetary or prudential 
policies? 
Yes/No/Don’t know
Should the IMF support member countries in strengthening public debt 
management to enable them to better account for climate risks in public 
budgets? 
Yes/No/Don’t know
Should the IMF support governments in developing contingency plans and 
securing pre-arranged contingent financing facilities from different sources, 






















Emergency lending and crisis support
What are the biggest financing constraints you face in terms of investing in 
pre-disaster resilience, disaster preparedness, and ex-post disaster 
response?
Please provide details. ______
Has your country so far received financial support from the IMF in the 
context of a climate-related disaster? 
Yes/No/Don’t know
If Yes: Please provide details, including the facility/instrument. ______
Do you think the IMF should adjust its lending facilities or develop new 
instruments to support climate vulnerable countries? 
Yes/No/Don’t know
If Yes: Please provide details on what you may have in mind. ______
Should the IMF raise access under the Rapid Credit Facility and the Rapid 
Financing Instrument? 
Yes/No/Don’t know
Should the IMF explore linking a new climate disaster facility to an issuance 
of SDRs, which would benefit only countries hit by climate disasters? 
Yes/No/Don’t know
Debt sustainability
Should the IMF explore options for a special treatment of climate debt, i.e. 
public debt that has been incurred as a direct result of climate disasters or 
necessary adaptation measures? 
Yes/No/Don’t know
Should the IMF promote the addition of natural disaster clauses to sovereign 
debt contracts? 
Yes/No/Don’t know
Should the IMF promote the use of instruments such as GDP-linked bonds or 
catastrophe bonds that reduce debt burdens in case of a (climate) disaster? 
Yes/No/Don’t know
Should the IMF work on a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism? 
Yes/No/Don’t know







Would it be helpful to have an overview of critical metrics on what can be 
considered “unsustainable debt” vs. “sustainable debt”? 
Yes/No/Don’t know
Final questions
Besides the issues already discussed, what kind of support from the IMF 
would be helpful for your country for addressing climate risks? 
Please provide details. ______
Are there any other issues you would like to highlight? 
Yes/No
If Yes: ______
Additional question (in relation to the World Bank) for IDA-eligible countries
For IDA-eligible countries: What aspects of IDA’s crisis finance toolkit 
(including core IDA, IDA Regional Window, Crisis Response Window, etc.) are 
working best? What aspects are not working? How could they improve?
Please provide details. ______
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